Defeat Of An Aggressive Ideology

What are the goals of Slovenia's current policy in the Balkans?

During the talks in Brussels, the Hague and London we tried to play a part in the Balkan show. After a short conflict in Slovenia in June last year, we assessed with justification, that we were not faced with a direct military threat, but that did not prevent us, for many other reasons, from remaining involved in the resolving of this conflict. In the end, this was demanded of us by those who set the tempo of our inclusion in various institutions. Our initiatives were not wholly unsuccessful: we urged for the idea of a "mini CSCE", which at the time, could have, perhaps, changed the course of the conflict towards a peaceful solution of the crisis. At the same time, through our diplomatic activities we tried to retain an objective image of the war in the Balkans. We wished to be objective, since we could not be neutral in a conflict in which one side had greater guilt than the other. Our image of reality was certainly not favorable as regards Serbia or Montenegro, since the leaderships of those republics carry the greatest responsibility for the war in these spaces.

How do you see the resolving of the conflict in Bosnia- Herzegovina?

Cyrus Vance recently abandoned the idea on cantonization, while our Foreign Ministry had urged for a whole Bosnia- Herzegovina from the very start, we were opposed to cantonization which only leads to war.

Isn't such a Slovenian stand contradictory? After gaining independence, Slovenian politicians urged for "the right to self- determination including secession" and opposed majorization, while in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina they have suddenly forgotten this same right, for, shall we say, the Serbian people, and defend the principle of a whole state.

The question of minorities cannot be resolved through the slogan "all in one state," but in accordance with certain rules. The disintegration of Yugoslavia came about when people began wondering if a different order was possible, one which would be different from a democracy by consensus. It is not necessary to develop the principle of consensus to absurdity, but this principle was the only barrier to a vulgar understanding of the majority principle upheld by Serbian policy. This is why self- determination is possible in culturally and nationally homogeneous units, while mixed ones require different mechanisms. This is also why I do not support the breaking up of Bosnia. I remember with how much tact, when we were part of Yugoslavia's diplomacy, we talked with various dictators, taking care that the heads of these states which had Serbian minorities would not be affronted by our ideas. And look at the facility with which they took to such drastic measures when the survival of the Serbian minority in neighboring states was concerned, states with which it was possible to come to an agreement without applying the logic of tanks and the knives. The right to self-determination is limited by norms on which the new world order is based, it is an order which is no longer based on pre-modern philosophies of territorial conquest, looting and all the rest which now characterizes Serbian politics and diplomacy when trying to "resolve" the Serbian question.

The initial political disagreements between Serbia and Slovenia were reflected on the problem of Kosovo. How does Slovenia and its foreign policy see Kosovo today. Do ethnic Albanians have the right to secede from Serbia? Allegedly, there was a change in Slovenia's upholding of Serbian stands before the start of the London Conference.

Slovenia and Serbia did not come into conflict in the former Yugoslavia over the problem of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, as over a difference in the timing regarding the perception that the time had come for democratization and the adopting of certain values which had prevailed in the civilized part of the world. We all claimed wholeheartedly that we wished to become a part of that world. The conflict could have erupted in any other field, not just over the ethnic Albanian question. I do believe that the ethnic Albanians have as much right to self-determination as any other nation in Europe - they have the right to a state and the possibility of realizing their idea in some new Europe. However, this idea is not of great importance to the world at large. We, Slovenians, do not consider the uniting of all Slovenians in one state a primary issue. The important thing is that our minorities are happy and protected. This is why it can sometimes be said that some ethnic Albanian parties are over ambitious in their goals.

You worked in the Federal government for quite a long time. When did you stop believing in the possibility of a democratic Yugoslavia?

I still have a copy of my resignation. I wrote it on the day when the election results in Serbia were announced, on Sunday December 10. Once Milosevic had won the elections, the Yugoslav option ceased to exist. I stayed on for a while as head of the press and cultural sector. Under an agreement with the Slovenian government I stayed in office until the end. When all that happened on June 26, 1991, I remained here (in Slovenia), this was where I belonged. I accepted the post of Slovenian Foreign Ministry spokesman.

At the London Conference and prior to it, you followed the work of the Serbian and Montenegrin delegations. How would you assess them now, especially since the arrival of Milan Panic?

We met Milan Panic for the first time at the London Conference. He asked for a short talk near our table and we agreed. Panic warned us of his government's open stand towards Slovenia and expressed regret over Slovenia's reserved stand to the new state. Rupel (Slovenian Foreign Minister) told him that we did not have anything against Serbia or the Serbian people, but that our policy concerning the new Yugoslavia would change only when Serbia changed its practical policy. We also talked about Bosnia. Panic reiterated that the planes bombing places in Bosnia were not real ones but some "Mickey Mouse" planes. Our talk ended with that. Slovenia is favorably disposed towards Panic's initiatives and the new political alternatives he is offering. However, until this policy shows results, there will be no changes in Slovenia's policies.

Minister Rupel said recently that even 1/3 of the border with Croatia was not defined, and that Slovenia would, if necessary, internationalize the problem of the Bay of Piran, which is greatly reminiscent of the problem of Prevlaka.

Since becoming states, Croatia and Slovenia have encountered some unforeseen problems. The Bay of Piran is a classical international-legal problem which requires an original solution which will respect the interests of both sides and will not follow the simplest logic based on an advantage gained by one side, but that side, in this case Croatia, will have to take into consideration some other priority interests. We will not ask for more than we can get in that area, within given norms. If we ourselves are not capable of finding a satisfactory solution, the most natural thing would be for two democratic states to ask for arbitration and consult international institutions. This is not internationalization as a threat, which is how Croatia has interpreted our initiative, but a normal reaching for instruments at our disposal.

You have already opened an Embassy in Zagreb. Are you thinking of opening one in Belgrade?

Not yet, but I am sure that Slovenia will find an interest in setting up intensive and good contacts with Serbia and Montenegro. It will be necessary to renew all severed cultural and economic links. Naturally, after the new state passes the international test with regard to respecting human rights and the integrity of neighboring states, which are essential to achieving recognition.

Is it true that when you left for Slovenia in June last year, you were robbed of all your property?

Yes. The flat in 7 Jula Street 10/a was looted. An unorganized and "spontaneous" police broke into my flat several days after the beginning of the June clashes in Slovenia. I tried to talk to them by telephone and get them to return some things which were of no importance to them, mostly mementos and presents from friends. They said that they had simply looked for the first Slovenian in order to take revenge "for the evil done in Slovenia," and in order to "make up for the losses" they had thought of me. I said: " All right, you make up for losses if there is anything to take from the Slovenian state, but those are my personal belongings, and you and I do not have any personal scores to settle..." I also negotiated through my friends in Belgrade, so that the new inhabitants of my flat showed a readiness to leave some things outside the front door and my friends took them. Luckily, paintings which I had bought while living in Belgrade were put outside, but a lot of other things I loved remained...