Card Castles

It was planned that first victim of the election campaign would be Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic, a politician who offered sudden hope and told those in power that they did not know what they were talking about, and the whole thing nearly collapsed like a castle of cards. Sunday (November 1) saw the publication of information given by the Russian agency NOVOSTI saying that the Socialists and Serbian Radicals had reached an agreement on passing a vote of no-confidence in Prime Minister Panic. Head of a group of Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) deputies Zoran Lilic, said on Sunday evening that he "really did not know" of such an agreement.

Those opposition parties which had built great hopes in Cosic and Panic, kept silent - not knowing anything and hoping perhaps secretly, that Panic's downfall would dramatize relations between the Serbian and federal authorities to such an extent, that the federal leadership would be forced to cooperate more closely with the opposition. On Thursday, Democratic Party leader Dragoljub Micunovic criticized the attack on the federal leadership as a rash move which could result in detrimental consequences. He, however, avoided answering why the opposition had been irresolute in its silence, saying they did not have a deputy in parliament, otherwise he would certainly have reacted to the action against the federal leadership; the Montenegrins had acted well; the outcome of the voting could have been guessed; had the government received a vote of no-confidence some non-parliamentary actions would probably have been undertaken, e.t.c....

Member of the Democratic Party leadership Zoran Djindjic did, however, call a press conference during the first day of the Yugoslav Parliament's session claiming that a putsch had started. On the same day several opposition politicians (Vuk Draskovic, Vesna Pesic, Nikola Milosevic, Ceda Mirkovic) made very critical comments regarding the attack on the federal leadership.

In the Federal Parliament, members of the Federal Government looked cool and forecast that there would not be sufficient votes for a revocation and if the government were to fall, the Constitution did not bind Yugoslav President Dobrica Cosic with a deadline in which to elect a new mandatory.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic showed that he was in command of his team in the Federal Parliament even when the voting was secret. The Montenegrins were restrained and used chosen words in resisting pressures and undisguised threats, and voted for Panic.

In the end Panic said that if a vote of no-confidence in the Federal Government had been passed, then a deep political crisis would have arisen and elections might even have been postponed.

The opposition expected a lot from Cosic's address to the nation on Thursday (November 5), but it left many opposition politicians disappointed, especially when he said decisively that he would not run for any function, but that he would back that political group whose progame he liked best. "I'll decide who I'll back once I've seen the programs," said Cosic. This was unequivocal pressure on the opposition to get their act together. Contrary to surface restraint, Cosic did also say that election results would be a judgement of his work, meaning that he wants a victory, but does not wish to participate directly, or put differently, that he expects the voters to eliminate his enemies.

Procedure was given as the explanation: Cosic will remain in office until elections and remain there "until he can cooperate with the new Parliament and new Government." Cosic's proposal for a verification of his mandate through elections was not accepted, probably because the Serbian authorities do not wish to strengthen the role of the Yugoslav President. Yugoslav Information Minister Miodrag Perisic said that the new Parliament would decide on the Serbian President's mandate. Milosevic's post will be challenged in the elections.

Dragoljub Micunovic called a press conference when Cosic was speaking, and said that Cosic would certainly back the opposition at the elections, but that he was not sure about Panic.

Cosic confirmed assumptions that he differed politically both from Milosevic and Panic with whom the public at large links him. He spoke with greater reserve about Milosevic than was expected of him, saying that Mr. Milosevic had tried to persuade him into accepting a new post; that he had not asked for Milosevic's resignation, nor that any of his collocutors had made the lifting of sanctions conditional to Milosevic's resignation. "This was demanded by Mr. Panic and he can make public the contents of those talks." Minister without Portfolio Ljubisa Rakic, whose statement was the reason for this answer, specified that Panic's condition for coming to Yugoslavia had been Milosevic's resignation. Cosic left it to Milosevic's conscience to decide if he would put up his candidacy, even though he had lately repeated that neither he, nor Panic, nor Milosevic should run in the election. Cosic again sought constitutional changes which would strengthen the federation and decrease tendencies by the two republics, Serbia in particular, to hold onto the scope of statehood enjoyed earlier. This still does not explain the neglect of DEPOS's (Democratic Movement of Serbia) demand for the calling of elections for a constituent assembly.

There are no indications at present that Milosevic will take given advice, nor of what chances are stood by Milosevic's only competitor, philosopher Ljuba Tadic, an opposition politician who defended Milosevic on several occasions with the fervor of a SPS member.

Cosic was more decisive in only one detail. He said that the raid by the Serbian Police on the Federal Interior Ministry building was an act of violence and threatened the country's constitutional order. This should be interpreted as an order, if Cosic has command over anyone.

The motive for the latest attack by the Socialists and Serbian Radicals against Panic and to great measure Cosic, was probably the announced disarming of paramilitary formations. It was seen in the Yugoslav Parliament that this move was spearheaded by such war lobbyists as Serbian Emigrant Society President Brana Crncevic and politicians who can still cover their tracks, or rather, hide their policy mistakes like former SPS President Borisav Jovic and Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic.

It is possible that after the failure to get rid of Panic, something else will be tried, e.g. the destabilization of Montenegro or some other place. It is best to quote Brana Crncevic as an illustration to point: "If (Panic) does not go, then Gentlemen, and I am sorry to have to say so publically in this Assembly, I foresee a civil war in Serbia, the arrival of UNPROFOR and a whole series of misfortunes."

This is not just a bare threat. Bosnian Serbs, those who enjoy asylum and Belgrade's hospitality and protection, especially those who go around Belgrade armed, and to various meetings of regional associations in Mercedes limousines, they are the ones pressuring Serbia to enter the war and are stepping up xenophobic pressure against other nationalities.They are the ones who promote Milosevic whenever the opportunity arises. During his stay in Serbia, Republic of Serbian Krajina President Goran Hadzic made political statements. The Kosovo Serbs' lobby is active, especially that part of it which profited from Milosevic's rise to power and built houses like the Radicals did.

Radical deputy from Kosovo Milorad Jevric tried to present a rally of 2,000 Radicals against Panic in Pristina, as popular opposition. When the people of Kosovo rise against a policy or politician, notwithstanding party affiliation, then such an event carries weight in a social-political milieu.

If the names from the Parliamentary records were to be erased, it would be impossible to discern when the Serbian Radicals and when the Serbian Socialists had spoken, such is the similarity between the two parties.

The Serbian Government's stand during last week's Round Table talks was hardline and unyielding. It refused to change the Serbian RTV Executive Board and proposed that the republican elections be held in 20 electoral units, which does not suit the opposition. The Serbian round table talks made a long break and during the last round of talks the government behaved as if it wished to circumvent the round table.

At a joint session of the Judiciary and Legislative Boards a sharp debate was conducted, and many differing views were expressed. Zoran Djindjic said caustically that it was obvious that there would not be any political compromise, and that early elections would not pacify, but rather inflame the Serbian political scene. "Much is probably being lost in preparations for these elections, if there are forecasts that the federal authorities could be detrimental to any particular party, then such federal organs should be dissolved, if the federal state is detrimental to a party in forecasting the balance of strengths after the elections, then perhaps, the federal government should be toppled."

Djindjic remarked that the Socialists were trying to retain a single political monopoly, and that it was made to look like a political compromise. "The SPS would like 20-50 or 150 electoral units, it suits them that their agitprop chief produces television programs during the election campaign, it suits them that the President of the country should also be party president. He could even be a Marshal, there is still enough time until the elections. It suits them if the opposition goes to the elections and it also suits them if the opposition boycotts the elections. Very well, there will be elections without us, only I don't know what they will bring."

The Serbian government did not even yield when the final decision was being taken on the law. The voting machine was working as usual and then Serbian Premier Radoman Bozovic unexpectedly called all the heads of deputy clubs and made an offer for nine electoral units in Serbia.

It remains unclear why the Serbian government yielded suddenly, at the last moment, humiliating its faithful parliamentary majority, always ready to confront the opposition. This remains a mystery all the more so as VREME reporter gained the impression last Friday, that the Socialists were prepared to bargain and even yield.

The reaction probably resulted from a signal from above, and it probably came after a sharp discussion by the federal top, where as VREME learned, elections were not the topic of the debate. Perhaps someone figured out that the Serbian regime's position was weakened after the failure with Panic. It seems, however, that the Socialists do want elections in which the parties of the center would participate, thus making them legitimate.

It is possible that the opposition deputies' behavior has made them realize that they have, perhaps, gone too far, and so they promptly decided to ease up.

Cosic described as "ominous" a question on what would happen if the opposition decided to boycott the elections, adding that it would be "a great mistake and great political disaster and loss for out political culture." He also claimed to have information that all the relevant parties would participate in elections.

DEPOS debated for several days on whether to participate in elections. Vuk Draskovic did not exclude the possibility of mass disturbances and new mass pressures on Milosevic to resign arising from the current situation. Draskovic seems to have met with Panic, and there are indications that he is more disposed to participating in elections. Micunovic said he hoped the remaining misunderstandings would be smoothed out, that elections would be held, and that they would be peaceful.

DEPOS called on the other parties to condition the holding of elections with freedom of the media, a control of electoral lists, numbered voting slips and that the 45-days-long campaign should start as soon as controversial questions had been ironed out, which is in fact, a demand for a postponement of the elections. At the time of writing, negotiations on this proposal are still underway.