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October 28, 1991
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 5

Transformation of the Army

Only in the past three months the Army has lost all of its moral and political credibility. The law provides for the pictures and the busts of Josip Broz to be removed from the offices, whereas a special commission has been appointed to decide upon the remaining decorations. The red star, which is the traditional Army sign was replaced by new insignia: the round badge with the three- coloured flag and the stylized JNA letters (the Yugoslav People's Army) in cyrillic. The equal use of both letters was abided by in the past, although the Army abbreviation was written in Latin on the badges and the medallions; this change, however, is due to more than just the change of design. It is the last stage in the ongoing process of transforming the "Yugoslav" and "national" Army into the Army of the fourth "Yugoslavia", which as yet has no name, no constitution, no borders and no people; it only has the leadership, the leader and the armed forces. The statements of General Kadijevic and Negovanovic concerning the "Yugoslav orientation of the Army" given in the past few weeks, do not change a thing: the Army is definitely becoming a Serbian army. In January 199O the Slovenes have published a confidential document devised by the Federal Defence Bureau, which was sent to all the Army commands and barracks. The document states that the Soviet Union is about to "compose itself". It then goes on to say that socialism in Yugoslavia has not been defeated yet. Yugoslavia paid a high price while resisting the first onslaught of anti-communism. There are reasons to believe that the country could be preserved as the federal and socialist formation". Since it has dismissed the Gulf war as being colonial, and defined the situation in the ex-communist countries of Eastern Europe as being "complicated" and escaping control of the ones who administered it from the outside, the Federal Defence Bureau has identified the enemy: "The script writers from the West have achieved major results, albeit not their final aim. They did not succeed in overthrowing communism in any country where the revolution was autochthonous". That is precisely the reason the victory in Yugoslavia is so important, since it will be followed by the attempts at "bringing down the communists who have stayed in power - either within specific republics or within the federation as a whole". "The Western democracy advocates are resorting to thinly veiled demagogy", says the Federal Defence Bureau, since "in the prevailing circumstances it primarily refers to whatever is anti-socialist." The Army found the much needed remedy in January in the shape of the Communist Party - Movement for Yugoslavia (SKPJ), election of which was taken to be "the main concern". SKPJ did not succeed in fulfilling its ambitions and has become a party of marginal importance even within the Army. The love story with the Serbian regime ended in disgrace (General Mirkovic last week denounced the Socialist Party of Serbia as being nationalist, and has called Budimir Kosutic /Vice-President of the Serbian Government/ a "fascist"), so the Army has had to find another political measure. Mr. Milosevic, a communist and the head of the most numerous nation in the republic and in the country, seemed to be an obvious choice. January was the deadline for the Army to decide whether it will preserve Yugoslavia at the cost of the defeat of communism, or will it concern itself with salvaging communism, while risking the downfall of Yugoslavia. They had a unique opportunity to save Yugoslavia, even at such a high cost: in January they could still have implemented the Presidency's orders, by disarming the "illegal paramilitary formations", regardless of their nationality and with their powerful presence appease the Serbs in Croatia, vouching for their safety. By assuming the responsibility for the public law and order and vouching for the lives and property of ALL of its citizens, without dividing them into the "good ones" (the ones who want to stay in Yugoslavia) and the" bad ones" (the ones who do not wish to do so), the Army could acquire considerable political credibility by placing itself under the authority of the democratically elected Federal Parliament and government. Instead of becoming the armed force of citizens and taxpayers, regardless of what political party they voted for, since it is their constitutional right, the Army opted for the defence of the "social and economic formation" which failed everywhere else in the world. This decision has led them into the strategic defensive. The first manifestation of this was on March 9 in Belgrade: by bringing the tanks to the streets the Army assumed the responsibility for an inadequate and confused regime, which on that day brought itself on the verge of breakdown owing to its own political misjudgment. The Army only came to help only because it was supposed to help the communist regime, meaning that it will be encouraged to so the same the next time opportunity presents itself. On March 15 Mr. Milosevic has at the closed session with the borough representatives defined his strategy: "If we can't work well, at least we can fight well". Mr. Milosevic announced on March 15 that he considers the unification of Germany to be the major threat to Serbia: "With the unification, Germany has become dangerously superior... and is beginning to act as the future coordinator and the founder of the future European order." According to him the advocates of the restoration of the Austro-Hungarian empire were starting to raise their heads... they want to claim the whole of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vojvodina and a part of Sandzak, they want Albania to annex Kosovo... On such a map Serbia is supposed to occupy the territories of the former Belgrade pashadom. The only support for this statement was provided by the attack on the police patrol in Kosovo and by the famous statement of Zelenovic (the President of Serbian Government), concerning the "treason within the secret service". General Kadijevic, the Defence Minister, has stated the following at the last Tuesday's session of the incomplete Presidency: "Germany is for the third time in this century attacking our country in an very direct and aggressive manner. It stoops today with the direct strategy typical for the special war, while preparing the economic blockade which is to be followed by the military onslaught." He added that the Germans are especially keen on the Serbs and the Montenegrins "because of the defeat they have suffered in the past two wars". Based on the above statement and the doctrine of Mr. Milosevic on the formation of "the puppet regimes" in Slovenia and Croatia, General Kadijevic was calling for the general mobilization, which would intercept "the preparation of the economic sanctions coupled with the military onslaught" of the despised Germans and Austro-Hungarians. He mounted even fiercer accusations against the Croatians and the Slovenes for "resorting to even more horrendous measures than the ones used in the Second World War." What has happened in the interval between March 15 and October 22 which forced General Kadijevic to side totally with Milosevic? Immediately after March 15, the Serbs in Croatia have speeded up the armament process, helped by the military and police arms from Serbia and Vojvodina. The first armed clashes are soon to follow (Pakrac, Plitvice), sealed with the massacre in Borovo Selo. The Slovenian escapade falls around that time: instead of the expected immediate surrender, the Slovenes have defeated the Army in ten days, applying the tactics of the territorial defence which General Kadijevic qualified as "the great set up". At this time the Army remnants are retreating from Slovenia while being treated almost like the prisoners of war: they are only allowed to take personal weapons, leaving the rest to the Slovenes. The Army is committing the same mistakes in Croatia as it did in Slovenia: instead of deploying and keeping mobile, which is an absolute must in the modern warfare, the Army has, after breaking out, lost around sixty garrisons, watchtowers and warehouses without having fired a single bullet - simply through starvation. Thus the Croatian side, rejoicing at the fact that it is defending its territories and that it is, after two centuries, at last waging a justified war and getting hold of the heavy weaponry desperately needed, which the "Austro -Hungarians and other Western capitalists" failed to supply them with. The totally unnecessary two month siege of Vukovar represents another defeat: despite the powerful weaponry involved the Army could not take Vukovar, Vinkovci and Osijek (major towns in Slavonia). This has nothing to do with the inappropriate tactics, but with the absence of the war strategy. If the Army were honest enough to admit that its prime war aim was to overthrow the present Croatian regime, it could have quickly reached Zagreb, without the human loss and the waste of time at the Slavonian front. To conduct a war you need to have a clearly defined and operative political concept, over which a consensus could be reached between the parties in conflict. The Croatians have it: their main concern is not to exterminate all Serbs, which has been claimed here; their concept is much better suited to the present political outlook in Europe than the doctrine of Mr. Milosevic and General Kadijevic. The Croatians claim to be defending their territory and their democratically elected government: they have a national consensus to support it. General Kadijevic has announced that the Army should be "transformed into an armed force of some kind of Yugoslavia which will survive". We are soon to be faced with the consequences of the "self-realizing prophecy": whatever Milosevic promised has materialized, owing to his efforts and that of his trusted colleagues. There are now very few of those, but he still has the support of the Supreme Command and of what is left of the armed forces, while SPO, the leading opposition party (Mr. Draskovic) has finally realized that it can not support the war and be against Milosevic, since Milosevic is the one who started it in the first place. There has been a fierce row between Mr. Draskovic and General Simovic (Serbian Defence Minister). The consequences remain yet to be seen. "You support the strategy whereby Serbia will be left without posterity since you are pushing it into the total and fatal war against the peoples of Yugoslavia and the world, although you know that Serbia does not want such a war. Even if it did want it, it is certainly not prepared for it. It is not, General, since it is left without a fiend in the world..." Thus the strategic defensive waged by the Army came to an end: there is still the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be considered, since Macedonia has just refused to mobilize its recruits. Serbia could be left alone in the Balkans with its army and let the "rest of Yugoslavia" find another form of association. Whatever form it assumes, at least it won't be war ridden. If that happens, the Army and Milosevic will be left in Serbia. And they will soon be counting the cost of war.

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