Bulatovic On His Own

He was the last to be drawn into this war owing to the obviously premeditated dispute over the cape of Prevlaka, situated in Boka Kotorska. The idle Montenegrin youth rejoiced at the opportunity of maintaining the honourable "heroic" reputation of their ancestors. Thousands of reservists started for Dubrovnik as if they were going to a wedding, convinced that the "ustashi" will retreat in horror the minute they raise their powerful voice. Intoxicated with drink and confidence, most of them were killed straight away.

Momir Bulatovic was said to have been horrified at the news concerning the ransacking of Dubrovnik and that it was one of the main reasons for his disillusionment with this war. If these reports are true, he turned out to be naive. The Montenegrins were encouraged into participating with the reminders of the old Montenegrin traditions, where plunder was customary and did not constitute a major offence, especially when coupled with acts of bravery.

This time they seem to have been instigated by their personal triumphant conquest of the affluent Dubrovnik, where they used to feel inadequate. The nationalist propaganda has totally blocked out this socio- psychological motive. But, the fact that the war is turning out to be a disgrace is not the main reason Bulatovic decided to bail out, since he has been known in the past to bear disgrace with aplomb. Accounting for his change of heart he pointed to what caused great disappointment in Montenegro: the mass desertion of the Serbian reservists.

It turned out that there are more Montenegrin than Serbian soldiers, which would present no problem if the war operations were developing the way they were expecting. Since they realized that there is no hope of a quick victory, and not being at ease with the war aims, these allies began comparing their casualties. If money was an issue here the disparity could be tolerated, but the war puts to test the closest friendships. The impression was created that Serbia and the Army tolerate desertion and the evasion of mobilization. Milosevic has already exhibited the tendency to lumber others with the cost of war, with the help of the ethnically mixed Army fighting for the Serbian aims, while, at the same time, denouncing that Serbia is in war and that it has any interest in it.

The Montenegrins have realized that they are not only meant to sacrifice their lives, but that they will also be made out to be fools. However, this does not seem enough to explain the sudden and complete swing of Milosevic: from total loyalty to a complete break. Bulatovic owes Milosevic his entire political career. He was chosen to be the main destructive force of the "old regime" during the antibureaucratic revolution. He was later given the decisive support from Belgrade which he had to be grateful for and which turned him into a mere Milosevic's puppet. Milosevic has for years benefited from the fact that Montenegro was formally independent, and that its vote was always supporting him. But now that everything is turning against Milosevic, this will cost him dearly. Bulatovic has at last got his opportunity and seized it with the skill of his mentor (Milosevic). If only a few days ago he had shown signs of disobedience and the readiness to vote differently in Hague, Milosevic would have found a way to finish him off with an antibureaucratic revolution and would have brought in an even younger team. But Bulatovic was wise enough to announce his intentions to the Montenegrin Parliament on Thursday evening on October 17, while going to the Hague on Friday and signing the agreement on the sovereignty of the republics. By doing this, he has secured some international protection for his republic and has hailed a goodbye to Milosevic.

This was the last decisive moment. The fictional sovereignty has materialized overnight. The official Belgrade is still dumbfounded. The host of allegations for treasons have only just started, timidly and with the hope that the damage could be made good. Nothing will come out of this: neither Bulatovic nor Djukanovic (the head of the Montenegrin Government) appeared at the "consultancy meeting of the ones remaining in Yugoslavia", which was hosted in Belgrade by Branko Kostic. Milosevic must have took it to be an impertinence when Bulatovic explained the way he will deal with the Titograd radio listeners. Having consistent views was never seen to be a desirable quality in a politician. You can always find a departure from the previously held views if you look at what each of them has said a few years back. But in countries with the democratic tradition a sudden U-turn can not be tolerated. Bulatovic can get away with it since this is a country which does not have a tradition in diplomacy and, what is more important, his detraction must have been carefully planned, although the public knew nothing about it. He most certainly set out to be loyal to Milosevic; there are many reasons for this. But the problem with Milosevic is that his brand of politics does not involve allies but only subordinates and enemies.

From time to time, Bulatovic used to say something of his own accord, after which a break would ensue, from which he would return purple red and would sing a completely different tune. It is a notorious fact that he tried to prevent the election of Branko Kostic to the Federal Presidency, since Kostic was even more indebted to Milosevic, being spared the antibureaucratic purge. His election was once again ordered from Belgrade, while Kostic's loyalty has surpassed even that of Borisav Jovic. At the last session of the Montenegrin Parliament it was clear that Bulatovic is in control of the situation, despite the patriotic outcry of the National Party delegates. The parliamentary majority and the well coordinated double Bulatovic - Djukanovic has once more exhibited the prevalence of common sense in politics. Judging by their behaviour one could deduce that they are more concerned with the public announcement of their position than with the reaction of Belgrade.

The following words of Bulatovic were greeted with an ovation: "If the criteria for evaluating the success of the Montenegrin Government are based on its compliance with Belgrade, then this people need neither the government, nor the elections." Milosevic needs to be more concerned about the fact that someone like Momir Bulatovic is slipping away from his grip, since the previously slavishly obedient politician obviously thinks he has nothing more to fear from Milosevic. His Hague escapade was not so much a cry for independence as a cry for political survival. Milosevic, thus, no longer holds all the cards. Bulatovic has used the opportunity to challenge the authority of the Army by appealing to the Montenegrin reservists in Slavonija and Banija to come back home.

The war is obviously taking the wrong turn, despite the Kadijevic's threats of additional mobilization, whereas Milosevic has no chance of securing any considerable concession from the Hague. Whatever he could gain by strengthening the association of sovereign state he stands to lose with the autonomous regions in Serbia. He has no answer to the accusation that he would gain considerably less by this war than he could have done two years ago with peaceful means. Europe is giving his unrealistic grandiose ideas a rough time, out of which only the Knin autonomy will remain, with Kosovo being given the same status, which would leave Serbia struggling over Vojvodina and Sandzak.

Montenegro is slipping further and further away, and it will take the Milosevic heir much effort to reestablish close links with this republic. All this does not go to show that the Serbs were punished because of the pointless arrogance of Slobodan Milosevic, although a different man in his position would concentrate on finding a friend abroad instead of undertaking the campaign against the major powers. Europe is not only interested in appeasing Milosevic, but also in creating the conditions for lasting stability.

The condition of the Serbs in Yugoslavia is such that they can not secure a better deal if Yugoslavia were to disintegrate than could be offered by the Hague. Whoever will be dissatisfied with the final outcome in the Hague, which will, at any rate, have to be accepted, should turn to the wizards who were propagating that Yugoslavia is the greatest illusion of the Serbian people. The same will go for the Croatians, who will have to examine the practical concequences of their independent state, which is carved up by the Knin Krajina. Lord Carrington argues for the preservation of the theoretical possibility of creating the firmer association if the interested parties consent to it; this association, however, will have no strings attached which will make the situation more difficult, since it would be based solely on consensus, without the use of threats and force. I suspect that this will take time. It could even happen that someone one day concludes that the old Lord deserves to be erected a monument.

Maybe even in Montenegro, which got more than it bargained for and which was threatened by some kind of a wild association with Serbia, to then suddenly find itself independent. But it yet remains to be shown that it can not handle this unexpected gift adequately. Lord Crrington definitely knows this and may even himself laugh at his plan full of insignificant small sovereign states. That, however, seems to be the usual disease of the transitional period between socialism and capitalism.