Fighters And Gardeners

The first free elections have been called in Serbia, or rather, Yugoslavia for the third time, and probably in vain again. With elections, or without them, Milosevic must leave. With elections, or without them, he does not want to. A small police exercise in Knez Milosa Street, with no bullets fired, showed Cosic and Panic who had arms and how far they were prepared to go. Milosevic also made it clear he was tired of their persuading him to retire. He knows that he has gone too far to worry about History's judgment, and precisely because of that, does not intend to end the party.

Dobrica Cosic did not have much choice but to call a general election. Cosic, the author, has found himself playing one of the main roles and he cares very much about his place in History, and believes that he can still improve his ratings. To achieve this he must remove Milosevic and it must be clear that he, Cosic, did so, since he cannot erase his responsibility in Milosevic's rise to power. But, Milosevic controls the television and police, and in order to defeat him, a great joint effort is required by all his opponents. In short, the elections must be a unanimous rejection of Milosevic.

Milosevic's lethal policy has resulted in the opposition's current stand. It seems, however, that Cosic is not yet ready to accept and back the entire opposition, and is still thinking of "what will come after." However, none have the right to ask this question any more. Those who did not understand at the start of the war in Croatia where Milosevic's policy was leading, have no place in serious politics, and would be better suited to gardening. Cosic would prefer to back the Democratic Party and the Montenegrin Socialists, but this block is weak, even with him to lead it. He is wary of Vuk Draskovic and DEPOS, partly for personal reasons; they seem revengeful and remember all his earlier sins better than his later merit.

As regards the federal elections, nothing is clear and a difficult battle over election conditions will be fought these days, but it seems that the opposition has understood that they must be united and unanimous, even if they have to draw straws to decide if they will participate or boycott the elections. The agreement is not a firm one. DEPOS fears election tricks and does not trust Cosic; the Democrats believe that with congenial parties they could seek support in some center, which, however, does not exist. The matter is akin to natural disasters such as fires, floods and earthquakes, from which salvation must be sought jointly. Only in this way, for a short while, can a hybrid name Vuk Micunovic come about.

If election conditions do not allow a reasonable chance of a victory, the opposition might decide to boycott them. If it decides to participate, it will have to ensure Cosic's and Panic's support. Whoever defaults or goes his separate way will be held responsible for all that Milosevic and Seselj break or destroy. And they can still do a lot of that.

The opposition's united appearance depends to a great extent on the Democratic Party (DS) and the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO). The others will fall into line, more or less. Relations between the DS and SPO are characterized by party interests and personal intolerance and a fundamental difference in the choice of means and methods to be used in opposing the regime. Micunovic believes that authority must be won by legal, democratic means and by elections. Draskovic doubts such ways and favors revolutionary methods and is waiting for the energy of rebellion to grow and erupt.

Both sides have better arguments against the other side than they do in favor of their own. Micunovic believes that rebellion is too violent and dangerous, and does not see who could carry it out, and cites the failure of protest rallies and demonstrations. Draskovic can easily prove that with Milosevic controlling Television, the opposition can only run around in circles. If it is true that the regime is slowly weakening and easing up, then the process is too slow. This regime must not be allowed any more time. The dilemma is a serious and real one, but the controversy is, perhaps, totally unnecessary, because Milosevic will resolve it himself. He is the one dictating the rules: to go to elections or to take to the streets. Votes or arms. Whoever rejects some of the means a priori, whoever is not ready for whatever is offered, will be written off as a partner. For the time being, Milosevic has agreed to elections, but he also has a card up his sleeve.

If opposition parties do participate in the elections, it would be best if they were to refrain from ideological controversies and dropped accusations of Bolshevism, stopped threats of revenge and punishment, and did not mention their programs and solutions. This regime is under United Nations sanctions and an investigation of war crimes. This is the only election topic to be worked on in order that all become aware of what it means and what the voting is really about.

The stand that sanctions are unjust and that Milosevic must go will only confuse the voters. The opposition must find the strength to say that the Serbian regime carries a great deal of responsibility for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The whole world is not misinformed, nor is there a planetary conspiracy against Serbia. If the international community had wanted to punish the people, it would have done everything to keep Milosevic in power as he is the greatest sanction of all. His regime is an embargo on life. This is well understood by those in conflict with the Serbs as a people. It is a certainty that Tudjman will do something linked to Bosnia or the Krajinas during the election campaign, something that Milosevic will be able to grab and hang onto. If the international community were to follow this dialectic, it would force the Croatian President to go on holiday until December 20, or punish him too. This would be of great help to the Serbian opposition. Tudjman has long deserved a tougher treatment. Milosevic's other hope are ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. It will be very difficult to persuade Rugova of the necessity to participate in elections and so help in toppling Milosevic and helping Serbia recover.

Finally, even if Milosevic should lose the federal elections, he will wait for Vuk Micunovic at the republican ones where conditions will be much tougher. If Milosevic loses them, he will have to play the card he has up his sleeve. The way things stand, Milosevic might soon opt for this argument, which has already been announced by the raid on the federal police building. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is exhausted: Milosevic has not achieved continuity, and Cosic and Panic are only in the way. Montenegro should not celebrate independence too early. Whosoever wishes to prevent it or wants to watch a new war, should, perhaps, go there rather than to Kosovo.

A time will also come when different means will have to be used in Belgrade against the "forces of chaos and evil". Judging by the tempo of the game so far, this could come about before or after elections. At a certain dramatic moment Milosevic will call on us to see reason and realize what dangers are threatening Serbia, and if we do not take heed, he will punish the disobedient and put the others in a safe place. Only after surrounding himself with naked arms will he trip over someone's rifle butt.

The most that the opposition can do is to prepare for and facilitate this final act. Total unity both in rejection and resistance will greatly narrow down Milosevic's maneuvering space. A very small passage should be left for those who will be getting out at the last moment. Even Dusan Mitevic got out on time. But the last man to arrive will be the most important one.