New Year's Negotiations

Cosic's Christmas address to the nation is an example of a politician without power and therefore without a stand. He repudiates war, but the fact that big powers want peace does not please him; the war in Bosnia is a tragedy, but the Serbian cause is just; Serbia is the hostage of "outside" Serbs, but we can't give up their interests. Cosic seems to cherish an ambition to be above all conflicting parties and all negotiating delegations, domestic and foreign alike - and to be accepted by all as a supreme arbiter. Nothing proves that Cosic would behave differently from Milosevic if he controlled the army and administration. Many will say that Cosic and Milosevic make a spiritual political tandem, and that the idyll with Panic was just a tactical alliance for getting the credit of peacemakers after a successful war.

Cosic's position at the negotiations in Geneva and his attitude expressed in the Christmas message were a manifestation of a Samaritan wishing to save insulted Serbs from undeserved punishment and direct them towards a just triumph. Military intervention must be avoided not because Serbian aims are wrong, but in order to implement an all-national unification of Serbs at the right moment. Now it would be too dangerous.

If Cosic were against war, he would have attacked Milosevic two years ago. But the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (with Cosic as its most distinguished and influential member) let Milosevic get on with the war job, the Church kept quiet until Milosevic gave up ideas of directly annexing Slavonia and Baranja to Serbia - and today they all wish to give full credit for the glorious victory to the main author of the Memorandum. Milosevic won't have it that way, and he's right. That is the main reason for the conflict between Cosic and Milosevic.

Milosevic initiated the peaceful formalization of Karadzic's war in Bosnia. By doing that, he made the very same move that surprised the public when he signed Vance's Plan, according to which Knin and Beli Manastir remained in Croatia. Then he suddenly accepted the territorial integrity of Croatia and of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, now he is advocating their confederate disintegration, which could finally result in the annexation of Serb-dominated regions.

The West still has no guts for a military clash with Serbs. If it arms the Moslems and attacks Karadzic's Serbs from the air, it will push the Serbs from Bosnia to Serbia. It would thus make a double mistake: it itself would become involved in ethnic cleansing and would turn Serbia into a dangerous barbarian camp ruled openly by the new warriors. In such a state people rally around those in power, believing that the world has plotted against them. The embargo is already perfect proof of this. Nothing would be easier in such a situation than to convince the Serbs that they must strike against Kosovo and Macedonia.

A bystander must wonder for how long the population will take it. It will, indefinitely. In England, before Cromwell's revolution, in many starving families parents threw dice in order to choose the child who was to be sacrificed for the benefit of other family members. Patriotism on a handful of rice keeps the populations close to the rulers, and fears that rebellion will fail keep them disciplined like the prisoners in Dahau.

Although against his will, Cosic is Milosevic's puppet. Vance and Owen know that they can argue with Cosic to their hearts' content about the advantages of the heliocentric system over the geocentric, but if Milosevic says that the geocentric system is better for Serbs and for Belgrade, that is the way it will be. At the Geneva negotiations, Cosic does not carry more weight than Karadzic.

Karadzic didn't refuse to sign the Geneva agreement on the maps of Bosnia-Herzegovina even though Izetbegovic had perfidiously cheated him. Such an agreement doesn't correspond with Milosevic's desires. His plan is a three-part confederation of B-H. Karadzic is still aware of his military superiority and of the fact that he doesn't have to step back before the balance of power in the field changes. Cosic is worried, and with reason, that this could result in foreign military reprisal - and is not yet sure whether this is Milosevic's last diabolic intention.

Cosic feels that, under the pretext that Serbia is threatened by a military intervention, he can explain the necessity of signing Vance's and Owen's plan for dividing Bosnia into ten parts. He has no power and will not decide what will be signed in the end. Even if he wanted to, he could not play it on double or quits and publicly attack Milosevic. He is too weak, anyway: hasn't he allowed Milosevic to go unpunished for a raid on the federal police building? Milosevic is something else. He will continue provoking the West until it becomes clear to him if the West will accept a Bosnian confederation or will resort to military intervention.