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August 31, 1992
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 49
Interview: Ivica Racan, Leftist in Croatia

Waiting for a Better Hand

by Svetlana Vasovic

Do the last elections mean an end of the fall and the possible beginning of an upward turn for the leftists?

It was with amazement that the governing party came to the conclusion that we had somehow retained our position as a parliamentary party, and one that in the last two months has succeeded in picking itself up considerably. Even though the media by way of trumped up surveys had already buried us and foreseen a mere 1.5 to 2 percent of the votes, we succeeded in attaining a lot more. Not only were the surveys methodically incorrect and unrealistic, but the people, who were surveyed by telephone, were afraid to support us, in the fear of bugging and manipulation... In any case, things are not easy for the democratic left. We have a bad hand and we know we have to play well with these cards.

Or try to bluff...

That is also a way of playing. However, the political game which is being played here no longer resembles open poker which means it is no longer possible to rely too much on bluff. Simply put, we must wait for a good hand and then we can play well! I am convinced that such a hand will come soon, just as soon as the question of the war and borders is settled, when everything is concentrated on the social questions and problems of the democracy here where the left can prove itself. This will be our chance.

 

How much of the voting body can you count on at the moment?

 

About 9 - 10 percent of the voters. This is the left, the "bad cards", at the moment. However, I think that a much more important fact is that the right is even more divided, considering that at these elections they practically experienced defeat. This is one of the good sides of the last elections. The defeat of the right was brought about by the maturity of Croatian citizens who in times of war voted for the status quo and in the main voted for the Croatian Democratic Alliance (HDZ). It may not look like this to you in Belgrade, but for us here Tudjman and the HDZ are not the worst thing that could happen to us. In Croatia the evil of neo-fascist rightwingers could have taken hold, and this would certainly have been a triumph for Milosevic, because it would have been established that "Croatia is Ustasha". The desire to show everything in Croatia as "Ustasha" is ridiculous; amongst other things I myself was a few years ago proclaimed and "recognized" as "the chief Ustasha in Croatia", even though I was born in a concentration camp and have experienced the cruel effects of fascism...

With his generalized naming of "Ustasha", Milosevic has done a disservice to the democratic forces in Croatia.

 

Nevertheless, at the coming meeting of the Sabor (General Assembly), despite the fact you have survived the elections, you won't be able to do much.

 

Well, up to now, even when we had many representatives, as much as 80, we were not able to do much; we have always been criticized by the non-parliamentary opposition of being incompetent. Now that same opposition, primarily HSZS and HNS, which has also entered the parliament, will be able to show for themselves how much they can do. But if the governing party does not change the course of its politics and doesn't notice that there exists an immense difference between the constitution of the voting body and the constitution of the Sabor, then it will itself exacerbate the political situation. If the HDZ doesn't move towards a rule of tolerance and compromise, the present government won't be bale to stay in the saddle for the next four years. There is a possibility that before the expiry of its mandate we get a government of national unity or a transitional government.

 

Was there a time when you were still in the Presidency of the Central Committee of the Alliance of Communists of Yugoslavia that you could have foreseen the present situation?

 

Three and a half years ago I said to Milosevic, at some meeting, that his "politics of greater Serbian nationalism, by which he wanted in his own measure to rearrange Yugoslavia, would have to provoke contra-nationalism and conflict which no-one would be able to stop". I even told his that he would maybe "cause a war and that he himself would fall in blood and amongst his own people to boot". It is recorded in the minutes. But I can't refrain from saying, even though it sounds funny today, that none of this need have happened.

 

While you were still in power, was it really impossible, with the support of other liberal communists in Yugoslavia, to prevent this move in Serbian politics?

 

Yes, it was impossible. Certain powerful individuals made a pact with Slobodan Milosevic. Because of this, under the famous "Croatian silence" grew a resistance, a resistance it was later not possible to stop. I was then an extreme minority, and unlike Slovenian partners who were more wily, I did not have the Croatian people behind me. In 1989, when in my report at one meeting I sought a multi-party system, I was immediately attacked by comrade generals and the demand was thrown out of the conclusion. Milosevic tolerated me because I wasn't dangerous to him, and at the same time I served as proof of his liberalism. This is how Milosevic succeeded in realizing his plan at the expense of all the Yugoslav nations, and particularly at the expense of the Serbs.

 

Do you think Milosevic's plan will succeed because his moves are being copied by Franjo Tudjman and other politicians of the newly formed Balkan states, which means that the change of the geographical map of this part of the world is realistic and inevitable?

 

The ethnic map of this area is definitely changing. Whether the borders will change is not yet clear and this is the straw to be clutched at by certain democratic and European forces. I myself am more and more skeptical, even though I am hard on the line of defending the existing borders. However, this war has already carried out an enormous ethnic shift and caused such deep chasms in the relations between the nations that we ourselves won't ever be able to improve them. Even with the help of Europe it will be very difficult. But there is another possibility open - because of Milosevic's politics the fate of the Serbs, particularly Serbs outside Serbia, could be very like that of the Sudeten Germans after the Second World War. Croatia definitely won't be left without its territories, the question is how many Serbs will stay in these territories.

 

 

 

I understood the crime of a policy that manipulates with people, despair and dissatisfaction. At that time, with the Serbs from Kosovo, later in Vojvodina (leaving out those in Montenegro), and very soon afterwards, with the Serbs in Croatia. And we are all paying the price. It was then that I understood the malevolence of that policy which was prepared to go to the very end, to bloodshed. I took very seriously the threat by Milosevic that in the defence of the Serbs, in his articulation of Serb interests, war was not excluded. I realized that his policy was leading us into the abyss. Serbs and others alike. He will force on generations of Serbs, like it was with generations of Germans, an awful feeling of guilt. And this is why this kind of policy is malevolent, primarily towards Serbs.

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