Pristina Out in the Open

The Kosovo Albanian alternative has united in a national program. All the Albanian parties in London stood for the separation of Kosovo from Serbia proper and its proclamation of independence. With this they entered the battle field.

The Albanians cannot fool anyone. The liberal parties of Kosovo lost the support of the opposition in Belgrade when they abandoned the idea of the autonomy of Kosovo within the framework of Serbia and joined the separatists. Maybe it is from tactical reasons that they talk of the independence of Kosovo so that at negotiation talks they can get autonomy for it. This isn't certain at the moment, but it is certain that until the moment of yielding they have gained, apart from Milosevic, the whole of the Belgrade opposition as opponents.

The Albanians cannot find allies in Novi Sad because the Vojvodina Serbs, beneficiaries of centuries long autonomy - from military and cultural to free cities and territorial autonomy - do not see Vojvodina outside Serbia. Naturally they do not like the present voting superiority of Serbs in the national assembly, credited with treating Vojvodina as an economic colony, but neither do they see the point of the demand for an independent Vojvodina except as part of the Serbian conflict between the people of Vojvodina themselves. Even if it were to separate from Serbia, it would not be easy for Vojvodina to hold out for long in the rectangle made up of Croatia, Hungary, Rumania and Serbia.

The people of Vojvodina are seeking for themselves a legislative, executive and judicial autonomy, as well as status as an European region, but not as a state. They are surprised by DEPOS' desire to take the autonomy away from the Serbs in Vojvodina and inhabitants of Vojvodina and hand it over to the Hungarians as a Northern Backa canton. To them this is a strange way of preserving the territorial integrity of Serbia. But it is logical to the Serbian nationalists. By collectivization they politically equalize all Serbs, which gives "unity" - in fact a centralized Serbia, as a governmental levelling of the historical and cultural differences between them, but at the same time recognizing other nations differences and offering them autonomy which detracts from the Serbs. Nationalists always have trouble with democracy and the open politics of development because they have a horror of the legislative decentralization of power, the federal political system and pluralism in the interpretation of "the national interests of the fatherland". Their involvement with borders is proof of their introversion and backwardness.

When Milosevic with his lawlessness destroyed the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina it was then the way to centralize military power without any intervention in the communist system. He still stands on this. Albanian nationalists in Kosovo have proved the justification of their efforts for the reinstitution of the autonomy of Kosovo by the violations of Albanian human rights and breaking of the civil rights of all Kosovo inhabitants. Here they found not only the understanding, but the support of the liberal opposition in Belgrade. By insisting on the upholding of human rights they also gained the support of the international community, because Yugoslavia is a signatory of international documents on these rights. By moving into open separatism they fall into the area of pure war politics, and demand of Europe that it change its policy based on the immutability of borders. This means that separatism is a method of protecting human rights!

Albanian separatism is a hindrance to Serbia's way out of the crisis. It prolongs the career of Milosevic, slows down the transformation of Serbia into a democracy and thus the renewal of autonomy for Kosovo. It even endangers the survival of Albanians in Serbia. In the Balkan mess, orthodox Greece, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro will first be united against the Albanians in Kosovo and Albania before they quarrel amongst themselves.

The easiest way for Belgrade to weaken the demands of Kosovo for secession would be for the authorities there to adopt real liberal and civil currents, or if those in power had evident influence. They would certainly offer Kosovo autonomy. The Albanians in Pristina can maybe hope for the independence of Kosovo in the case of international military intervention against Serbia because of its politics in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia. But, Serbia will now change itself into one of the most peace-loving countries in Europe. Belgrade leans towards the political formalization of the military victories of the Krajisnici (people from the Krajina), convinced that this will come sooner from negotiations than from digging new trenches.

Apart from military success, Milosevic in five years of power has had no other. Serbia is economically ruined. It is too risky for him to immediately open the Kosovo front when he hasn't closed the Sarajevo one. He will leave Rugova to explain to Europe how Kosovo can not breathe without independence, while in Belgrade he will be publicly surprised by such an approach, proving that he has become peace-loving and cooperative. There will even be early elections!

Now Rugova, with the other "independent" Albanians on the political scene in Serbia, is completely alone. In Europe he will be met with great reserve - amongst other things because the encouragement of separatism would weaken the efforts of the "federal authorities" to shove Milosevic's war politics from the front to the lobby of the lower republican government. The weakening of Milosevic does not contribute to the explanation of the certainty of the separation of Kosovo from Serbia. And Milosevic cannot gain strength without provoking a civil war in Serbia. For the time being Rugova will be strong in Kosovo, but will lose strength in Serbia and in the diplomatic circles of Europe.