Night Attack

Milosevic's regime now controls all information which had been collected for decades, processed, analyzed and kept in the archives of the secret service of all the previous Yugoslav states. The matter is reminiscent of King Solomon's treasure; a treasury of political arguments, one of whose importance very few people were aware of. The federal state has been left in the control of only two secret services, and that it is not a sure thing.

Things became clear later. But then it was too late. The public was first aware that something was happening on Sunday evening when the first edition of the Belgrade daily BORBA dated October 19 hit the streets. "Republican Police Oust Federal Police" said the headline on the last page, and the article went on to say that Federal Minister of Interior Pavle Bulatovic might find himself "knocking on a closed door" when he goes to work tomorrow. The article also said that the Federal Ministry of Interior had received a letter from the Second Municipal Court saying that the building now belonged to the Serbian Ministry of Interior, on the basis of a decision signed in July by Mihalj Kertes as the "assistant" of the federal minister. Those employees of the Federal Ministry who have telephones did not need to read tomorrow's "Borba": they were informed by their department heads on Sunday evening that they need not come to work the next day, as they would not be allowed to enter the building. No explanations were given, as none need be given to subordinates.

Concrete measures were undertaken in the night between October 18 and 19: eyewitnesses say that about 200 police of the Serbian Ministry of Interior, in full battledress and with arms encircled the building of the Federal Ministry of Interior in Knez Milosa Street no. 92. There was no resistance - according to some reports - the guards on duty (several policemen) were disarmed without incident. On Monday several persons left the building under heavy guard and crossed the road to the building of the Serbian Ministry of Interior. Everything seemed as usual on October 19 at the end of Knez Milosa Street, with the exception of a larger number of policemen in front of the Serbian Ministry of Interior building and a certain number in civilian clothes standing on key corners and in cars. At about 10 a.m. Mihalj Kertes, deputy (Serbian Socialist Party - SPS) in the Serbian Parliament and former assistant of the Federal Minister of Interior, was seen entering the building of the Federal Ministry. During the morning Yugoslav Army (Mi-8) helicopters flew over this part of the Savski Venac municipality, something they do not normally do. The Yugoslav Army General Staff said they were following developments, that Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic's hasty return was linked to the affair, but that Yugoslav Army units had not been placed on full alert. The Special Units' command was, however, "carefully following developments."

During the following days Pavle Bulatovic met unsuccessfully on two occasions with Serbian Interior Minister Zoran Sokolovic, after which he moved his cabinet to the Federal Government building in New Belgrade. Things were happening in the Federal Ministry building. Employees of the Federal Ministry of Interior received an offer - ultimatum, on Tuesday: they would accept new passes on which was printed "Serbian Ministry of Interior" without which they could not enter the building, or... World press and television stirred up a fuss over a "coup d'état." This was overdoing things. It was clear on Tuesday that the operation was a limited one, but the goals, it turned out, were much greater than had been thought.

Things cleared up on Monday, October 19. The Serbian Government was the first to address the public with a statement saying that everything was all right, that the matter pertained to a banal "property controversy," because the building, allegedly, had been the property of the Republic of Serbia since April (under a decision signed by Petar Gracanin - Federal Interior Minister at the time), and with the Second Municipal Court's decision of October 15, the right to move in was carried out. However, on the same afternoon, President of the Second Municipal Court Bratimir Tocanac (in charge of the land-register) said publicly that he was not aware of any controversy. The situation quickly became interesting from the legal point of view: it would turn out later that the entire legal basis of the night raid was fictitious. The matter pertains to violence and Sokolovic's explanation (Wednesday, October 21) that the "Serbian Ministry of Interior was the only competent organ" (for the carrying out of the non-existing court decision) does not seem to hold. Namely, it has turned out that the Second Municipal Court's alleged ruling (which in spite of claims by Tocanac, does seem to exist) is far from being valid: the deadline for complaints had not run out; it is said that the Federal Ministry received the ruling on October 19, i.e. after the night attack ; there is no final decision for the forceful moving in, which must be issued by the competent executive court.

The Federal Government met on Monday morning, even though it was scheduled to meet at 4 p.m. An announcement issued in the evening said that the matter concerned an act of violence, and said, without going into the political implications, that the Federal Prosecutor would lodge a complaint "for disturbance of property."

Prime Minister Panic later tried to play down the importance of the incident (Vienna, Thursday). At a meeting of Federal Ministry employees on Thursday, Bulatovic accused the Serbian police of lies and political allegiance, instead of protecting the state and law. Information that three federal policemen had barricaded themselves in some rooms, and were being kept without water and food for three days, could not be checked. Sokolovic said on Wednesday that he did not understand what the whole fuss was about: "We thought that the matter was to the satisfaction of both sides," said Sokolovic, adding that he had agreed on everything with the Federal Ministry of Interior (during Petar Gracanin's term in office) and that Mihalj Kertes had nothing to do with the whole affair, and that he (Sokolovic) considered "all signatures valid, whether that of a minister or an assistant." Some later recalled a decree issued by the Serbian Government in August 1991 banning the use of all property belonging to the former federation until a final division of assets had been completed. Regardless of this, former Federal Minister of Interior Petar Gracanin informed the Serbian Ministry in May 1992, that he had vacated a part of the federal building for the needs of the Serbian Ministry of Interior.

Why did last week's night attack come about and why have hasty, insolent, untruthful and hypocritical explanations been offered post factum? Why did the Federal Government, or rather, its Minister of Interior, allow itself to be put into such a situation, even though it knew, or must have been aware of the Serbian Ministry of Interior's appetites? It seems that panic forced the hand of the Serbian side; and that the federal side was confused, or perhaps even worse...

In what political context does a night attack on the Federal Interior Ministry building take place? Where, with the exception of Spain in 1936 at the beginning of the civil war, does one police force take over the offices of another? On the Friday preceding the critical weekend, Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic threatened in the Federal Parliament that paramilitary formations, war criminals and "armed politicians" would be prosecuted. Negotiations in Geneva are reaching a final stage in the taking over of responsibilities in this respect. Even the birds know who are the people who fall into these three categories. The broader context is even worse: time is running out for Slobodan Milosevic and his followers, the final showdown with the federal authorities is closer and chances of a victory are diminishing.

"I'm surprised they waited so long; I would have done it a long time ago," said an employee of the Federal Ministry of Interior speaking of the night raid, and gives his reasons: the building and equipment are chicken feed compared to the real stuff; the archives and dossiers of the Federal Ministry of Interior, i.e. its State Security. These archives cover practically everything of importance that took place with regard to internal and external security since 1944 up to the present day and in minute detail. We are not talking of the final product, reports sent to the state top, but of the raw material, of original reports from the field, before they had been processed. Apart from this, the archives contain all the information regarding collaborating networks at home and abroad, codes, the real identity of agents and detailed histories of various operations. This includes operations of the most sensitive nature, and are linked to the so-called international cooperation of security organs. Whoever possesses those archives and knows how to use them intelligently, has great political power."

VREME's collocutor recalls that, with regard to the most recent Balkan wars, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Ministry of Interior archives contain all the details on how networks were set up for the organizing, insurgence and arming of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (plan RAM), reports by Federal Ministry of Interior inspectors from the field at the beginning of the war (March-July 1991), reports from collaborating networks "from the time when the Federal Ministry of Interior State Security existed - until July 1991," said our source. Asked what he meant, he said that the Federal Ministry of Interior State Security "had been liquidated in the operational sense of the word when the war really started", and that the Serbian Ministry of Interior under Radmilo Bogdanovic and Slobodan Milosevic's parallel Secret Service headed by Mihalj Kertes had practically taken over all work and sources linked to state security. Until that time, however, the State Security apparatus was relatively intact, thanks to the efforts of its employees, and was sending "very interesting information" on developments in the field. It is these facts, which pertain to the circumstances under which the war started, which could be of crucial political importance at a given moment, since they refer to "relations between various organs of the Interior Ministry, between politicians and public personalities and paramilitary formations of various parties, various police or well-known criminals." The matter concerns, said our collocutor, arms, money, equipment, telecommunication and vehicles "in one direction, and looted goods, money, foreign currency and gold in the other." He refused to mention names, but said that this was "all public knowledge."

Another State Security employee with whom we talked underlined the potential political importance of the Federal Ministry of Interior archives, i.e. the Ministry of Interior of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on a long-term basis: "Look, there are two sets of all the dossiers - papers and microfilms, I never understood why they were kept in the same place. It's crazy. That is highly explosive stuff. The possibilities of abusing those papers are fantastic, if anyone has a monopoly over them, as they do now. Every legitimate and justified operation in the past can now be presented as espionage, treason and crime. A lot of honest and patriotic people working in this Service, and outside can be dishonored. After twenty years in the Service I know how widely we were spread and how certain things can be abused - if someone wants to." Our other collocutor said that the night attack has given Milosevic's people "great material" with which they can prolong their political life "for several months at least" - if they are intelligent. He recalls that the public still does not know some details: above all, that the Federal Ministry of Interior had been "systematically infiltrated" by the Serbian State Security since 1989, so that "they did not have to wander about the building: they knew exactly whose offices to enter and what they would find there." He recalls that "two-thirds of the Federal Ministry of Interior had been forced into early retirement from 1989 to 1991, and that this included many young, honest and competent people aged 35-37, while careerists, Milosevic's followers and amateurs remained. The Serbian Ministry of Interior took over a part of the staff - at higher salaries. Regardless of all this, "a certain professional standard was retained in the house," said our collocutor.

After the attack, a group of Federal Ministry of Interior members of Montenegrin origin ran out of patience and returned to Podgorica. "We did not want Serbian Ministry of Interior passes," they said, obviously dissatisfied with "Bulatovic's role. It's as if he were in on the whole thing. They offered some of our men a job with the Serbian Ministry of Interior, secretly, but they refused." Bulatovic belongs to the cadres of the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" and is directly linked to the arming of Eastern Herzegovina, the Dubrovnik operation and events in Plevlja. He also minimized the incident, telling his policemen that the "vital functions had been preserved," and that "it was unimportant where the Federal Ministry would carry out its tasks (as if he, by moving his cabinet to the Federal Government building, had also taken along with him the archives, technology and equipment.) One of the employees of the State Security who talked to VREME believes that the matter could refer to a "deal" between Bulatovic - "it is not easy on him either, he's done all sorts of things" and Sokolovic - "somebody handed the building over." "Ten determined men could have defended the building; they could have called for help from the Federal police brigade in Batajnica (police barracks outside Belgrade); let somebody try and fire at them or return their fire: the army would have to become involved - on one side or the other; at least we would finally know how we stand, not this way, with everything just dragging along..."

The Federal Government allowed itself the luxury of not telling all and sundry what dangers threatened its Interior Ministry, and that is something it will have to deal with sooner or later.

The support shown immediately by political parties confirms this: only the Serbian National Renewal (SNO) and Vojislav Seselj's Serbian Radical Party upheld the raid using arguments of the "it was an anti-Serbian Broz-type conspiracy," kind. ("Of course, they can breathe more easily because Panic did not get hold of their dossiers," said one of the policemen we talked to.) It is clear that a battle for control of police and secret services is at stake, i.e. for a monopoly over their information sources - knowledge and power, especially in Balkan politics. One of the collocutors laughed at the allusion to monopoly: "That will be difficult: I know a lot of them who have taken and hidden sensitive, current issues - just in case, so as to save themselves, if need be." The atmosphere is clear: everything is falling apart, "its best to save one's skin, and if necessary, secure the future, and we didn't ruin the Service in the first place..." The same collocutor recalls that a good deal of the most sensitive information and of the greatest importance was always fraternally shared by the Federal Ministry of Interior, the military security and SID (Intelligence Service), so that copies of cases exist, as well as traces for the future reconstruction of cases, operations and networks. He cautions, however, that the greatest part of the sensitive material had remained in the Federal Ministry of Interior archives and that their loss was due to "unforgivable amateurism," because those archives are the "basic tools, without which the police are powerless." Military Security and the Intelligence Service, he says, received all that concerned them; and the Intelligence Service is currently controlled by Sokolovic's former State Security chief Zoran Janackovic, "which is disturbing, as they have infiltrated the federal top and that is a very sensitive spot," cautioned our source. There is another reason for the night attack on the Federal Interior Ministry building, and it is one of a preventive nature. Namely, it could be expected that Panic's Federal Government would try to secure the operative support of the police in the field, because without it you do not have real power; the only available option was the former Federal Ministry of Interior. With the support of federal policemen forced into retirement who would return to active service (capable, experienced and still smarting from the insult), Panic would acquire an efficient police with significant operational possibilities and technical and documentary sources unparalleled. This had to be prevented at all costs, VREME's collocutors agree. If we add to all this data on the military (or, shall we say, paramilitary - that was how it started in Slovenia and Croatia) potential of the Serbian Interior Ministry, the conclusion should be reason for concern for the federal authorities headed by Cosic-Panic, if it is not so already.

Namely, the systematic transferring of highly rated specialists from the military reserve into the police reserve, gives the Serbian Interior Ministry about three infantry divisions (35,000-38,000 men); the Serbian Interior Ministry can always commandeer the necessary transportation from civilians and the heavy arms and equipment from the Territorial Defence reserves; experience has shown that the Police reserve and Territorial Defence were used to create the republican armies (in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia); if we add to this the active Police Force, irregular paramilitary units - in the long run controlled by the Serbian Interior Ministry and the para-police controlled by Kertes-Bogdanovic, including experienced Serbian troops from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina which could be engaged at a given moment for the defense of Milosevic's regime, we end up with a significant military force. This force, with its men (experienced fighters), their motivation (careerism, lack of choice, hatred of the Serbian opposition) would have against it young and under-trained soldiers of the Yugoslav Army, reservists who have had enough of everything and those professionals of the

Yugoslav Army who will, in the meantime, be organized and trained. With the adequate psychological preparations (an artificially provoked crisis which would stir up a nationalist euphoria), Slobodan Milosevic's war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could stand the chance of a short-term success - after which things would not matter any more, as the time for all reasonable solutions has already run out. The only thing which could change the development of such a military situation, and the matter pertains at this moment solely to a balance of strengths, as Milosevic likes to say, is the Yugoslav Army's unconditional support of the legal federal authorities led by Cosic-Panic and the definite political commitment of all the truly opposition parties in Serbia and Montenegro against Milosevic's regime. In that case - and only in that case - will the loss of the Federal Interior Ministry building and its archives become a politically irrelevant incident. Until this is not cleared up and defined, a time of fear will begin for many.