Towards Great Serbia

His quest for Great Serbia is not only the manifestation of his political authority, but it is also a response to the European reluctance to put forward a clear political stand. The Americans are for now keeping quiet, letting the Europeans grow weaker, since they no longer need the European based political block against the Soviet Union. The disintegration and the help to the Soviet Union in any case do not depend on the attitude of the European Community, so the Americans can carry on with their Eastern politics with their bilateral allies within the E.C. The Hague Agreement means the defeat of the ideas of the Serbian nationalists. With the Hague the idea of Great Serbia and Yugoslavia under the military Serbian control falls to pieces, as well as Kadijevic's (Federal Minister of Defence) "small Yugoslavia", which in effect means Great Serbia. The Kadijevic's vision of Yugoslavia, which he is advocating while allegedly refuting the ideology and the political influence of the Army, will most probably be the last trick Milosevic is about to pull prior to the all-out war. Advancing towards the Great Serbia there are at least two ways for him to implement his programme: firstly by deliberately delaying the negotiations in the Hague, giving the impression of "good will" while making negligible concessions; and secondly by undertaking forcible mobilization in Serbia aimed at making a quick "grab" of the territories in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and maybe Macedonia as well. He goes to the Hague as a conqueror while eager to give an impression of a man willing to compromise. If Bulatovic (President of Montenegro) stands by his Hague statement that the Montenegrins have the right to form their own independent state, Milosevic will make hell of a noise while forcing the men from Cetinje and Podgorica (major towns in Montenegro) to stay loyal to the Kadijevic's small Yugoslavia with the centre at Milosevic's home in Dedinje (the posh politicians residential area). If Bulatovic really wants to give the state back to the Montenegrins, protecting it from becoming a satellite to Serbia and its regions in Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia, he will have to face a duel in Belgrade. He already had to. This is the only chance for him to gain the support of the patriotic Montenegrin opposition, the Belgrade democratic opposition, all of the Yugoslav states, all of the states in the Hague and of the Karadjordjevic and Petrovic dynasties. Bulatovic may even square Milosevic to do what the Belgrade opposition has done with the Crown Prince Alexander: to invite Prince Nikola Petrovic back home and make way for the revival of the constitutional and parliamentary monarchy. Bulatovic would here be faced with a serious problem: how to convince the Montenegrin public that he is willing to break away from his two and a half year pro-Serbian politics and make way for the king? Kadijevic and Milosevic, with their publically announced decision to forcibly create small Yugoslavia - Great Serbia, have been stripped of their already weak propaganda. They can no longer claim to be acting within the legal framework. However, they would at least have to explain the following: how can the present Yugoslav non-legal four-member Presidency pass decisions on mobilization, whose only aim is to divide up the territories of the Yugoslav republics, only to serve the interests of the new Yugoslavia. How can Yugoslavia attack itself only to be created again? The possible war cannot really be to the liking of the Serbian reservists: they are once again not defending Serbia against the foreign invasion, but are fighting for the territories which the Belgrade Headquarters have earmarked. At least the resistance of the reservists will probably be as fierce as ever, while the motivation for the front line clashes will decrease even more. Thus Serbia could have a blitz-krieg. There is little possibility of that happening when the severe weather conditions set in. The past experiences also point to the slow gradual Army advance as opposed to the blitz-krieg. Serbia is at this time at no risk of becoming the Belgrade pashadom. The international troops cannot get involved in Yugoslavia against Serbia until Europe defines its political status. Milosevic wants to gain territorial supremacy before that happens and before Europe decides to send primarily the French troops to Serbia. Milosevic wants to present the world with the fait accompli since he knows that the Serbs and the people of Vojvodina will have moral reservations about fighting against the French. But he will himself invite the French and other troops to the demilitarized zone, this time on the Western borders, which will stretch far over the Drina river. Milosevic is here helped by Hungary's dirty mouthed politics, although Serbia has too loudly been denouncing it, forgetting that its only free land passage leads through Hungary. It is true that Serbia is internally choking while denouncing the whole world as conspirators, but it is also true that it enjoys the masochism of its suicidal purity. The Belgrade opposition will finally have to make a clear stand. Kadijevic's and Milosevic's Yugoslav Presidency has again made the fatal error of arguing for the formation of Yugoslavia, albeit a smaller one. Few Serbs would go along with their vision of Yugoslavia. If Serbia were to announce the war for Great Serbia, it would have had more supporters in Sumadija (central Serbia) and Vojvodina. This is why the opposition is in the position to accuse the socialists once again for forcing the Serbs into sacrificing their lives for a foreign country. If Milosevic lays his cards on the table, which he is unlikely to do, and cries out loud: "Let's take out all the Serbs, let's fight for Great Serbia!", then the democratic opposition will have to make the ultimate choice: war or peace. Some say that the traitors within the opposition are well known. Some say they know what will become of Serbia.