Panic-Milosevic 42.6:25.5

By the middle of October 1992, the Belgrade Center for Political Science and Public Opinion Research, together with the Institute for Political Sciences, carried out an opinion poll in Serbia (without Kosovo) and Montenegro, using a random sample of 1932 people. The mentioned institute predicted the results of the '90 elections. This year VREME figured as one of the co-financiers of the research.

If you had to choose between Panic's and Milosevic's politics, which would you choose? The research carried out by the Institute for Social Sciences shows that Panic is more popular than Milosevic (the total score is 42.6:25.5 - for details, see the table).

An almost identical picture of political polarization is given by the answers to the question on sanctions - 46.7% think that everything should be done for them to be lifted, and 33% consider that the pressure must be withstood. However, there is an inconsistency in public reaction - on the one hand, many polled are for an end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they don't accept the recognition of the borders in B&H and Croatia. Forty percent of the polled can't think of a single condition to be fulfilled in order to lift the sanctions.

In a survey carried out prior to the second vote of confidence, the Federal Government was first on the confidence list, ahead of the army, police and other political institutions. At that time, Panic enjoyed the support of three quarters (76%) of the Yugoslavs. When it came to a vote of confidence in the Federal Government, there were fewer supporters - 59.4%. Public opinion was even more reserved towards the idea of President Panic leading the alliance of the democratic opposition (38% "for"). This is certainly a sign of the inconsistency of support that Panic has.

To the question "Which politician in Yugoslavia do you personally have most confidence in?", Slobodan Milosevic and Milan Panic were at the top of the credibility list (16.8:16.5), followed by Dobrica Cosic with 13.5, while Vuk Draskovic had 3.5%, Seselj 2.5%, and Vojislav Kostunica 2.3%.

Using a different criterion (the sum of favorable and unfavorable marks), Cosic is first, Panic second, Patriarch Pavle third, Slobodan Milosevic fourth. Before the appearance of Panic and Cosic, Milosevic was indisputably the first.

Of the sixteen national leaders (President Cosic, Patriarch Pavle, republican and federal presidents, political party leaders) 21% of the voters have no faith in anyone, and 19% are undecided.

Support for the Federal Government is greater among the more educated: Panic enjoys the support of the most highly qualified experts, civil servants, qualified and highly qualified workers, employees with secondary education, pupils and students, whereas his opponents are most often farmers, unqualified and semi-qualified workers and pensioners. The developed "North" is for Panic, the undeveloped "South" for Milosevic. Seventy seven percent of the Socialists and 49% of the Serbian Radicals are for Milosevic, while 87% of the members of DEPOS, 84% of the Democrats and 67% of the members of other parties are for Panic.

However, the Government and Prime Minister Panic don't have the support of the public with regards to the question of the Serbian state, e.g. borders, and this is the key political argument of their opponents. While the Federal Government advocates a civil state and national equality, only 11.2% of the polled answered that the different nations could live in accord with each other, the majority being convinced that it is best for a state to be made up of only one nationality - though majority should respect the rights of national minorities.

In measuring the attitude towards other nations and foreign states, a considerable increase in xenophobia is evident. If this survey gives a correct reflection of the state of affairs, then not only do 10% of the inhabitants of Serbia suffer from xenophobia, but 68% are in its varying stages. Most of the Serbian voters at this moment have very adverse opinions about almost all the countries in the world, with the exception, to a certain degree, of Greece, China, Rumania and Russia; their feelings towards all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, except the Montenegrins, is very unfriendly. This could be a consequence of the current "war of disintegration": only 16.1% feel as members of the former Yugoslavia, which is considerably less than those who feel they belong to Europe (26.1%).

To the question on the character of migration from Bosnia and Hercegovina, 72.9% say that it is being carried out under pressure, but there was no question as to who is applying the pressure and who is suffering its consequences. It isn't clear whether this represents an outbreak of national self-criticism - or simply vexation. With respect to this, 44.5% claim to be ill-informed about the actual situation in Bosnia. About 85% consider that we should all help the refugees, but 34.3% answer that their families wouldn't be in a position to do so.

To the question of whether Yugoslavia will be attacked in a year or two, the percentage of those who consider it probable amounts to 41.7%, of which 32% think it will be done by the USA, 16.5% by NATO, 12.1% by Germany, 11.2% by Croatia and 6.6% by Albania.

The public opinion's sensitivity to these problems widens the area for manipulation and new problems (such as sanctions and isolation), and merely provides new excuses for the governing party. The effect of propaganda on the public produces the kind of reaction that provokes irrational behavior.

The ruling party in Serbia remains in power by giving priority to resolving the Serbian question, rather than solving acute problems such as economic collapse, dysfunction of the legal state and poverty which could easily lead to social unrest and endanger its position.

To the question "Are people nowadays prepared to publicly express their political thoughts?", the sum of those who said that some, many or all were afraid to speak out came to 57% of the voters; 13% "are not sure", and a good 70% said they are frightened. This deep, accumulated, personal fear is something that is not being taken into account in this crisis.

Most people say they are highly affected by the sanctions and the country's isolation. The petrol shortage and worsening of transport hits 57.4% very hard; the shortage and high price of heating fuels greatly affects 71%, the shortage and high prices of food - 76.8%, the shortage of drugs - 72.4%, general insecurity and the fear of violent crime - 69.7%.

On the basis of an index which combines various contents, the researchers conclude that around 47% of the polled have a negative attitude towards the regime, 19% are ambivalent, and 33% positive. According to these indicators, one could predict that the party in power will lose the elections. However, says Dragomir Pantic, Ph.D., this dissatisfaction has not automatically moved people towards the opposition parties. On the contrary, when the attitudes towards the parties, personalities, property, etc. are measured, it turns out that 52% are actually for the present regime, 22% are ambivalent, and only 26% show a clear orientation towards the opposition.

The amazing inertia of public opinion needs a deeper explanation which may be grasped after the final processing of the material collected in this research, and with the new research being conducted these days by the Institute for Social Sciences. The first commonsensical explanation is that general dissatisfaction is not enough for the forming of political standpoints, because the election game is still only a game of confidence. It illustrates an important political paradox: dissatisfaction on the one side does not make the voters turn to the other. The voters' dissatisfaction includes that with the leaders of the opposition as well, either because of their weakness or because official propaganda often blames them for the faults of the regime, and frightens people with the assertion that the opposition is merely "fighting for power" - a patriarchal sin. The paradox is interesting: a good segment of the public sees that the actual regime has messed things up, but does not move over to the other side, either because it doesn't want to offend the regime it can't get rid of, or because of a feeling of uncertainty. This is not a new phenomenon in Serbia, where even in the time of true parliamentarism, as a rule, elections were won by the government that called them.

On the confidence list made up of all governments, police, army and all political parties, the most confidence is given to the more important government institutions, though it is not great. The opposition parties are placed in the lower half of the list between 10th (Democrats), 15th (SPO - Serbian Renewal Movement) and 22nd place (SDA - the Party of Democratic Action). The ruling Montenegrin Democratic Party of Socialists is in 14th place. The lack of confidence in the opposition parties varies from party to party: 57% say they have no confidence in SPO; 35% in the Democratic Party; 35% in the Serbian Democratic Party; 37% in DEPOS; 49% in the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). The degree of confidence is small, less often medium, and in a minimal number of cases great.

The ruling party, SPS, is in the fifth place, although 40% of the voters say they have no confidence in it. It is better placed than the Serbian and Montenegrin governments.

At first glance it looks as if the primary aim of the election battle would not be in proving the guilt for the present catastrophe, but in gaining confidence, which the majority of citizens gives, by inertia, to the authorities in power. The Federal Government is the exception that proves the rule; judging by this survey, it enjoys the confidence of the greater part of the public, though it is evident that it has no power. It is obvious that the strategy of the ruling party at the elections will be to destroy this authority.

Panic says that Serbs are not for opposition, but for a change in system. A number of indicators indeed shows that around 45% of the polled opt for the rational liberal pole, while 20% opt for the pronouncedly conservative. In relation to the previous research, the fall in percentage of "modernists" is surprising (there are now around 37%); 42% fall into a mixed type, which includes disillusioned modernists, undecided and other, while 21% are classical traditionalists.

When attitudes towards borders, property, communism, dilemmas of the state or individuals are added together, there is a surprisingly high level of rational approach to an irrational situation.

According to 40.6% of the polled, socialism had its good points, but these points are now exhausted and an overall change of the system presents itself as necessary. Thirty two percent consider that the country would have been better off in all respects had the communists not come in power.

The state should enable people to make progress in life - say 61.5%, and 28.8% think that the principles of the state should ensure the fulfilling of their basis needs.

Almost a third of the polled (31.3%) consider that socially owned property should be sold to the highest bidder, 31.2% think that companies should become the property of the employed, and 11.4% think that socially owned firms should become state owned.

It looks as though a large number of voters don't hold with the basic tenets of the present system any more, but continue to defend the status quo through Slobodan Milosevic, though opinion about him is practically divided in half (28% in favor, and 30% very much against).

Everything comes down to the quality of leadership. Those questioned like Panic's energy, his self-confidence (25%) and optimism (18%), while 14.8% don't like his superficiality and frivolity. The researchers, however, notice that his case is possibly a repetition of the "Ante Markovic syndrome" - wide support in the public, but of low intensity; support founded, for the moment, more on the perception of the president of the government as a savior than on an acceptance of the policy he represents.

In spite of this and the liberal orientation which is recognized at a second level, on the eve of the 1992 elections the electorate is undecided, disillusioned and, in fact, unprepared for changes. To the question "Which party will you vote for?", 19.7% say they will vote for SPS, 14.3% for DEPOS, 4.8% for the Serbian Radical Party, 5.8% for the Democratic Party, and 2.9% for the others. In Serbia 21.1% won't vote, and there are 31.3% undecided. Without counting in the Kosovo Albanians, more than a half of the electorate in Serbia is presently outside the election process.

Forty days before the previous elections, 51% of the voters in Serbia were undecided or planned to abstain. "It is obvious that the outcome of the elections will be determined by the undecided voters. Of the 31% undecided at this stage, SPS, DEPOS, the Democratic Party and the Serbian Radical Party can each count on a quarter of the voters (around 8%)," says one of the researchers.

A lot of this could depend on the course of the pre-election campaigns. Before its campaign in 1990, SPS had 30% of the total number of votes at the election (one and a half times less than presently estimated), and in the course of its campaign it won another 17%; the Serbian Renewal Movement climbed from 7% to 17%, and the Democrats from 2% to 6%. In other words, in 1990 SPS increased its score during the campaign by 36%, SPO by 59%, while the Democrats were relatively the most successful, gaining 74% more votes during their campaign. These figures clearly show why the Socialists have done their best in 1992 to keep the campaign period as short as possible.

To the question "Is there any party you would never vote for?", against DEPOS in one large survey are 45.5% (51% from Serbia excluding Belgrade), 27.3% are against the Socialists in power, 17.3% against the right wing nationalist Serbian Radical Party.

Noticeable is the correspondence between SPS and SRS sympathizers, so that the creation of a coalition is not unthinkable, while for these two parties the creation of any democratic coalition is unacceptable. For 70% of the socialists, the radicals are a reserve party, and for 62% of the Radicals, the next party is SPS. The line has been drawn: around 89% of the socialists won't vote for DEPOS, as won't 75% of the radicals.

Twenty five percent of those who will vote for DEPOS find an alternative in the Democratic Party, which is half the number of Democratic Party voters willing to find an alternative in DEPOS. A combined appearance by these two groups would ensure a majority vote for the opposition, but the total number of votes would not be higher than the votes for SPS and SRS put together.

Vuk Draskovic once again presents a very interesting phenomenon; he has charisma, but it is a charisma limited to his sympathizers and fiercely rejected by his opponents. On the other hand, the Democratic Party is unacceptable to a mere 0.2% of the voters, which may offer a chance for this opposition center to become acceptable to "defectors".

The present strategy of the federal leadership in the matter of the main conflict is not completely clear to the average voter. The Panic-Milosevic conflict is of political importance in Yugoslavia, it is a conflict of two options, two political styles. President Dobrica Cosic has nonetheless arbitrated in this conflict and hasn't left Panic to "burn out", but has instead spoken openly of serious disagreement with Milosevic. "We are not of a like mind on strategy and tactics of national and state policy and development."

In an interview to "Politika" daily, Cosic spoke of the impossibility to work with Milosevic, of the usurpation that took place when he and Panic were outside the country, which practically liquidated the Federal Service of State Security and threatened the legal system of the country, and which, as Cosic says, must have been done with Milosevic's blessing. Milosevic, who "must have known about the threat to the constitutional system", is deemed, in other words, a conspirator. When Milosevic ignored the court decision and allowed the occupation of the Federal Police building to go on, Cosic announced that he was not joking and called for an urgent meeting of the Federal Parliament. The Panic-Milosevic conflict is still only the surface of the more serious conflict between Cosic and Milosevic.

Some of the data from the research indicate that tying Panic to the opposition could bring in a few of the votes held by SPS and many of the as yet undecided votes, without losing "old" voters. However, the question is what the result will be of the present loose relationship by which Panic is very dynamically taking part in the campaign without identifying himself with any particular political group.

As shown by earlier surveys, authority is of great importance to almost half of the Serbian people, which speaks in favor of the supposition that the voters will make their final vote on the basis of a leader's authority. There is, however, one indication of a possible departure from this "authority cage". The polled were asked to comment on the statement: "We should be grateful to leaders who tell us exactly what to do and how to do it" - 4.7% were in complete agreement, and 57% in total disagreement.

Measuring the internal political force of action and reaction, the researchers consider that the combined authority of the two federal presidents could threaten Milosevic's authority, i.e. weaken the chances of the present ruling party at the elections.