The Influence Of Television On Uncanny Voters

On October 25th and 26th, the Belgrade-based MF Agency conducted an extensive public opinion poll among the citizens of Serbia (except in Kosovo and Metohija) about the rating of political parties, coalitions and politicians, and about stands regarding the topical questions over which the public and the political scene are polarized. The agency conducted a similar poll at the end of August so that it was possible to analyze the changes that took place during September and October. The poll was based on a random sample chosen according to the principle of probability and the territorial and structural distribution of the over-age population. The sample included a total of 1500 people distributed in regional strata (Vojvodina, Belgrade, central Serbia and Sandzak) proportionally to the size of the electorate. In every stratum the sample was chosen in three stages (local communities, municipalities and persons) with the probability of the choice being approximately equal. Municipalities and local communities were selected proportionally to the size of their electorates. When choosing interviewees, those who conducted the polls followed the instructions determining the age, sex, educational and social structure of the sample. The results were corrected by the so-called post-stratification procedure to the extent to which the age and the educational structure as a whole diverged from the structure of the population (determined by the 1991 Census). The strength of a party is not measured by the number of its members, but rather by the size of the electorate which is ready to support it. The answers to the question "If the elections in Serbia were to be held today, which party would you vote for?" gave the following picture of how much the followers of parties account for in the entire electorate, with this percentage possibly being reduced by the number of those who would not turn out at the elections and who, at the same time, refuse to be polled (consistently resistant).

 

Party Percentage of votes

Socialist Party of Serbia 24.0

Serbian Radical Party 10.0

Serbian Renewal Movement 8.0

Democratic Party 7.7

Democratic Party of Serbia 4.5

Serbian National Renewal 1.8

National Party 1.2

Civic Alliance 1.1

League of Communists-

Movement for Yugoslavia 1.1

Democratic Alliance

of Hungarians in Vojvodina 1.1

Other party 2.6

Undecided 22.5

Would not take part in the elections 8.1

The rest 3.4

 

Since the end of August, the rating of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) dropped by around 5 percentage points and that of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) by around 4 percentage points, while the Serbian Renewal Movement's (SPO) position is unchanged. The rating of the Democratic Party (DS) has significantly grown (by around 3 percentage points), as did that of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) (around 2 percentage points). The number of the undecided increased by around 3.5%, while the number of those who would not turn out at the elections dropped by around 2%. The Serbian National Renewal, a "small" party, not counting the parties of national minorities, which remains recognizable, has stayed at the level of up to 2% of the electorate. By forming coalitions, opposition parties obviously gain in relation to the ruling party and the Serbian Radical Party, which is correlated to it. The practical formation of a coalition in October produced the following picture of the voters' mood:

 

Socialist Party of Serbia 23.9%

Democratic Movement of Serbia 17.6%

Serbian Radical Party 10.4%

Democratic Party 7.3%

Civic Alliance 1.3%

Other electoral list 5.9%

Undecided 21.7%

Wouldn't turn out 11.9%

 

 

One notices that the coalition of the Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEPOS) is much "stronger" than when the percentages of its integral parts are added up, which points to the favorable effect of the coalition or the favorable effect of the toned down need to identify with a party. The most important message for the opposition lies in the answer to the question "If the United Opposition were led by D. Cosic and M. Panic at the elections in Serbia, who would you vote for?" which gave the following picture:

 

United Opposition 33.2%

Socialist Party of Serbia 21.1%

Serbian Radical Party 8.4%

Other electoral list 7.1%

Undecided 18.4%

Wouldn't turn out 11.6%

 

 

It is obvious that in the event that the opposition unites, the alignment of M. Panic and D. Cosic with it would have an impact on the balance of political forces. The opposition would increase its strength not only on account of the undecided, but also on account of the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party, whose number of potential voters is dropping. The potential choice of the undecided is of crucial importance for pre-election strategies and forecasts of the outcome of the elections. This category probably also includes "converts", who usually have a crucial impact in the outcome of elections even in "old" democracies. It is assumed that this category of voters opts for the "rational formula", unlike others whose choice is based on identification with a party. (The rational orientation means envisaging the chances of one's own interests being met). The possible orientation of the undecided is intimated by certain facts concerning their attitude to party leaders and to D. Cosic, who undoubtedly has a great impact on the voters' choice. On the basis of the positive assessments of party leaders one can also conclude whom the undecided are inclined towards and how much the leaders' parties will get when it comes to voting:

 

Party The percentage of the

undecided inclined

towards a party leader

 

Socialist Party of Serbia 25.8 (23)

Serbian Renewal Movement 9.7 (10)

Democratic Party of Serbia 18.9 (21)

Democratic Party 23.9 (26)

Serbian Radical Party 22.7 (20)

 

 

In the case of the Democratic Party of Serbia and the Democratic Party, there is a somewhat larger percentage of the undecided who are neutral (grade 0). For this reason the estimates given in the brackets are more probable. The mentioned parties can count on the following maximal number of percentage points from the undecided:

 

Party Additional percentage

points from the undecided

 

Socialist Party of Serbia +5

Serbian Renewal Movement +2

Democratic Party of Serbia +5

Democratic Party +6

Serbian Radical Party +5

 

Or in other words: the united opposition forming the Democratic Coalition can count on an additional 13% of voters - that is, on a total number of votes that would guarantee its victory at the elections. The conduct of opposition parties and leaders is also of crucial importance for the ruling party whose chance of winning lies primarily in possible disagreements within the opposition and in a subsequent coalition with the Serbian Radical Party. However, it is most important for the Socialist Party of Serbia to keep Panic, and especially Cosic, away from opposition coalitions. If it succeeds in this and if the opposition divides, Milosevic's party will not need the help of the Radicals to win. The sample was not big enough in order for a reliable estimation to be made for regions or constituencies. However, on the basis of earlier public opinion polls and indicative assessments made in constituencies, one can presume what the rating of political parties and coalitions would be in certain regions. Rough estimates of the strength of parties according to regions would be as follows:

 

The strength of parties according to regions -%

 

SPS SRS DS SPO DSS Ud Wnto Oth

Belgrade 18 10 10 12 8 20 10 12

Novi Sad 26 11 11 5 1 23 3 20

Zrenjanin 26 12 5 6 38 7 16

Uzice 22 8 3 11 8 21 9 18

Kragujevac 21 9 6 10 6 29 9 10

Smederevo 26 4 5 3 3 40 5 14

Nis 25 6 12 10 2 17 18 10

Leskovac 44 17 9 7 18 3 2

 

SPS = Socialist Party of Serbia

SRS = Serbian Radical Party

DS = Democratic Party

SPO = Serbian Renewal Movement

DSS = Democratic Party of Serbia

Ud = undecided

Wnto = would not turn out

Oth = others

 

The regional distribution shows the more or less known differences contained in the conclusion that the south and the south-east are the authorities' firmest strongholds, while Belgrade, central and western Serbia and Vojvodina offer a chance for the opposition. However, the high percentage of the undecided in the Smederevo and Zrenjanin constituencies makes it difficult to forecast the results in these two regions and creates space for new political regrouping. There is no doubt that the Television is the most powerful means of influencing the voters just as it is certain that the Socialist Party of Serbia is a privileged party. In any case, the very fact that the director of the Television has become a member of the Socialist party's leadership is a mere demonstration of power. Even though, when asked "What is for you the most reliable source of political information?", 36.3% of the polled said that they believe no one, compared to 28% who trust the Television, answers to other questions show that the Television manages to generate its viewers' stand and that it molds the public opinion in the real sense of the word. Questions about the issues to which the Television devotes considerable attention are mostly answered in accordance with the way in which the Television directs the public opinion. Thus, for instance, when asked "Whether the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija should have a university in their own language and with their own curriculums?" only 6.3% of the polled answered affirmatively, while 53% gave a categorical negative answer. It is difficult to discern, in these answers, the truly independent opinions about the reasons pro and contra. The case is similar with the recognition of Macedonia: 49.2% is against and only 22.2% for it. Answering the question - "What should the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia do in the event of a military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina?" only 12% opted for neutrality, while 48% of the polled were for a military engagement. The prospects of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a state alliance are not seen as good by only 12%, even though over half of the population predicts social unrest and clashes caused by one of the parties (56.9%). Only 7% of the polled think that the sanctions are justified, compared to the 60.8% of those who consider this move by the international community to be unjustified, but then, 43.2% believe that the sanctions can be endured. When posing questions about issues to which the Television has not devoted full attention, one gets a diversity of answers. Asked about an appropriate name for the state alliance of Serbia and Montenegro, 39.8% were for the already existing name, 32.7% were for "The Alliance of Serbian States" and 10.2% for "Serbia and Montenegro". There is a uniformity in the opinions about the conflict between Milosevic and Panic. 28.2% thinks that it is Milosevic who has caused it, 28.6% considers that it is Panic, while there are 20.5% of those who believe that the conflict is not real. Therefore, Television has a great influence on the public opinion even though its credibility is largely contested. There is not just a high percentage of those who do not trust it but also when asked "What do you think about Television Serbia?" 43% said that it was the propaganda headquarters of the Socialist Party of Serbia, compared to 21% who consider it objective. Since daily newspapers have low circulations, it is no wonder that a small percentage of people get information from them and believe them. Finally, the poll proved right the claims that in the Television the authorities have a powerful weapon and that they are entering the electoral race with a considerable advantage, but it also showed that the opposition is not without a serious chance of winning either. It is possible that the outcome will not provide anyone with a sufficient advantage in order to form a government. The race has begun, the chances are equal at the moment, with the Socialist Party of Serbia being technically superior. In order to neutralize the effects of the Television, the opposition will have to invest a lot of effort. The winning combination is known but the president-writer has still not decided to become a president-politician.