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March 8, 1993
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 67
War and Crime

The Battle To The Last Robbery

by Filip Svarm

The numerous observers have never once asked themselves how the leaders of the warring nations control their armed followers, and to what extent they can influence the implementation of signed agreements. That this is not just a rhetoric question, has been confirmed by the latest political showdowns in Krajina and the fact that the Croatian members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina government rejected the Sarajevo government's legitimacy. Negotiations are underway, and it is increasingly unclear who the negotiators really represent. Have those, to whom war has become second nature become so powerful and independent that they are not allowing it to end?

The rehearsal of war in Croatia was conducted institutionally and non-institutionally. While Serbs from Kninska Krajina kept guard at the barricades, they were armed through various channels from Serbian and Vojvodina police arsenals, and generous contributions from various services and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). Apart from this, Serbian villages were visited by various persons introducing themselves as Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) activists, collecting contributions for the buying of arms. Many a cow and sheep were exchanged for a Kalashnikov rifle or Thomson with complete combat equipment. The Croatian authorities were not sitting idle either. The now legendary convoys brought arms mostly from East European black markets, which were then distributed to deserving and tested fighters of the ruling party. The first armed clashes followed and the opportunities for making money in war grew greatly. In the new situation, the population resigned itself to a daily drop of standard. Shortages of basic foodstuffs became an everyday occurrence, homes were abandoned and people departed to the uncertainty of refugee camps, taking with them their last Deutschmarks, since now everything had to be paid for, including survival. In those places where there were no conflicts, everything was done to provoke them. Several armed men would attack a police patrol or a lonely control post, and then without many problems, persuade the frightened inhabitants that their only hope lay in taking up arms, which, as so happened, they had more than necessary... This was followed by the capture of cities and villages and their systematic looting.

The first wave of "liberators" to enter a town were after "gold and ready money", the second wave took "household appliances and other equipment," and they were followed by the "scavengers" who would take up parquet floors, take down windows, toilets, and practically everything that could be carted off...

As the Serbian side can boast a greater number of "liberations", it follows that its ranks have much more loot. But, the Croatian forces were not far behind in this, when they had the chance... When the front line stabilized, and when there were no more video recorders, deep freeze boxes and other useful things to be taken from the "other nationality", support of "our cause" determined whether the property of compatriots would be confiscated or not. And when this source was exhausted, looting started without any explanation. All the authorities, especially those Krajina, claimed that armed groups and individuals out of control were responsible for the looting, while at the same time doing nothing to prevent them. Asked why such gangs, mostly organized in paramilitary and volunteer formations were not stopped, the best answer was given by a former JNA general who said: "Because they were the only ones prepared to charge!"

The Sarajevo ceasefire cooled down the white-hot goals in Croatia. Krajina's number one problem became survival: all that worked, or could work stopped. In the overall poverty which followed, those who had managed to accumulate the necessary capital in the previous year, now started investing it in legal business, as if this were the most normal thing in the world (exchange offices and other lucrative activities), while others turned to supplying Krajina with various deficit goods. Even though there is a constant battle against war profiteers, and the small fry are arrested from time to time, there is really very little that can be done. For the current authorities to become what they are, they needed a war. Big national interests, as perceived by the current Serbian regime, which lay in the background of all this, are not relevant in the current relations between "all the Serbian lands." That this is so, was confirmed at a recent meeting between representatives of the Kordun and Banija municipalities with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic. The Kordun and Banija representatives complained of corruption and crime in the Krajina leadership and asked Belgrade to put an end to lawlessness, since Knin was not willing to do so.

It is certainly difficult to rule over, and send to the front people whose existence has dropped below all minimum, at the end of the 20th century. Under such conditions, the only way of remaining in power is to introduce a form of war communism: there is no personal or property security, administrative decisions are taken on every facet of life, and all dissenting views are suppressed. Such a system has its price. Hadzic is paying the price by devastating the forests and destroying the cattle fund, printing worthless money. Crumbs are thrown to him by those who are making big money out of it all, and it is impossible to imagine a different solution for the functioning of the Krajina state. While Hadzic is occupied with broad national interests and solves problems with phrases, others are forced to come up with concrete answers for the present anarchy, or what they find sadder, answer questions: "What was wrong while we lived with the Croats?" All this is not easy, all the more so, as the minority ensconced in the leadership never had it better, while the majority never had it worse.

Many believe that the war in Croatia, in spite of everything, was a summertime manoeuvre compared to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ethnically mixed population, the clearly defined Serbian and Croatia war goals, the Moslems' frustrations in the bloody nightmare and massacres, camps, ethnic cleansing and all the rest, resulted in opportunities for making quick fortunes, such as war profiteers had never dreamed of. In Sunj, one of the rare Croatian settlements to hold out in Banija at the start of enmities, the wily municipal authorities sold Kalashnikov rifles to both sides for 640 DM apiece. In Prijedor top SDS officials organized the sale of Kalashnikov rifles to Moslems for 2,000 DM. After the war spread, all the buyers were arrested according to lists made by the sellers.

Bosnia-Herzegovina army deputy chief of staff Jovo Divjak, said that only the criminal elements in Sarajevo possessed arms, and that they were the first to use them. The continuation of war showed that they were the one's to pursue politics, not forgetting to fill their own pockets at the same time. It is no secret that inhabitants of Sarajevo were led out of the blocked city via Kiseljak. The only condition being payment in hard currency, and the sum was determined according to the client's affluence. If Moslems were involved, they had to buy additional forged personal documents (Croatian), in order that they might be let through by members of the Croatian Council of Defence (HVO), on their way to refugee camps. The profits were divided into three parts, one third went to the Moslem police in Sarajevo, one third to the Serbs who let one pass through the encirclement, and one third to the Croats who organized the reception in Kiseljak. In Kiseljak, many believe that thanks to the war, life is much better than before, since the possibilities of making money by smuggling food and people are limitless. There are many assessments to the effect that Sarajevo is not being deblocked because it is not in the interests of the "warlords." Regardless of which side they belong to, they have set up links and are guarding them jealously. There are numerous examples of trade in everything, most often in human life. The price of being let out of the camp in Omorska was 10,000 DM. It is said that only one man paid it, the Moslem owner of a prosperous firm. During the organization of convoys for minorities leaving various towns, usually those where the Serbs were the majority population, or Croats and Moslems, apart from leaving all their property behind, the refugees had to pay an extra 50-100 DM for a bus seat. There is no point in mentioning the sums made from classic ethnic cleansing. The same holds true for the looting of humanitarian aid - a man was arrested at a Belgrade market selling these packages.

To what extent are these criminal gangs, masked by the ruling national ideology, really in charge of the two years long war? The Moslem authorities in Sarajevo, who pretend to represent the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, are losing in credibility daily. The latest blow was delivered when Bosnia-Herzegovina Vice-Premier Mile Akmadzic said publicly that the Croatian ministers did not agree with the policy of President Alija Izetbegovic and his Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic. Prior to this, the Croatian Council of Defence had broken off all cooperation with the Bosnia-Herzegovina army, and closed all passage through the Croatian community of Herzeg-Bosnia, through which the supply routes had passed.

As far as the Serbian authorities are concerned, in a situation where the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia faces an economic blockade, they function as they do -money is the important thing, and the way it is obtained. It must not be forgotten that the international public has called its leaders war criminals, and that in the situation in which they find themselves, they have nothing to lose. Finally, the Croatian side is in a situation to ask payment from both the Serbs and Moslems.

Too many people are making money out of this war. Organized gangs on all three sides don't want the bloodshed to end before they have grabbed all they can. Trebinje is a good example. Paramilitary formations, with the help of the Trebinje authorities expelled the Moslems who had fought with the Serbs, only that they might rob them. The suspect legitimacy of all warring sides outside the mother countries, allows events such as in Somalia, where war is waged for a liter of oil or a kilo of flour. The profiteers will leave on time, with their sacks of money.

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