The Realistic And The Possible

The results are essentially worse than in December 1990. After all the demonstrations, gatherings, processions, silent protests, petitions, announcements, memorandums, millions given for advertising, the entire opposition won only some twenty seats in parliament more than it had, with whom it does not know what to do. It also has serious opponents on the extreme right. The destruction of Yugoslavia, the war, the cataclysm and isolation have reduced Milosevic's score by only have a million votes, and 56% of those who turned out at the elections repeated the slogan of the winner of these elections that they have no intention of changing anything. The veritable hero and the formal loser in these elections, Milan Panic claims, and so does the defeated opposition, the there were serious violations of the electoral procedure; foreign observers said that in every normal country such elections would be annulled.

At many voting places the boxes with ballots were not properly sealed, the number of people erased from lists of voters in Belgrade was around thirty or forty voters per polling place, which can account for 400,000 voters at 10,000 voting places. According to certain claims, the number of people erased from the lists could reach as much as 1%. The voting material was kept, contrary to regulations, by municipal electoral commissions (which are controlled by the socialists and the radicals) where they could have been manipulated with, and, according to Vojislav Kostunica from the Democratic Movement of Serbia and the leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia, "they ended up where the current authorities think they belong - they were transferred in garbage bags". On the basis of this and on the fact that he was a victim of the campaign and an unequal treatment on state television, Milan Panic requested that the republican presidential elections be annulled and held under international supervision in three months' time, but the Republican electoral commission rejected the request. The Democratic Movement of Serbia has also asked that the elections be annulled, as did even the socialists who have called for the annulment of the local elections in which they are currently losing. True, the elections have been annulled at 2% to 11% of the voting places, depending on the seats in parliament, mostly in Belgrade where the opposition had the best possibility of controlling the elections. The opposition claims that the stealing of votes took place before the elections. The federal electoral commission claims that 23,707 refugees were included in the lists of voters. On the other hand, around 120,000 people who have left Serbia because of this war were excluded from the elections by the very fact that the adoption of the law on amnesty was prevented; according to the opposition, soldiers were not allowed to vote, which could once again be a "transaction" worth 100, 000 votes.

The commentaries by most opposition politicians boil down to: "Impossible, they cheated!" Perhaps things should be observed from another angle - that what happened on Sunday is realist and possible. The December failure of Panic, the Democratic Movement of Serbia and the Democratic Party should, therefore, be observed from a different point of view than the one usual for the Serbian opposition which likes to claim that it was tricked (the announcement of the Democratic Movement of Serbia: "A colossal manipulation!"). There probably was some cheating, to the extent which is usual for this system, under this regime and in these circumstances, but why not come down to earth and see these results as traces in the snow which have shown the state which the Serbian society is in, the proportions of its xenophobia and its confusion, the consequences of the fact that it is neither understood by those who wish to help it nor by those who are at war with it.

Your analyst has noticed certain regularities in the elections. Namely, the results of the presidential elections were the closest to the average results in small places with only a few streets, two pubs, one or two small factories whose workers are on compulsory vacation, several cafes and possibly, a cinema that works on Saturdays. Belgrade, in which refugees have found shelter, a megalopolis to which the poor who are affected by the crisis come in large numbers, and from which all those whose fathers have, due to some circumstances, left them surnames that sound strange to the creators of lists of voters, flee head over heals, has been divided up into the socialist, the democratic movement's and the radical thirds. Its central communes gave support to Panic, but already in the suburbs the results were the same as in the interior. All those thousands of people from workers' suburbs and small places, and also from big towns turned into small ones, voted for the war option called "to endure under the sanctions".

There is no doubt that on December 20th Serbia missed a big chance, and not for the first time. Even up to now, the downward trend led through a series of spoiled liberal reforms. It is the war lobby and the fighters for the interests of their native regions on the Belgrade asphalt that won and the ultra-nationalist bloc found a stronghold in the frustrated poor people who lost nine tenths of their income in two years. The fact that an ultra-nationalist grouping in Serbia won the relatively largest number of votes in Europe in the past fifty years will be yet another ugly label on Serbia's face. Most of the voters on December 1992 (over two million and six hundred thousand) accepted Milosevic's "bills" and his mistakes are no longer only his. It remains to be thought about and examined why the impoverished, frightened Serbian voter, the same one whose children fled head over heals from this war, decided to take that risk.

These elections have made it possible for Milosevic to rule in an unhindered way in this catastrophe, with the help of war-time national communism. For this it is necessary to have strong authority which cannot be established with the this kind of balance of forces. On the one hand, the results of the elections have satisfied the opposition - in two years the ruling party lost one third of its voters and it is now no longer the dominant party; it now has 101 seats in the Serbian parliament where it had 194 seats two years ago, and also a dangerous ally, the Serbian Radical Party which won 74 seats. The opposition counted on this but it hoped that the Socialist party would break up along different lines, it hoped that the more liberal wing would join the opposition, but it turned out that the harder nationalist wing went over to more radical Seselj. Among the ranks of the Democratic Movement of Serbia this is added to the list of the failures of Cosic as well as of Micunovic's democrats and Mirkovic's social-democrats who are close to Cosic. These elections showed primarily that the so called national institutions and national figures do not have a real influence on the people in whose name they speak. The request for democratic changes was supported by academicians, writers, artists, the Church, the Crown, Cosic, university professors and students and high-school students - but nothing was seen of all this in the boxes with ballots. In this context, very illustrative is the example of president Cosic who is the biggest loser at these elections, apart from the nation, - the socialist informed Cosic that in this native Drenova Milosevic won 67% of the votes and his ciphered advise was either not heard, few people have read his political messages contained in his books, or the bewildered majority ungratefully rejected it. Those whom he mostly supported fared badly. The result is not to be boasted about - Cosic's defeat is the defeat of a compromise formula: on the internal plane it is a sign of a sharp polarization of the society. In an interview, president Cosic said that weeks of uncertainty lie ahead of Serbia, but he constantly kept playing dumb. On the very day of the elections, this dissident said for that catastrophic state propaganda, that open abuse of state institutions for the purpose of one party and one person, that stuffing of people to the benefit of the regime which has ruined it, and those calls for war, that it is not that unobjective after all. True, he did say that there exist significant differences between himself and Milosevic, but he practically helped no one in the unequal battle. He was constantly very concerned, but he never came up with anything. In other words, president Cosic acted as if he owed something to president Milosevic, some believe that this is the result of his ideological closeness to Milosevic, while some of his old friends are convinced that he stayed on the sidelines, as a reserve, correctly assessing that the opposition would lose the elections. Vuk Draskovic reminded him of the promise to resign if non-democratic forces win the elections. Non-democratic forces have really won, but it is not clear whether Cosic's position in that constellation is really untenable, or who could replace him.

Although so far the Socialist Party of Serbia couldn't reach agreement with anyone, it will now face the challenge of filling its gaps through cooperation with a very unpleasant ally, the ultra right Serbian radicals. If this happens, the practice violating two basic principles of democracy - the non fulfillment of obligations and the overstepping of rights, will continue. Many see that alliance as a sure thing, although it would be like a drunkard getting married to an old maid. President Milosevic likes servile associates, but he hardly likes equal partners. Through his cooperation with Seselj, he could show the Russians what it would be like if their present opposition were to win, but this cannot be a happy marriage although, even up to now, the socialist party had in its ranks many nationalists, but they were controlled by the party... Seselj, who was the first to congratulate Slobodan Milosevic on his victory, warmly recommended this (he said that some kind of national reconciliation had been achieved and reminded the biggest party that it is up to it to launch the initiative for creating a coalition). Seselj is already pushing the socialists into new showdowns with the democratic center and he is hoping that the leaders from the center will withdraw, that their MPs will not show up in parliament, and that the parties from the center will be dissolved. He ensured his ascent precisely by proclaiming national academicians foreign agents. In the old parliament, the socialists hugged Seselj, tapped him on the back, laughed at his tirades against the opposition, but then he was neither that strong nor in the position to have to be given a lot. Speaking to "VREME" certain socialists didn't hide concern because of the fact that Seselj won so many votes, that he could ask for half of the mandates, because he will have 73 seats in parliament. There are no chances of the opposition forming a Yugoslav government together with the Montenegrins, since the Serbian socialists and radicals have more than half of the seats in the Yugoslav Assembly's Chamber of Citizens.

A possible new harmony between the one time allies (the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Montenegrin Democratic Party of Socialists) would also not be enough for a new government to be chosen, and that would also be a deviation from Milosevic's usual conduct, because he never formed an alliance with someone with whom he had the kind of conflict he had with Bulatovic. The Montenegrins could now request that they, in accordance with the Constitution, give a candidate for the prime minister, which could open up space for Cosic to abandon the announced resignation, to place himself once again on the altar of his Home country and to propose an expert government of national unity, which is being speculated on in Belgrade political circles, while he will, as usual, be silent about it for some time. It is not impossible that some kind of combination of the socialists and the democrats on both sides be made. The candidates being mentioned are Marovic, from the Montenegrin side, and Kovac, from the Serbian. The beginning of the rule of the radical-socialist coalition in Serbia would probably be marked by the introduction of war-time communism and repression which would lead to the closing of the opposition's ranks and would strengthen the resistance to the regime.

Asked whether the Democratic Movement of Serbia would accept some kind of government of national unity, Vojislav Kostunica was restrained and said that one should wait to see who is offering what, although he stressed that he didn't believe that someone could change from a thief to an honest person overnight, so that, therefore, one should also not expect the socialists to change. He warned that, at the federal level, the Constitution could turn against its creators. The socialists and the radicals have a majority in the Chamber of Citizens', but their proposals could be rejected in the other chamber, the Chamber of Republics. Therefore, that Constitution could cause constitutional, parliamentary and state crises, and this could lead to new early elections. This would, in fact, mean that Milan Panic would remain the prime minister because of the impossibility of a new one being elected. Panic's announcement that he would stay in Serbia and continue to fight deserves respect, as does the fact that he won a million and a half votes with an election campaign of only a week. His electoral headquarters was not the most experienced, but let us not forget that these are representatives of that other Serbia, which showed a different face last June. If one is to be sorry because of something, it is the fact that this other Serbia did not get satisfaction and because with this kind of placing of cards its existence is seriously endangered. It seems that the opposition did not accept the proposals to leave the parliament and to let the socialists and the radicals rule as long as they can, until they destroy everything. That kind of rule with a semi-representation in the federal government and with a semi-composition of the former central committees, resulted in the bloody disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The rule of the socialist nationals and the radical extremists could mean a red and black terror; it could be characterized by persecution, repression and everything that accompanies an isolated regime in an unstable country, and it could have catastrophic consequences.

If Milosevic resists the temptation and surpasses himself, which is difficult to imagine because this has never happened before, since he usually chose compromised people to be the ruling elite, it could happen, by some miracle, that a kind of concentration, that is a compromise government be formed at least at some level, and that, true, it would be faced with great difficulties, but it would be the only way out of the situation which is becoming worse by the hour. With such a gesture Milosevic would "send a loud message" and would perhaps increase his chances of being accepted as a negotiator by the world. He must pay back his debt to Seselj, but it is not certain that he will also continue the propaganda in his favour.

The opposition did not get enough seats in parliament to do anything significant. It could now have a better composition in parliament than last time, a composition which would have to try to do what it didn't manage in the last term of office, to try to influence the public opinion through parliament, and primarily to try to introduce into the political tissue the idea which it is fighting for, to preserve, as much as possible, the liberal, civil option and to maintain some kind of contacts with the world which will now turn its back on Serbia. Its most important task would now be to try to defend the dignity of the parliament, although even the very attempt will be very difficult in a socialist-radical environment.

The opposition lost the advantage it had in big centers, but judging by the election campaign, it shook the public opinion and found at least weak strongholds throughout Serbia. If its sympathizers do not give up, it could be quite successful at the local elections and there it could create a basis for broad actions on the entire territory of Serbia. Will those losers know at least to do that? Serbia lost a lot in December 1992, and it stubbornly, just like its leader, exposed itself to new challenges, but perhaps it still hasn't lost everything. There are several ways out. One is for Cosic to resign, and the other is for Cosic not to resign.

The Parliament of the Republic of Serbia

Socialist Party of Serbia 101; Serbian Radical Party 73; Democratic Movement of Serbia 49, Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina 7; the group of citizens led by Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan 5; Peasants' Party 3; the Coalition of the Democratic Party and the Reformist Democratic Party of Vojvodina 2; the Muslim Democratic Reformist Party 1 seat in parliament

Federal Parliament (Chamber of Citizens)

Socialist Party of Serbia 47; Serbian Radical Party 34; Democratic Movement of Serbia 20; Democratic Party of Montenegrin Socialists 17; Democratic party 5; Socialist party of Montenegro 5; People's Party 4; the Coalition of the Democratic party and the Reformist Democratic party of Vojvodina; the Coalition of the Democratic party, the Reformist democratic party of Vojvodina and the Citizens' party 1