The Conflict

In his nightmares the Federal President Dobrica Cosic was hesitating whether to move against his biggest obstacle. The obstacle has attacked him. Slobodan Milosevic, still the Serbian President, in an interview to the TV Serbia called Cosic "that other person".

DEPOS member Zivorad Stojkovic has given the Yugoslav President an unambiguous advice: "We are now in a state of emergency and it calls for urgent action. Conflicts and disorder, which would be provoked by the self-defense of the ruling Serbia, together with its ally Seselj and his armed to the teeth specialists for violence, could be prevented by taking extraordinary measures". Practically, Stojkovic offered Cosic to place himself at the head of the opposition and to make a coup d'état.

Cosic finally uttered that the differences between him and the President of Serbia are growing. He is now expected to do something he is not capable of - to act energetically as Milosevic does. The Federal Minister without portfolio, Ljubisa Rakic, whose statement in fact was commented by Milosevic, this autumn has surprised the journalists knowing his former enthusiasm for the Leader: in the Federal Parliament hall, during the discussion on the confidence in the Government, he said loudly and furiously: "Nothing good, until these Milosevic's communists go away!"

Professor Svetozar Stojanovic has recently warned that "the President should not be used out". These words could indicate that the President will not enter any electoral slate, that he does not intend to become the leader of the opposition, and will not, to the last moment, support any side directly, but will try to play the role of arbiter in the big confusion.

After the failure of the referendum (44,12 %), Vuk Draskovic (Serbian Renewal Movement) has stressed that the elections now depend on Cosic's and Panic's good will and decisiveness: these two should address the public and ask for help, in which case the things would change fast. On Thursday (October 15) he pointed out again that there could be an outburst of dissatisfaction, which would not be as tolerant as the previous ones.

According to Vesna Pesic (Civic Alliance), conflicts in Serbia are being intensified, whereas the Civic Alliance favors the peaceful means of conflict resolution. Cedomir Mirkovic (Social-Democratic Party) also finds that the Republican and Federal Governments conflict is getting more obvious and more severe. He fears that the ruling elite will defend its power by very unpopular means.

Zoran Djindjic (Democratic Party) considers that those who voted against the referendum do not want peaceful changes. He is afraid that the supporters of radical changes will now clash with the radical defenders of the regime.

Cosic does not like this. In his interview to "Politika", he declared himself against "revolutionary changes" and "chaos", preferring - as at the beginning of his mandate - "evolutionary transformations". The speech that he delivered in the Yugoslav Parliament shows that he assesses the earlier politics as catastrophic and is trying to take a pragmatic standpoint.

Cosic's recently published diary notes prove that he considered "the most popular Serb of the 20-th century" (Slobodan Milosevic) responsible for the "uniting of Serbia", for breaking up with "titoism" and raising up the Serbian issue, but at the same time found him too authoritarian in internal affairs and surrounded by bad collaborators. The last remark was confirmed by Milosevic himself in his interview to the Serbian TV: "In general, they are right..." (those who claim he used to choose bad assistants). In so far, Cosic has not joined any action against the Serbian leader (he could have an alibi in the fact that he stayed in hospital during a part of Milosevic's rule): in 1990, he supported Milosevic's referendum "first the Constitution, then the elections"; in March 1991, he wrote a letter advising Milosevic to ease up, at the same time speaking in public that he saw only disaster; in spring 1992, when Slobodan Selenic (DEPOS) suggested the Serbian Science and Art Academy to request the resignation of the Serbian President, he was short of words, capability for understanding and observation to express his anxiety; in the conflict between the authorities and the opposition over the terms of the May '92 elections, he lamented ("For God's sake, let them reach the agreement"), practically defending the authorities rather than the opposition.

In the summer, with even the sparrows shouting "Go away", he said that he "was not well acquainted" with the Serbian President, that they were not friends and had only cooperative relations. So far he has not given any sign of having a direct intention to remove Milosevic, although it was clear he was trying to push him aside. According to Vojislav Kostunica (Democratic Party of Serbia), by voting at the referendum Cosic admitted its legality. He, however, annulled its result right on the spot, when in front of the ballot box on Dedinje on Sunday (October 11) he mentioned that "another possibility could be used" i.e. that the Republican Parliament could be dismissed. Yet Cosic has not indicated how he plans to do this, since, formally, he does not have such a right. Four days later he described holding the elections as the condition for the state survival, preservation of the Serbian-Montenegrin federation and bare existence.

On September 4, Slobodan Milosevic, upon his arrival from the London Conference, after he had been looking for pilots through London hotels for 2 hours - in nearly a conspiracy plot with Seselj and Crncevic - set forth a proposal for taking a vote of non-confidence in the Federal Prime Minister, without informing the head of the state about this. Cosic reproached the initiators very severely for not being consulted and announced that he would not follow them.

Milosevic is probably counting on potential differences in the Federal Palace, since he so bluntly stated he did not consider Cosic and Panic being team-mates. It was said by a witness that Panic, wishing to make a strong impression in London, has given Milosevic a letter of resignation to sign. In reaction, the "Governor of California" physically threatened Panic, who asked surprisingly: "You want to fight?" After this, the vote of non-confidence in the Federal Government was set up, soon to be abandoned, maybe under Cosic's pressure, maybe because of external circumstances, and maybe because of the risk of opposition demonstrations.

It could be that Milosevic's fury is now urged by the Federal Government's promise to cooperate with the Security Council in investigating the war crimes. Since this process could be seen to contain a "wanted" circular for an important person in Serbia, a violent reaction was expected. Those who can see the state apparatus at work from within say that opening of the inquiry has provoked much confusion and strengthened the tension.

It is interesting that the official propaganda has not undermined Panic's negotiations with ethnic Albanians, whose beginning is encouraging. The police, however, has not restrained itself from intervention against demonstrators.

In Belgrade political milieu a lot of excitement was provoked by the Yugoslav President's announcement that he would address the nation. It was clear that for some time he would go on with exhausting himself in the "navigation technique". When it was obvious that the referendum had failed, the President's adviser Svetozar Stojanovic varied the thesis that the Serbian Government "should draw consequences for itself and for the future", meaning that it should resign since its significant proposal was not accepted by voters and that the elections must be held by the end of December.

In September and October no political group, except for the Democratic Party, reacted to shyly announced constitutional changes at the federal level. These were guessed to include restrictions of the republican presidents' power, perhaps even the abolishment of these posts. At the same time, however, in Montenegro, de facto and de iure, the position of the republican head of state was being strengthened.

Cosic's intention to enforce the federal authorities is not directly connected with the success or the failure of, either the efforts to hold the elections, the attempt of the Socialists to exclude the post of the republican president from the vote, or Milosevic's potential transfer to the position of the party leader.

Commenting the reproach coming from the top state officials that voters will replace all the irresponsible opposition leaders, Vojislav Kostunica bitterly says that it is in fact Cosic and Panic who currently have the least legitimacy, as "they were not elected". He thinks that the relations between the Serbian President, the Federal Prime Minister and the President of Yugoslavia must be cleared out and that their conflict is unavoidable; at the moment, their attitudes concerning the elections are not clear.

Even those who consider him an accomplice in the present problems look now at Cosic, apt to support him, even to forgive him. It is not clear yet whether he, who used to be a friend of leftists and nationalists, and leftist who became nationalists and nationalists who became pacifists, wants to use their support.