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April 5, 2001
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 485
Arrest - Role of the Yugoslav Army

Set Up Politics

by Roksanda Nincic

In order to be able to understand the whole story, it is important to define the parameters within which it unfolded.  The decision for Milosevic to be arrested was made by authorized officials in the Government of Serbia.  Several hours following the beginning of the police action to arrest Milosevic the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia still did not officially inform the Yugoslav Army what was happening, despite the fact that tensions between the police and the army units detailed to guarding the residence of the former president were rapidly mounting.  Whatever the explanation for this, it certainly hindered the efficiency of the action which could have, and had to be carried out with far greater gravity.

Army General Milivoje Bojovic, Commander of the Yugoslav Army Guard Brigade detailed to securing the presidential complex in Dedinje’s Uzicka Street, where Slobodan Milosevic used to live until the time of his arrest, explained for VREME the unfolding of events from the point of view of the Yugoslav Army.  However, prior to this explanation, he insisted on reiterating the fact that the “status of the former president of the FRY was never adequately resolved in terms of his place of residence,” following the changes which took place last year, but that “this is a matter that is neither in the jurisdiction of the Yugoslav Army, nor the Ministry of Internal Affairs.”  Besides this, the issue of Milosevic’s personal staff of bodyguards, which has remained the same as when he was president of the FRY, was never adequately dealt with.

It is probably known by every citizens of Yugoslavia that Milosevic and his family and house in 11 Uzicka Street in Belgrade’s posh district of Dedinje were guarded by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, while the Army, from its two buildings located on the grounds of the presidential residence, guards the gates and all approaches to the presidential estate, ensuring that “no terrorist group penetrates and kills Milosevic.”  However, while Milosevic was in power, the Guard Brigade acted more as porters at the entrance to the presidential estate, because neither Bojovic nor Pavkovic had the authority to permit anyone to enter the presidential grounds, without first getting the green light from the oval building instead the fenced grounds where Milosevic used to live.

COOPERATION:  Until March 30, this state of affairs was not objected to by anyone.  Army General Bojovic stated for VREME that his cooperation and understanding with Police General Senta Milenkovic, Chief of the Directorate for Personal Security in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, who was entrusted with guarding Milosevic in Uzicka Street, in Karadjordjevo, in Dubasnica and in all other places where the former president used to reside or visit and where his entire entourage of Yugoslav Army and Serbian Police used to escort and guard him.

On March 23 things began to change, when General Pavkovic, Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army, was summoned by Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs, Dusan Mihajlovic, to meet with him at the Ministry.  He brought with him Generals Bojovic and Djakovic, as well as Colonel Petar Kovacevic.  Later on Mihajlovic accused all three Yugoslav Army officers of obstructing Milosevic’s arrest.  At this meeting at the Ministry of Internal Affairs also present were senior federal policemen, Milos Potkrajac and Zlatko Radnic.  Officers of the Yugoslav Army were informed at that point that the Directorate for Personal Security of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs would not be required any longer to guard the former president and that the Yugoslav Ministry of Police would take over, with a Sixth Directorate within the formation of the State Security Service would be formed for that purpose.

Three days later, a new meeting was held which Bojovic and Kovacevic attended as representatives of the Yugoslav Army, with representatives of the police at that meeting being Potkrajac and Radnic, as well as Senta’s deputies, colonels Manasijevic and Reseta, the latter better known as the personal bodyguard of Mihalj Kertes.  The Police informed the Army that Potkrajac will take over charge from Senta Milenkovic and that the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs will officially notify the Yugoslav Army taking over charge, at which point a list of persons on Milosevic’s staff of bodyguards who will be replaced will be submitted, along with information when the takeover of charge is scheduled to take place.  “We were told that only four people on Milosevic’s staff of bodyguards will be replaced, while everyone else, along with the entire security staff at the presidential residence will remain unchanged,” Bojovic told VREME, adding that it was his distinct impression that something was about to happen.  “I asked General Susic, Chief of the President’s Military Cabinet, to ask Mr. President whether something was about to happen.  He told me that he made inquires and was told that nothing special is being planned.”

“MINOR DIFFICULTIES”:  On the surface, not much did happen in actual fact until March 30.  “That day I went to Cacak – had I known anything was up, I would not have gone on that trip.”

General Bojovic was contacted by phone from Belgrade and told that “there are minor difficulties” at the presidential estate in Uzicka Street, that a group of policemen from the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs came with Potkrajac to take over charge from Slobodan Milosevic’s security staff, but that the agreement on official notification from the State Security Service had not been respected, and that Manasijevic refuses to budge.  Potkrajac stated that he has his orders and is ready to enter the grounds of the presidential estate even by force, should that be necessary, while Manasijevic responded by saying that his orders are also to shoot, should that be necessary.

General Bojovic’s deputy, Colonel Cosic (separately accused by Minister Mihajlovic for obstruction), called General Pavkovic, Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army, who in turn summoned Cosic, Potkrajac and Manasijevic to his cabinet.  However, they all returned to their positions in Uzicka Street in apparent discord.  Potkrajac refused to negotiate with Manasijevic, asserting that he is his superior by rank.  The number of policemen from the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs steadily increased in front of the presidential estate, along with the number of civilians who also flocked to the same place.

General Bojovic returned from Cacak.  Potkrajac told him that despite prior understandings, he is now under direct orders from Minister Mihajlovic.  Bojovic went to see Pavkovic, Pavkovic called Mihajlovic and told him that the situation is “tight”, the lads on the inside barricaded themselves, threats are being made on both sides of the fence, etc.  The Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army called Yugoslav President Kostunica who told him that everyone must take responsibility for their part of the job.

NON-INVOLVEMENT:  General Pavkovic told General Bojovic, with General Bojovic relaying the message to Cosic, that orders are that the Yugoslav Army must not desert its positions, that there must not be any involvement in the conflict and that weapons must not be used.

Within less than ten minutes, Minister Mihajlovic called General Pavkovic to tell him that the Army is not allowing the Serbian Police to do its job.  General Pavkovic inquired of General Bojovic what Cosic is up to.  General Bojovic answered – “nothing in particular.”  Then the Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army told the Serbian Minister of Police that the Yugoslav Army cannot desert its post, that it will not get involved in any conflict, and suggested to the Minister that “both the one and the other side are yours.”

In the next one hour, General Pavkovic contacted President Kostunica no less than three times, stating that he is under great pressure and that he must know the president’s position on the situation at hand, with his, Pavkovic’s, personal recommendation being that the Army should be withdrawn.  President Kostunica agreed, General Bojovic sat in his vehicle and returned to Uzicka Street.  At the military outhouse on the presidential estate he met Potkrajac and several officers from Milosevic’s “new” security staff, Colonel Cosic and Manasijevic.  General Bojovic told them – “good thing you are all here” and told them that the Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army issued an order for all members of the Guard Brigade to withdraw from the position at the presidential estate.  “We will take our personal weapons and our personal equipment, and you, officer Manasijevic, you should know that the Army no longer has any jurisdiction here and that you are responsible for everything that happens.  We will give you all the lists and everything, you have ten minutes to take charge of the entrance gate and all the approaches to the house, and you, Colonel Cosic, summon your soldiers and guards and report to the Army barracks.”

“I handed the rapport to Mr. Potrkajac.  We left him everything, except for ammunition and our jackets.  A little past midnight, on the night between March 30 and 31, I was in my office in Bulevar Mira.  I informed the Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army that all my men have been withdrawn, along with individuals on the list given to me.  He told me – ‘good, we’ll wait and see what happens,’” the Commander of the Guard Brigade told us, adding that representatives of the Yugoslav Army asked the police the following question at the meeting held with Kostunica on March 31: if we stood in your way until Friday, past midnight, how is it possible that it took you two entire days to resolve the problem?

POLICE ARSENAL:  General Bojovic answered two apparently key questions.  First: why did the Army permit entry to the presidential estate in Uzicka Street to all of Milosevic’s civilian supporters, including those who were armed, and did not allow members of the Serbian Police to enter the estate, given that they came at the order of the Serbian Minister of Police?

“I already explained that according to existing regulations, we could only permit access to the presidential estate to those people we were ordered by the residents of the Oval Building to admit.  In any case, those paramilitary units, headed by Igic and Zecevic were on the estate grounds long before any problems arose.”

Second: how did it come to pass that the arsenal of weapons on the presidential estate included all those automatic rifles, sniper rifles, rocket launchers, grenades, etc.?

“Senta took those weapons from the arsenal of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs for those 50-60 people on Milosevic’s security staff.  It is well known what weapons they had with them, although such weapons are not unusual for securing a president.  Heavy weapons were mostly brought to Uzicka Street during the war in 1999, when there was danger of attack from NATO special forces on the presidential estate,” General Bojic explained for VREME, claiming unequivocally that “no single piece of armament came from the Yugoslav Army.”

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