I am Not the Most Powerful Man in Serbia

Reactions to this interview were fairly diverse. Some here read it as Djindjic's reference to the West that in Serbia "there is no alternative" other than him and that it is far better to support him more heartily now, before it's too late. And it would be late, in case financial aid fails to arrive, already in September if social unrest spreads across Serbia. Initially, when the government submitted its report on the first hundred days of its work, September was mentioned as the month when the economy will start to function, when the first new jobs will appear, when the arrival of foreign capital will be felt along with the effects of the first investments. That is why Zoran Djindjic's interview for VREME starts with the question - isn't the deadline for the announced changes in the economy thereby extended by a couple of months, or for an indefinite period of time?

"I just received a report that in June our budget was filled one hundred percent, which means that things are going rather well", says Djindjic. "But in July we have to pay for the wheat and repairs of the power stations, which will clear all the surplus from the budget and will amount to seven-eight billion dinars. Previously, wheat had never been bought from realistic sources, money was always printed for that purpose which lead to inflation and monetary instability. In July and August we will therefore have a budget crisis due to these expenses, that always happens in summer. All of this doesn't mean that my previous plans on reanimating the economy have been changed. However, an element in macroeconomy does exist which is somewhat worrisome, and that is global economic recession and a danger that it can psychologically reflect on the countries which have promised to give us certain donations. My address in Spiegel was actually an address aimed towards their public opinion, not ours. That interview was supposed to mobilize the public opinion of those countries to put pressure on their governments to adhere to the timing which they have set. Elections are coming up next year in Germany, France is facing presidential elections, both countries have unemployment and state debt problems and a danger exists that they will say - all right, let's slow things down, transition will last at least ten years in Serbia anyway. That would be very unfavorable for us."

VREME: That interview was interpreted in various ways. There are those who thought - the reforms have fallen through because there's no money. There were also thoughts on how Djindjic is now maneuvering because he sees that expectations from that aid are too high and he wishes to cool them down with these statements.

DJINDJIC: Those are secondary effects. I didn't know that effect would be produced here, but I did know that there would be reverberations in the West. The weekly which published it is one of the most prestigious ones in Europe. There are two messages which we have to understand. First of all, that donor aid isn't cash which someone brings in a bag which we then take to Kragujevac, Bor, Sabac and hand out to the workers as their salaries, that money is tied to projects which are being implemented in infrastructure, traffic, the power industry... So people have to lower their expectations, especially if they hope to blackmail the government to give them that money for their wages with strikes. Such hopes are very misleading. Strike isn't a job which should be paid for and that won't happen. It is also important that people who work in the federal and republic foreign affairs services have to understand that the cat still isn't in the bag. Rather, it is a daily battle with the bureaucracies in Brussels and in all those countries. We have to adapt to the EU structures which are very sluggish, Babylonian, and my warning to our ministers is - call every day and ask what's going on with the money. It doesn't matter if they say it's OK - ask if today that money is a millimeter closer to us than before.  

VREME: After your interview in the Spiegel, you have probably heard comments which go - what does Djindjic want now, he expected to become the West's favorite for having extradited Milosevic to The Hague, and didn't count that such a move doesn't have long-term value?

DJINDJIC: That shows a total incomprehension of things. Milosevic's extradition was a price for our inactivity on that issue in the last six months. We don't receive any prize for it, we only prevent sanctions. If we had resolved the issue of cooperation with the tribunal with a law in February or March, if someone had stood trial on war charges here in May or June, Milosevic wouldn't be in The Hague today. Some kind of unspoken consensus existed that he is important to us as an individual and there wouldn't have been any conditions in that sense. Since we were too late, we found ourselves in a situation where our credibility was generally questioned. It wasn't a trade of "Milosevic for money" but instead "Milosevic for credibility". If we hadn't had a crisis in the federal parliament in June on the issue of cooperation with The Hague, the donor conference would also have been successful. But, since we did have that crisis, if it hadn't been for this move, the donor conference would have been a flop and that would have shown that we are a country which doesn't deserve confidence. That would have been the end not only of reforms, but of the image of Serbia which has formed in the world after October 5. The loss would have been so great that no individual destiny merits it. If I were in Milosevic's shoes, I personally would have said - I'm going to The Hague if so much is riding on it. I'm not guilty, that doesn't matter, everyone will know I'd done it for my country. No one now asks why Milosevic didn't have the nerve to take something like that upon himself even though he was the president of this country, everyone is asking why did Djindjic do it. If we are to weigh the destiny of a nation and a personal destiny, it is only natural that the person whose destiny is in question takes the burden upon himself in name of the nation. It isn't up to the nation to explain why it is more important than an individual.

VREME: Do you really fear that in September instead of the economy, street activities and social unrest could  be awakened?

DJINDJIC: It could happen that despite the realistically improved economic motions people might think that more could be had with street pressure. All the more so since it is no longer risky to demonstrate. Everything else is more difficult. It is more difficult to organize something in your company and to fight for better management of that company, it is easier to ask the government for something. There is a realistic possibility that the social brakes could stop functioning and people could say - let's give it a try, it doesn't cost a thing. That would be very unfortunate because the general image of our country in the business sense would be greatly damaged. No one wants to invest in a place where radical syndicates exist and where employees can dispute anyone's rights and property. The whole world is a potential market and if someone can invest in Poland, China or Lebanon, why would he invest here if these problems exist. As far as realistic economic dynamics are concerned, they won't be sufficiently strong for people to be satisfied. Even if everything goes according to plan, salaries won't reach the desired level soon. One can expect a ten percent increase. In comparison with the overall despair, a ten percent increase in living standards doesn't make that much of a difference.

VREME: By criticizing the West for its slowness in sending aid, you also tried to scare them with a story how the socialists and the radicals could start heading that social rebellion. Do you seriously think that someone who, according to all polls, has less than ten percent of the people's support, can truly put himself at the head of a social rebellion?

DJINDJIC: I had the idea of national-socialism more in mind. Not the concrete bearers. These existing socialists and radicals will never again have a chance to do what they had done in the last ten years. However, in poor countries, the idea of national spite in relation to the rich world, as well as the idea of social radicalism in relation to the riches of others, are always fairly alive. It is easy to fire up people with such demagogics.

VREME: People here already exist who say - everything is the same, only he's gone.

DJINDJIC: That is a certain type of nihilism. How can it be the same if you were arrested a year ago for wearing a T-shirt, when they beat you up with batons, when they kicked you and when you could have been found dead in the morning next to the container. That's nihilism which eats up the society's moral. A year ago the only thing you could hear were stories about terrorists, enemies, plots, today you can choose what you want to hear and watch. Is that the same? A certain dimension of intellectual nihilism, as a trace of obstruction, remains from Milosevic's time, which is gradually poisoning our country and killing the people's potential to see anything that is positive.  

VREME: Your ministers were in Zastava last week and the impression is that they were somewhat unprepared for what awaited them there. After that it seemed as though your government was threading on terrain which contains a lot more mines and quicksand than can be imagined by the soothing smiles which you  have thus far dispensed?

DJINDJIC: I have a map of all the critical spots in Serbia and it isn't a minefield, it's a carpet. Not a single step can be made without coming upon something rotten. As far as Kragujevac is concerned, I believe that was more of a police problem. Concept-wise, the ministerial team wasn't unprepared. They have been dealing with Zastava for the last six months and held a number of meetings on that subject. A group of criminals who have nothing to do with Zastava, who used to work there, created the scandal. Their motive was to incite a political crisis, followed by new elections, with the hope of reviving a corpse. Milosevic and Seselj will yet return. The police had to know about this. Each meeting with socially imperiled workers is a security risk in any country. I told minister Mihajlovic to make a serious analysis and see whether his service is capable of providing a normal environment for the workers, employers and ministers to hold talks on difficult issues. Or will they opt to become hostages of extremist small groups of people where any five thugs can come and beat up a minister and three days later the newspapers are full of stories saying they were from the syndicate.

VREME: Until now, you have refused demands for the Serbian government's reconstruction a few times. The Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) has just announced that cosmetic changes of the government are out of the question, since, according to their belief, it isn't capable of dealing with the inheritance from the past.

DJINDJIC: This criticism is pure demagogy. During these six months, I didn't receive a single legal or any other type of suggestion outside of the government. I didn't receive, apart from two - three individual cases which turned out to be untrue, any concrete criticism. Batic was criticized for extraditing Stakic. He had nothing to do with it.

VREME: How far are you prepared to go in the government reconstruction?

DJINDJIC: If clear alternatives exist, both conceptual and personnel-wise, and if we judge that they are better, I am very open for it. But I have to stress that there were no conceptual differences until now. On the subject of personnel, I would like any of the journalists who professionally deal with the fields which the government covers, to list better solutions. Maybe a better candidate could be found in two or three cases. But there are no personnel alternatives which are so pronounced as to be able to say - it would be logical for so and so to be finance minister, economic minister or something else. If there are no clear conceptual or personnel alternatives, then the story about a reconstruction becomes empty demagogy.

VREME: If those two stands, that a thorough government reconstruction is essential and the other that it's demagogy, don't draw any nearer, are new elections the only way out?

DJINDJIC: I don't think so, because DSS is also saying that they will accept a detailed analysis as credible evidence. The next step which I plan is for all ministries to make out detailed reports of their activities, for all DOS parties to list their objections to the government's work, to compile it all after which every minister will have two hours with DOS to answer to those objections. If someone has a principle objection and says - I would like to replace five of them, but I won't say who and what - that would be frivolous. At the same time, it is clear that justified objections at a certain level unavoidably lead towards personnel changes.  

VREME: In your interviews, you often warn that a power struggle shouldn't occur in Serbia again because that would signify an end to reforms. At the same time, you are often reproached for saying that because you have previously installed your people in all the centers of power.

DJINDJIC: My question is - what is power in Serbia? Power always means a division of privileges and money. In a democratic society, relatively controlled, with a large number of participants, it is fairly difficult to hand out privileges. DOS controls personnel policies to such an extent that you can't even appoint a teacher in a school in Leskovac, without it previously being discussed in DOS's human resources commission. I personally didn't appoint anyone to a single company, nor a single institution. I only had a single suggestion, and that for the director of the Health Fund. The other possibility of power is money. In Serbia today, that is highly controlled. There is no chance for anyone in Serbia today to turn any channel of funds to the other side or to channel it towards someone who then owes you, or to keep it for yourself. And third, power is a potential for using force. I hope no one serious is even contemplating that I would order the police to arrest someone only so that I could demonstrate my power. Actually, there is no power in Serbia, that is an empty story of those who are spreading haze and saying - Djindjic is the most powerful man in Serbia, he manages everything. I don't manage neither companies, nor banks, nor ministries. Djelic, Obren Joksimovic, Gaso Knezevic, Dusan Mihajlovic, Batic - all of them are autonomous in their duties and there are no interventions from my side. My only power is in coordinating it all.  

VREME: What will talks on the future of the federal state be like? How much longer is Serbia capable of waiting?

DJINDJIC: A very short time. According to my belief, Serbia isn't in a position to wait until January, February, that issue has to be resolved. My idea was to set a deadline for January first. It is good that a referendum is being organized in Montenegro so that the people can finally say what they want. Serbia can fit into any option which Montenegro's citizens choose, but it has to be quick because that is an open subject which is hindering us. Any resolution is better than to continue this current agony. That is a realistic agony which the citizens of Serbia are paying for. They are literally paying for it, because they are funding two governments, and that other government is four times more expensive per capita than its own government, and on top of that it isn't doing practically anything for Serbia.

VREME: How much does the future of that federal state depend on the stand of the international community? Professor Zarko Puhovski claims that today the US ambassadors in this part of the world have become commissioners just like Russian used to be. He mentions the US ambassador to FRY, Mr. Montgomery for whom he says that he had previously helped the socialists to lose power in Bulgaria, that afterwards in Croatia he helped the social-democrats to win, and that tomorrow he might be able to convince Djukanovic not to secede.

DJINDJIC: The possibilities of that influence are limited. Up to a certain point they do have influence as a country which is important on the global level and whose support one should strive to have. It's the same in any life situation. If you have someone who is very influential, then you won't squabble with him without any undue need, rather, you will try to win his sympathies. However, that has its limits. In the case of Milo Djukanovic, that's obvious. They have suggested to him a long time ago to strike a deal with Belgrade, which he ignored. They suggested he take part in the elections held in September of last year, which he also refused. And he still remains their partner, and again when the US congress allocates money, it allocates a disproportionate amount to Montenegro.  

VREME: Did the Americans play a commisioner's role when Milosevic was extradited to The Hague?

DJINDJIC: They didn't even know. They only conditioned their participation at the donor conference with our acceptance of the obligation to cooperate, but not in the sense that someone will be sent to The Hague. They asked for a very clear obligation in that sense - concrete cooperation with The Hague until the end of June. That was all. And if the constitutional court hadn't contest the Decree, extradition prolongation would probably still be ongoing, various legal remedies would be called up, there would be requests for some judges exemption. The constitutional court practically closed that road. At that moment, dynamics which no one in the world expected were set in motion. They called us from Washington to ask about the misinformation concerning Milosevic, and we told them he was already in The Hague.

VREME: How do you perceive future cooperation with The Hague? At one point you claimed that they were fairly busy with Milosevic now and that Belgrade no longer has to hurry. The officials of the tribunal, however, persistently claim - hand them over immediately, hand over all those who are on the list.

DJINDJIC: I don't know whether immediately, in a short time span. We have a total of 15 people on the list for The Hague. We also have two strategic goals. The first is that the list ends there and the second that a part of those cases are tried in our courts, if that's possible and if the tribunal in The Hague agrees. All of the countries in the regions will have to do the same. The next ones are the Albanians from Kosovo who will have to face up to the fact that some of their leaders will end up in the docks. That is a reality and it isn't possible for all these wars to end without having this unpleasant part which ensues. We in DOS have a bit of time, not too much of it, to work out a concept of cooperation with The Hague. We can tell them because they have Milosevic, that means they have 50 percent of all they had asked for. It wouldn't be good if arrows are pointed from The Hague to such an extent as to force us to say that we will no longer cooperate in that way. The tribunal now has incomparably less international support for further pressure on us than at the time when Milosevic was here. Two thirds of the country in the world believe that our business with the tribunal is concluded. Naturally, we don't wish to enter into any disputes with the tribunal, but we also don't want Serbia to be some kind of supermarket which someone enters and says - give me one from here, one from there. By sending Milosevic to The Hague we have brought ourselves to the situation where we can take part in creating the concept of cooperation on an equal basis.

VREME: Since you dispatched Milosevic to The Hague on St. Vitus day, one part of the clergy reacted by saying that you have "deleted yourself from history". Shortly after that you visited the Patriarchy and agreed upon introducing religion into the school curriculum. Was that a construction of your "church of penitence"?

DJINDJIC: I went after receiving an invitation from the Patriarch. That meeting was previously arranged and the topic was religion. Expert groups have been discussing introducing the subject of religion into the schools for months. One moment a pause occurred and the Patriarch called me and asked me to speed up that process since they, from their side, have undertaken all that was necessary. As far as I am concerned, the constitutional court chose to have Milosevic extradited to The Hague on St. Vitus day. If they hadn't contested the decree that day, we wouldn't have made our decision on that day either. If we had made that decision on any other day, we would have had cameras in front of the prison gates, prison guards, at least 500 people who would be waiting there, an international phenomenon. And just like with Milosevic's arrest, that would have been proof of this state's incapability to carry out its own policies. Those very people who support Milosevic were the ones who decided that it happen on that very day, in that very manner. As far as I am concerned, Milosevic could have remained in central prison until today, and we would have had normal relations with The Hague. Some other people would be in The Hague and it would all follow a normal course. On the subject of the church, I support the idea that it gets its position in society. I have no complexes as far as religion is concerned. The most successful countries in the world are religious. The US has managed to preserve itself under difficult circumstances in two centuries with religiousness in everyday life, and if anyone tells me that it isn't democratic, let him look and see what is happening in churches in the US on Sunday, during holidays, when families go to church. I don't see anything bad if my child has religion as a subject in school. My children like going to church, not because of my direction. I don't take it seriously that one bishop "deleted me from history". In the church's many-year-long isolation from society, individuals from the church have also lost touch with reality. I didn't send Milosevic's head to The Hague. He went to a hotel in The Hague. He isn't Karadjordje who made the Serbian people rise to rebel for freedom, but a man who has ruined the lives of millions of people. Interpreting that as if he was sacrificed and his head delivered to some sultan is totally wrong. He was imprisoned here, now he's imprisoned there. The difference for him exclusively lies in the fact that here he was in a lower standard prison. Maybe that bishop believes we should have freed Milosevic from prison and amnestied him for his crimes. For me, that presents a lonely opinion in the church and I had no problems with the other bishops over my decision.