An Explosion Occurred on October Fifth

Milan Milutinovic is also "present" on an indictment from The Hague. On Interpol's web site, which FRY has recently rejoined, a "wanted" notice appears next to the name of the president of Serbia along with a note that he is a "dangerous man". Recently, prior to the visit of The Hague's main prosecutor Carla del Ponte to Belgrade, word was out that she was arriving in order to quicken the departure of the rest "from Milosevic's list" to The Hague. Apparently, she was told that such a thing is not on the agenda here at the moment. For the same reason, the New York Times recently speculated how Milutinovic's eventual testimony against Milosevic, due to his consciousness or possible write off of all that he is charged with, could be "beneficial" for Carla del Ponte. Milan Milutinovic unwillingly speaks about The Hague and the indictment which is hanging over his head. That is probably why The Hague part of the forthcoming interview has undergone significant changes when it was subsequently authorized.

The interview with the president of Serbia Milan Milutinovic started off with reminiscence of October 5 of last year and with a still inarticulate answer to the question - how did a regime which seemingly strongly controlled all levers of power, collapse in only a few hours on that October 5?

MILUTINOVIC: "Only a year has passed since then and a lot more dust would have to 'settle down' for a more final assessment of all that had then occurred", says Milan Milutinovic. "A black and white evaluation of those events wouldn't be good because, first of all, it wouldn't be totally correct. It would be overly simplified to say 'a coup d'etat occurred' or the 'people rose'. One could talk more about some kind of so-called cumulative effect of everything and it is my impression that something like that simply had to happen, sooner or later. The country was under a blockade for so many years, we had wars in our vicinity, before that, a previous state was dismantled, the political system changed to a multi-party one, we should also take into account a large number of refugees, followed by non acceptance of the facts of life, a wish for changes, the mood of the people and the level of the standard of living, which all together produced that cumulative effect. An explosion occurred. I still think that the first decision of the Constitutional Court of Serbia inflamed Serbia and incited the anger of the people. Although maybe some of the events which occurred could have been avoided if certain facts of life had previously been taken into account and then efficiently corrected and if behavior was different in other spheres of life. Primarily in economics. That still holds true today. Everything depends on how the people are living."  

VREME: Did you see Milosevic in the days immediately following the elections? Some claim that you were amongst those who advised him to admit the election results?

MILUTINOVIC: I did, and that very clearly and in a  substantiated way. Not only I, the majority of the people from the leadership believed that we should't go for a second round because the difference in the number of votes was so apparent and practically irreparable. Those arguments didn't bear fruit. In such situations assessments don't only depend on a collective opinion but, primarily on the candidate himself in whose hands lies the decision whether or not to go for the second round.

VREME: Did your party colleagues ask you to stop certain laws? One often hears the reproach from SPS that by the constitution you have great power, but that you mostly endeavor not to disturb the new government.

MILUTINOVIC: There were various requests. Those requests were made from an intentional or real ignorance of the constitutional regulations, and the majority was inspired (true, not so much now as before) by  certain individuals' attempts to concoct some kind of "entertainment" over my head, as though I don't have enough problems anyway. That's why I refused them fairly decisively and very clearly, because I don't think it is right to come to the situation - individual, even if he is the president of the republic, against the parliament. According to the constitution, the president can postpone a law from being passed only for seven days. If he refuses to sign in a law because he disagrees with a certain regulation, or with the law in its entirety, that practically doesn't mean a thing. After seven days, the parliament will put it on the agenda again and "send a bill" to the president. A seven-day postponement doesn't mean a thing. There was very strong pressure in that sense. That's why I was forced to resign from all functions in SPS because I believed that wasn't the method of operation for any party, and especially an opposition one, and that such conduct shouldn't be employed.

VREME: Many of your party colleagues are in jail today, or could end up there. Do you see in that the revenge of the new government or is something else at stake here?

MILUTINOVIC: It is difficult to answer a question which is thus formulated. And to give an answer which would at the same time be all-inclusive and correct. One can't say that there wasn't uncontrolled revenge, primarily on the local level. Many evaluations have been given on that point, especially prior to and after October 16 when the Agreement on Calling Elections on December 23 of last year was signed. Anyway, the crucial moment to stop possible subsequent acts of revenge was, according to my opinion, a wise political decision (somewhere around October 11) to call early elections in Serbia. That was the moment which, actually, determined the subsequent peaceful changes in Serbia. Maybe that still isn't sufficiently comprehended, but time will show all of its suitability, the brave, wise and statesmanship decision of SPS. Other than that, it isn't revenge if someone had performed criminal acts for which valid evidence exists. Anyway, the courts will soon give their final word based on law in all the ongoing cases. However, I have the feeling that the number of those who are suspects for something aren't as large but the same cases are repeated in the media a few times, and then the public gets the impression that there is a greater number of people.

VREME: Recently, when talking about The Hague, you said something to the effect of - what will be, will be, one can't change one's destiny. It is a fact that the indictment against you (at least what was publicly stated) is fairly thin and you are currently protected by your presidential immunity, even though that isn't an overly reliable category here. Do you expect to travel to The Hague one day?

MILUTINOVIC: There's not much to explain there. I personally think that this indictment from The Hague, at the moment when it was made, was practically duplicated. Simply, at that moment, at the height of NATO's bombardment of FRY, it seems as though someone had a political need for it to appear. Objectively, and subjectively, I am not guilty. Due to the simple reason that both by the constitution, and actually, I had absolutely no jurisdiction over either the army or the police. Namely, in war and peace, the president of FRY commands the Yugoslav Army, in keeping with the decisions of the Supreme Council of Defense (article 135 of the FRY constitution). However, from legal and other acts it is clearly perceived that the Supreme Council of Defense only has an advisory character, and the president of FRY independently promotes and discharges officers of the Yugoslav Army, issues corresponding orders, instructions etc. According to both the constitution of the Republic of Serbia  and the Law on Internal Affairs, exclusively the government of the Republic of Serbia and the police minister answer for the operations of the police forces. All of the MUP assistants (for all branches, meaning public and state security as well), are appointed and dismissed by the government. As a member of the Supreme Council of Defense (VSO), in the period between January 1, 1998 until the war (March 1999) I took part in seven VSO session during which the only point of discussion was the financial situation of VJ. Only once did we seriously discuss the actual military-political situation (October 4, 1998) when I agreed with the assessment of the military-political situation which was given by general Perisic with regards to NATO forces, expressing the hope that reason would prevail and that the strike would't occur. Because, if the situation is carefully evaluated, the entire UN resolution, item by item - we practically fulfilled all of them. If there was anything else we could do, we should do it to avoid the strikes. That conclusion was unanimously adopted by all three VSO members (including the president of Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic). During the war, and after the war, not a single VSO session was held. That is a very well known fact, both in our country and abroad. I spent the entire year of 1998 in negotiations with a number of US diplomats who were mediators of the representatives of the Albanian parties, in order to reach some kind of political agreement on the issue of self-government in Kosovo and Metohija, within Serbia. Also, I held very successful negotiations with the Albanians, with the assistance and mediation of Monsignor Vicence Pallet on the Education Agreement in Kosovo and Metohija. After that, Rambouillet and Paris ensued, and immediately afterwards, the bombardment. As is apparent, there could hardly have been any kind of responsibility.       

VREME: Are news on sunken refrigerated trucks, moved bodies and mass graves throughout Serbia a surprise to you?

MILUTINOVIC: I am not only surprised but also deeply shocked by those news. That is for every condemnation and should be investigated to the end - to the final truth.

VREME: Talks on the fate of the federal state have for now fallen through, and you weren't even scheduled to take part in them. Do you feel that Serbia is slowly nearing a referendum as well?

MILUTINOVIC: First of all, I don't agree with the estimate that they have fallen through. Sufficient wisdom and patience will be found to enable them to continue. That entire problem has been going on for too long to postpone it for too long. Otherwise, no one anticipated that I should take part in this round of talks and president Kostunica explained that very well. The platforms on the future state were drawn up by the federal and republic governments and I didn't take part in them, I don't even have those texts, and the second platform was drawn up in Montenegro. I personally wouldn't make much of a problem over the participants in those talks. The talks should first be well prepared and then held often. I know only too well what it means to prepare such talks. I took part in preparing Dayton with a few high US diplomats, five months prior to the conference in Dayton and no one knew that. We "cooked" a single two and a half page long document for five months in which all of the key principles were imbued which, later, were consistently represented in the "thickened" Dayton agreement. Holbrooke appeared on the scene later. That is why I am an advocate that such things should be done gradually even though I know that a lot of time has already been lost.