Tying Into A Dead Knot

On the Orthodox Christmas Eve, Dobrica Cosic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, gave a wonderous speech. It would be fair to admit right away that I didn't understand a thing. But, a job is a job, and this article has to be written. If he hadn't read, one would have thought that he was tired and temporarily indisposed, but as the situation grows more serious, he systematically grows more and more incoherent and inadequate. This speech, at least some of its parts, can be of use to all those who still need Cosic's support. However, war mongers will find more reasons for citing it than peacemakers, although the speaker's intention, I believe, was different.

When one says that we are threatened by political and military capitulation, or by an attack by the world's strongest powers, there is nothing more to be said, at least in Serbia. Here it means: we'd rather be dead that be slaves. However, all of a sudden, Cosic evades answering his own question and starts talking about patience, tolerance, reconciliation, correction of inner weaknesses, the strengthening of our ranks, and comes up with a solution: the formation of a concentration government. Our misery and danger are real. Perhaps Cosic can do nothing but plea for inner consolidation. But in politics, the one who looks for a solution must not formulate the dilemma as Cosic did, tie a dead knot and present all the solutions as being equally fatal.

It seems that Dobrica Cosic got carried away by his literature, in which there is no room for small or medium words, notions and situations. Perhaps he liked finding himself in a position to talk about destiny, history, the nation, life and death, or he believed that he, of all people, was chosen to utter the horrifying truth. Let's take it for granted that he said what he thought and believed, but, put in simple words, all horror and fear of capitulation got reduced to the fact that Serbia can't spread across the Drina river, nor can Serbs in Bosnia get more than the others. In fact, according to the most recent maps, they will gain a little more, but not enough to say that the war was not in vain.

Cosic did not say a word about the war in Bosnia that could contradict the official story, which really was his primary task. Furthermore, he praised the leaders of Bosnian Serbs. Within his political concept that could mean that he is preparing to get rid of them soon. But he didn't offer Serbia a chance to reconcile with the rest of the world and come to its senses again. He repeated the crazy story about a world ruled by the powers of evil and madness (just like Iranian ayatollahs) and named some of those whom he considers to be on the bright side - western diplomats, who are paid to look for a peaceful solution till the last moment. He therefore invented both enemies and friends.

All in all, Cosic absolved Milosevic from the strongest accusations for the war. Could it mean that his support of Panic's peacemaking was insincere? It must be that Cosic is deeply impressed by the election results, by Milosevic's and Seselj's success, which led him to overestimate the degree of the people's insanity and craziness. Convincing the people all over again that they are in the right, that their leaders are wise and courageous and that they are suffering without reason - leads nowhere. For as long as he flirts with the darkest prejudices, no concentration government can bring salvation.

The problem is becoming permanent. Serbs are turning into a people constantly waiting for salvation. Until it comes, they are unable to get on with small, ordinary, everyday things, like the rest of the world.

Cosic's idea of a concentration government is just a technical expression for a never-ending Serbian dream about unification and concordance. This is a dream other nations also have, but as it never comes true, the smarter and more experienced ones have long ago abandoned it and created a system of "institutional discord". This is called multi-party parliamentarism. In order to achieve a higher degree of unity during crises, more scope for action, a basic consensus - a minimum of mutual confidence is needed, and that is best ensured by democratic rules.

I don't think it would be wrong to form a concentration government in Serbia or Yugoslavia, but I do not see how it would be possible in a lawless country in which mistrust has resulted in an all-out conflict, something that Cosic himself helped greatly. Besides, it is necessary to establish the political aims of such a government: whether they would be a preparation for war or agreement to an uncomfortable peace, which implies sharing the responsibility for renouncing the maximum of national goals? Is Cosic seeking support for giving up the idea of a Greater Serbia, or is he only trying to bind Montenegro, which does not know what it is doing in this state any longer?

Cosic invited the representatives of all parliamentary parties. Among others, the talks will be attended by Seselj and Arkan and I'm sure it will be a pleasant meeting, especially when pistols start being used instead of arguments. What if Seselj wishes to become foreign minister and Arkan Justice Minister? What if they ask for posts for their gunmen? Cosic will find himself in an unpleasant situation if some of his old, inseparable friends, whom he turned his back on because of state interests, now show up as members of DEPOS.

In short, the problem lies in the fact that a man who does not have any idea of what he wants from people who trust neither him nor one another, is forming a government which has no power, simply because there is no state. Seselj and his clique will be the first to be expelled, since it is impossible to talk politics with them. The Socialists will also be cast out, but then there will be no government. Therefore, Cosic must look for vacilating and characterless careerists whom he will promote into experts. The most important mandates will have to be passed to the opposition.

This, however, is unrealistic and Dobrica Cosic is hoping in vain that it is possible to revoke election results, after which all reasonable solutions seem nonsensical. I do not understand why he is worried at all, when, in practical terms, he has no power, only a title. Whatever government he forms, it will have as much power as Milosevic is willing to give it. The same holds true for Cosic's ''horrible dilemma''. Let him sign whatever he likes, capitulation or war: he is no longer a serious obstacle to either.

In the past two years, Serbia has rejected and turned down two liberal governments, Markovic's and Panic's. It resembles a sick man refusing to take his medicine. Whenever he reconsiders his state and asks for help, he ends up with the same prescriptions, each time with stronger doses, all of which makes the situation increasingly unbearable. The present state of affairs will remain unchanged until someone summons up the nerve to reformulate the so-called Serbian national question, which, contrary to Cosic's opinion, is not democratic for as long as the issue of ''all Serbian countries'' exists.

Of course, no one surrenders great historical projects until the defeat becomes obvious. Germany put its national question on the agenda half a century ago, and hopefully Serbia will draw a lesson from that example. Since it seems that the we are close to the end, here is what I think Serbia will face in the moment of truth: Serbia, the Serbian elite (whoever they may be) will have to define a national minimum. Contrary to a gradual, devastating and self-destructing process of surrendering, bit by bit, the parts of a dream of a Greater Serbia, a new and democratic process must be initiated. In order for that to happen, we must start from a national minimum, which does not include either the Krajinas, Bosnia, Montenegro, or even Kosovo. It means an opening of all possibilities, dropping the expression ''Holy Serbian Land" from the political vocabulary, and getting ready for long and minute negotiations.

Serbia must convince the world that it has been reborn and that it is starting from scratch, regardless of how far it can get. Perhaps that moment is not far away, precisely because it cannot be any farther.