Coup D'etat Without a State

The fault lines along which the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) threatens to disintegrate were apparent already on October 6, last year.  Those fault lines are a part of the fundamental political line of division in the Balkans which figures much like the St. Andrew's rift in California that holds the permanent promise of an endless abyss.  These are the lines of division between the nationalists and everyone else - a basic, fundamental division into two irreconcilable points of view.  Everything else here arises from this teaming and unavoidable conflict: various positions toward the Hague and war crimes, the debate on religious education in state schools, the haggling with Montenegro, the mudslinging directed at Nebojsa Covic, etc.  Once again we see at work the ancient conflict between the old and new schools of thought, between traditionalists and modernists, a subject which Latinka Perovic treated exhaustively.

These fault lines became apparent immediately, from the outset, in President Vojislav Kostunica's three favorite issues - "moderate nationalism," "legalism" and "continuity."  The present situation in DOS is merely an escalation - a deterioration, that is - of the irreconcilable differences which are integral to this ad hoc coalition.  There are considerable similarities between this and what was seen in the January 2000 elections in Croatian and later, up to today, but the lessons of this have been unfortunately overlooked by nearly everyone here.  Pre-election, ad hoc coalitions are a dangerous, transient affair: the sooner they fall apart after having achieved their objective, the better, because their coming to power merely brings to life the latent differences integral to such constructions.  When strategic, vital decisions are at hand, these differences invariably crop up and threaten the coalitional fabric itself, perhaps even its original, fundamental objectives.  For instance, when Slobodan Milosevic was extradited to the Hague, President Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) clamored at the top of its voice; today, in Croatia, Drazen Budisa's HSLS is doing the same thing with regard to the extradition of two Croatian generals to the Hague.  Both Kostunica and Budisa consider themselves "moderate" and "intellectual" nationalists; both of them believe that their respective parties faired poorly in their respective coalitional governments; both of them believe that the Hague Tribunal is expressly intended against their respective peoples.

Today Vojislav Kostunica is talking about a "controlled coup d'etat" which facilitated the extradition of Milosevic to the Hague; furthermore, he feels like a hostage because of this.  Now he says that "the consequences of this action should be controlled", but how this is to be done is not entirely clear.  There are several possibilities: that Milosevic gets a limited prison sentence; that no one else be extradited to the Hague; that the parliament (regardless of its final makeup) should adopt, based on the Croatian model, some type of "Declaration On Dignity Of A War For Greater Serbia";  that the DSS gets far more ministerial seats in the Serbian Parliament; that Nebojsa Covic be forbidden to work in politics; that skipping class for state school students during religious classes be declared a crime; that all the corpses exhumed from various mass graves be buried anew and that all investigations of this issue be halted immediately; that the Donators Conference be informed that Serbia does not intend to take a single cent of the 1.3 billion dollars donated to it; that Nebojsa Pavkovic, Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army be promoted to the rank of army general and that Rade Markovic, Milosevic's Chief of State Security, indicted and recently sentenced, be pardoned and reinstated to his former post; etc.

It would be well and it seems that the time for this has come, for all cards to be finally put on the table.  Kostunica should explain whether he thinks that Milosevic's project was of a criminal nature or whether he thinks otherwise; Miroljub Lesnjak (DSS representative for Vojvodina) should explain why the exhumation of mass graves is "immoral" and whether their continued concealment would hence be moral; Marko Jaksic (DSS representative for Kosovo) should declare himself once and for all on why Nebojsa Covic's plan for getting back the land security zone in the South of Serbia is wrong and should make it clear which way is the right way for Kosovo.

THREE ISSUES:  Here is where we come up against the three issues of vital importance to Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica and to the Democratic Party of Serbia.  "Moderate nationalism" is a moral oxymoron; "moderate" nationalists should hardly have any reservations toward the extradition of war criminals and the discovery of war crimes; if they are "moderate," then nationalists ought not to be rubbing shoulders with nazi oriented organizations like "Obraz", nor should they attempt to smuggle religious education into state schools through rushed parliamentary procedure.  In all this the whole idea of "moderation" is somehow lost, for moderation is closely tied to the existing situation and local customs.  In his inaugural speech, delivered on October 7, Vojislav Kostunica promised, among other things, that "power will not change him."  This is precisely what we were afraid of, because there are those among us who remember what Kostunica and the DSS used to say while they were the opposition and when they could afford to speak that way.  Now that they are in power, some of their positions ought to be revised, and a slightly larger view of Serbia and its future ought to be taken into consideration - this assumes the extradition of Milosevic to the Hague and the ultimate abolition of Milosevic's politics.

Here we come to President Kostunica's second crucial issue - his famous "legalism."  A consistent "legalist" would have refused to accept the decision issued by the Federal Constitutional Court on October 6, and institution that is unquestionably illegitimate and corrupt, because on October 4 this same High Court reached a diametrically opposite decision, with October 5 having transpired in the meantime, so that the just Court found it advisable to conclude the exact opposite of what it concluded on October 4.  In this way this High Court and all its members at that time left themselves open to a criminal indictment because they abused their positions in causing extensive public unrests when enormous material damages were incurred and human lives were lost.  Had the court concluded on October 4 on the basis of the same information available to it on both October 5 and October 6, all this excitement would have been avoided.  Today President Vojislav Kostunica is pointing precisely to this shameless fickleness in support of his argument that the Federal Constitutional Court is a legitimate, honest institution: did it not acknowledge his victory on October 6?  And if such a High Court concludes that a federal government decree is unconstitutional and suspends it, how is now it possible for President Kostunica to contradict this same Court?

The very consistent "legalist" Kostunica is now questioning the decision adopted by the Government of Serbia on cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and is declaring the entire matter to be a "coup d'etat."  In all honesty, however, how else could we describe the events of October 5 than populist coup d'etat which unfolded in the streets in the name of justice and truthfulness?  Kostunice is entirely satisfied with one violent, political fait acomplis and is content with a Constitutional Court which, frozen with fear, rushed to acknowledge this same fait acomplis, but has "legalist" difficulties with a decision adopted by the Government of Serbia on the basis of existing laws.  Let us remember: the Serbian Government based its decision on Article 135 of the Serbian Constitution and on Article 16 of the Yugoslav Constitution.  And if anyone is unhappy with Article 16 of the Yugoslav Constitution, which automatically declares international laws and pacts to be legally binding for our state legal system, let him state so and let us then proceed annul our membership in the United Nations and in all other international organizations, pacts and agreements.

Had President Kostunica addressed the Federal Parliament, as was demanded of him, and used his authority in getting the Law On Cooperation With The Hague Tribunal passed in the form it was drafted in, Milosevic would still be in Belgrade's Central Prison.  The same would have happened had he offered support publicly for the Federal Government Decree, while explaining privately to the Montenegrins that they should not rock the boat.  At that time he could also have use the opportunity to consult the Federal Constitutional Court...  We have the perfect example of this in Croatia.

Kostunica's third crucial issue is "continuity."  This word has hardly ever been pronounced except in the context of statesmanship.  But the concept and principle is there and applies to other matters as well, not just to Nebojsa Pavkovic, the Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army, both under Milosevic and now under Kostunica.  As a case in point we have a federal state which was created by Milosevic and Djukanovic at Zabljak and which constantly had the ambition in terms of "continuity" to inherit the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  In the meantime, Montenegro mostly lost all interest in "continuity", except for Momir Bulatovic's impoverished tribesmen who have to be consulted by Zoran Zizic and Predrag Bulatovic for everything concerning affairs of state.  The first one to lose patience was Miroljub Labus: he told Zoran Zizic, Yugoslav Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, Yugoslav President and Zoran Djindjic, Serbian Prime Minister, that he is a little tired of doing Zizic's job and that he intends to take "a well deserved vacation", begging them to be so kind as to inform him when work will continue and "when an end is put to this farce."  The only logical way out of this situation are new federal elections in which all Montenegrin political parties will participate - OR, for Montenegro and Serbia to part with mutual respect, tolerance and in the interest of good neighborly relations.  Everything else is merely the prolongation of the agony, including the draft of the "Declaration On Protecting The Constitutional System" which is being submitted for debate to the Federal Parliament by the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the Yugoslav Left (JUL) and the Serbian Radical Party (SRS).  Vladan Batic sent a message to the SNP that they should not even think of voting for this law, or else...

FURTHER DEMANDS:  What Kostunica is calling a "coup d'etat" and "controlling consequences" of this has another dimension which is very much a part of "moderate nationalism," "legalism" and "continuity."  Of course, at issue are further demands which the Hague Tribunal can direct to us.  After St. Vitius' Day, Zoran Djindjic was fairly lackadaisical in promising that further extraditions will follow at a later date - figuring that Milosevic is a bite full on his own, and they need to digest him first before they get a further helping.  If anyone thinks that Milosevic's journey to Northern Europe will divert attention from Milan Milutinovic, Vljako Stojiljkovic, General Ojdanic, Nikola Sainovic, Sljivancanin, Mrksic, Radic and several other gentlemen, that that someone greatly errs.  The appetite of the Hague Tribunal is merely growing, with each new helping.  Its opponents have three options: to acknowledge the decision adopted by the Serbian Government on Cooperation With The Hague Tribunal; to take their time and procrastinate once again, with the result that the tenuous Yugoslav federation will entirely fall apart in this process; or to declare war against NATO, which was already defeated by us recently.  After this the predicted Armageddon will follow, with the Third World War which Radovan Karadzic announced recently unfolding - the final conflict between Good and Evil - but in all this we will not give up Milan Milutinovic, even if that means that the entire world must go to shreds.  In any case, last Monday, Mr. Garcevic (Socialist Party of Serbia MP in the Serbian Parliament), triumphantly announced that Slobodan Milosevic will return victorious back from the Hague...

NAME, RANK AND NUMBER:  Slobodan Milosevic has already gotten down to the business of constructing a triumphal return for himself from the Hague.  He does not want a lawyer, but only legal advisors who will instruct him in the details of the Tribunal's Statute and procedure, while he aims to deal with Carla del Ponte on his own.  Intelligent and experienced people already advised him that the outcome of this cannot be good for him, because God in all his wisdom had a reason for creating lawyers.  But he never listened to intelligent and experienced people in the past, and it got him this far.  He considers himself to be a political prisoner, a war prisoner of sorts who was arrested by the losing side which is now avenging itself against him for having defeated it in 1999.  There are intelligent and experienced lawyers who would advise him to defend himself differently, and not through political speeches.  The matter is simple: according to the Geneva Convention, a war prisoner is only required to state his name, rank and number - nothing else.  A political prisoner has only two ways to come out of a political court case without supporting his persecutors: to keep quite and to avoid all communication with the court (Mosadek, the leader of the Iranian revolt in 1953 managed to carry this through successfully; they did not dare to sentence him to more than exile to his place of birth where he died a natural death); or to swamp the court with such a thorough and successful defense that it will pass a not guilty sentence just to finish with the case.  Georgi Dimitrov managed to win his case in 1933 in Berlin in precisely this way (the indictment, setting fire to the Reichstag, was very shaky to begin with, and the German judiciary was still "undifferentiated").  Another successful case of the latter defense is that of a member of the 1968 protests in Yugoslavia where the accused managed to choke the judge with his endless speeches on Marxism and Leninism to the point that the judge released him from prison because he could not endure such verbal terror any longer.  Well, the indictment of Milosevic is slightly better founded than the one against Georgije Dimitrov, so that the coupd de theatre which will outdo the one in 1933 is hardly possible.

The fact that Milosevic's defense will impress the Russian Duma and Djuganov is all fine and well, but that is not enough.  It is also unlikely that the Hague Tribunal will be suffocated by Milosevic's speeches to the extent that they will release him from prison and will refuse him access to Dutch territory during his lifetime: they had opportunities to listen to more tiresome speeches, no doubt.  On the other hand, it is already clear that Milosevic has no intention of keeping quiet and refuses all cooperation with "this false tribunal;" he is getting ready to tell it to them straight to their faces, which will only make their job easier.  Namely, some people do not realize that Milosevic finished his role on the political state once and for all and that according to the exigencies of political logic, he needs to be gotten rid of once and for all, regardless of what they might think about his eventual guilt.  They learned everything from Milosevic, except for the most important thing - that politics is "a balance of power."  Djindjic and his government have learned this lesson well from Milosevic.  By contrast with them, Kostunica is following the example of Drazen Budisa and the HDZ: he would be willing to review the Hague Tribunal from its beginnings (1993), as if he himself is one of the signatories of the Dayton Agreement, and not Milosevic.  The right wing in Croatia (HDZ and HSLS) is now insisting that Croatian soldiers be considered like "allied soldiers following World War II," because victors, according to them, cannot commit a war crime - especially if they are Croats.  Is anyone willing to state this openly to the Serbian public: that a Serb is incapable of committing a war crime?  Brana Crncevic and others made such claims in 1991, but now they are not coming forth too strongly with such arguments.

This fall we will have an opportunity to watch Milosevic play the lead at the Hague Tribunal, so we will have an opportunity to watch the outcome live.  Milosevic will claim that the Hague Tribunal is "the victors' tribunal"; the Nurenberg trial served the same purpose, thank you very much; this same Milosevic, however, claimed and still continues to claim that he defeated NATO.  As a victor, he himself tried and sentenced his NATO enemies at Belgrade Regional Court after the bombing of Yugoslavia - everyone got a 20 year sentence above board.  There is only one difference: they are not in prison - he is.