An Introduction to the General Military Calvary

Five full years have passed since the crime in the Paracin barracks "Branko Krsmanovic, when Aziz Kellmendi killed four and wounded five of his uniformed companions. There were few then who could have foreseen that this could maybe be an indication of the general calvary which neither Yugoslavia nor its mighty army would survive.

Following the first news of the crime and the first official statements, commentators appeared in the media. The official military and national stand was warmly embraced by Tanjug's commentator and the "Rillindya" commentator as a media paradigm whose content was epitomized in the heading which said that Kellmendi had shot at the Army as a metaphor for Yugoslavia. This heading was later worked to death, and the entire media and informative propaganda offensive throughout Yugoslav territory (with the exception of Slovenia) turned on the dead Kellmendi as a personification of Albanian nationalism and separatism. This was the line of least resistance, and it pleased those of lazy spirit and anti-Albanian sentiment, which is to say that no effort was made to discover the real motive of Kellmendi's tragic act. Later on support was sought (and found) for the thesis that Kellmendi had consciously sacrificed his life in the interests of the Albanian nation. In this way it was "discovered" that even before coming to the army he had advocated and defended the idea of a "Kosovo Republic"; that his brothers had written out "slogans of unfriendly content", and that his father, then a guest worker, had, on the day of the incident, come to the barracks "supposedly to visit his son, but his intention was apparent: he was going to collect him and cross the border".

Even though the investigation, and later the trial in January 1988 of his accomplices, moved in this direction, today it is still not known whether Kellmendi pulled the trigger as an Albanian nationalist romantic, as a mentally deranged person, or as a mass murderer. The Military Court in Nis was unable to disregard certain facts, for example, that Kellmendi had twice before come into conflict with Safet Dudakovic (one of the killed). The truth is that Kellmendi killed him first! Safet was the only one of the four killed and five wounded that he looked for among the sleeping soldiers. Why? Why after the first and chosen victim did he continue in his bloody coup?

The court hearing was closed to the public and little is known about it. Admittedly, throughout out the process which lasted for two thirds of January and the first week in February 1988, the public was offered regular reports. But only what passed through the fine sieve of Vuk Obradovic, Ministry of Defense spokesman at the time. With no intent to undermine military administration of justice, the verdict could in principle have been foreseen from the moment the process began. The eight accused, all Albanians and one Moslem, were condemned, as accomplices in the crime, to prison sentences of between 2 and 15 years.

The Army kept the public in the dark for half a day, particularly the parents whose children were doing their military service, so that the Paracin tragedy was surrounded by rumors already by 3 September. But, when the official information was leaked, the Administration successively launched the dictum that the Army, in particular its command and officers' corps, were in no way guilty for what happened in the "Branko Krsmanovic" barracks. One of these statements said that "the reaction of the guard in the barracks could have been different, but in no way could bloodshed have been avoided", because "the crime had been planned and the murderer resolute in carrying it out". The Federal Secretary for Defense at the time, Admiral Mamula, in his many tirades, repeated the pathetic question: "How many more Kellmendis are there in our units?"

Probably no-one then could have offered an answer to the sensitive vanity and interests of the military establishment of Slobodan Milosevic. He masterfully rode the wave of "attacks on the Army", and in this way saddled the credulous and not particularly intellectual generals, who so supported Milosevic's populism and noxious nationalist passion in Serbia.

And anyone who believed in the power of the Army and perfection of its organization, anyone ready to open their eyes, had to be concerned and shocked by the total lack of order in the Paracin barracks: not one lever of its internal service functioned as it should have; ammunition was stored in a cupboard that could be opened by a blow of the fist, and soldiers changed duties as they pleased. There was Albanian nationalism in the Army, of course there was. But we are strongly convinced that nationalism was not the decisive factor in the Paracin tragedy. Kellmendi had to happen, whether in Paracin or some other garrison, as an expression of the decadence of the army and the system it served.

The Paracin disaster was the beginning of the end of a once mighty army. There are few today who remember the crime, which can hardly be called a crime any more in relation to the frightful bestiality which has been ours for already a year and a half, and for which no end is in sight.