Geneva Ghosts

Radovan Karadzic must have felt that he was making a great personal sacrifice, much greater than that of all the victims in the Bosnian war, when he finally agreed to the Geneva principles. He said he was ready to resign if parliament does not agree with him, if he does not manage to explain how he had achieved a maximum, and how in the end, he had to bow before the world's force and injustice. He hopes, however, that parliament will say: "No Radovan, stay, for God's sake!"

Whatever parliament may decide, it became clear after Geneva that the movement for the unification of all Serbs, has admitted to defeat in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the same happened in Croatia. At least, the main leaders and inspirators have done so, albeit, in principle. Many occasions and reasons remain for turning the clock back to the beginning, for checking, once again, the resoluteness of the world powers, probably until the first bombs start falling. This means that none should hurry with celebrations, or buy a return ticket to Sarajevo. Snipers and gunners from the surrounding hills are in mourning, and I don't know if they will find much comfort in the fact that the Moslems didn't fare much better in Geneva, or that the Croats will have to wait a while before rounding off their state. Karadzic's army had three goals: to conquer, cleanse and link up all the territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the Serbs are scattered; and to win such a degree of sovereignty which will later allow them to join Serbia through self-determination. The achieving of "a state within a state" has been thwarted by the Geneva principles, while the proposed maps of the region annul the real goal - a territorial wholeness. There will still be negotiations on maps, but Karadzic's prospects of getting something at the negotiating table are as weak as they are strong at the front. In seeking his corridors, he can only call on the right of the stronger, on which basis the world must recognize and correct the injustice that Serbs in Bosnia have been so unfortunately distributed over the centuries.

The problem lies in the fact that Vance and Lord Owen now want to take all that has been won by arms and cleansed of non-Serbs, with a hypothetical threat of military superiority. Experience has shown that Karadzic regards the world's military force as an abstraction, but Geneva, with the help of Milosevic and Cosic seem to have made him doubt this a little. They probably told him that this was his best hour, and that after an intervention, his negotiating status would be somewhat changed. Nonetheless, Karadzic and his followers do not find it easy to perceive a concrete victory as an invisible defeat.

Milosevic used different arguments with Karadzic. He could have told him that he did not think much of ungrateful friends who do not repay their debts, and do not take care of his changes of mood. Then again, he could have said the following: "You know, Radovan, I sometimes think that apart from me, no one is indispensable." I do not believe that Karadzic's initial stubbornness in Geneva was part of a crafty plan to present him as being more independent than he really is, or to let Milosevic rid himself of accusations, pressures and threats. This impression has only been partially achieved, and the world will demand more convincing proof of Milosevic's noninvolvement. This is sufficient to spare Serbia, only in the event of a military intervention. But, as far as sanctions are concerned, the world might conclude that they are having a salutary effect on Milosevic. Karadzic is both greatly dependent of Milosevic, and at the same time rather independent, because he knows that Milosevic cannot sacrifice him all that easily and turn himself into Milan Panic overnight. Karadzic's war decided the elections in Serbia, and helped Milosevic a lot more than it did Vojislav Seselj. If it turns out, as things now seem, that Milosevic is really abandoning the idea of a Greater Serbia and pulling out of Bosnia, we still have a lot to go through. There will be great ruptures among the Serbs in Bosnia, there will be anger, desperation, guilt and mutual accusations; they will be persecuted by their and others' crimes and victims, who, in the final say have lost all meaning. The war might start abating if the world powers are sufficiently decisive. Vance and Lord Owen's plan will start looking more realistic and Bosnia will find itself an international protectorate, as partly foreseen under the plan. Milosevic will probably continue to take up a lot of space in the world press. He will notice that while he was looking the other way, Montenegro had slipped away, and he will try to woo it back. There is still Kosovo, which he might have planned to divide up and offer a part of it in exchange for Bosnian territory. Suddenly, no one is interested and there is no market, contrary to beliefs held by many domestic experts on world powers and their strategies.

To make matters worse, ethnic Albanians have found the most efficient antidote for Milosevic and are immune. They are boycotting all that can be boycotted, and are waiting. Perhaps the Serbs will resort to this method in the struggle against their authorities which they tried to topple unsuccessfully with charges, rallies, petitions.

The fact, that after Geneva, Milosevic said he was satisfied, and was practically proclaiming a victory, is a good sign. Cosic is certainly more sincere when he talks of the need for a reasonable easing up in the face of great pressures, but this is something which cannot be said out loud in Serbia today. Seselj and many others who wish to continue the "just struggle" have grown too strong, so that Cosic should not be surprised if they want to remove him from office. Interpretations of Geneva as the defeat of the Serbian people are not realistic. Only an aggressive, conquering and unjust policy has been defeated. The right of the Serbs to live together is indisputable in principle, but can only be realized together with others, or by war, crimes and genocide.

Milosevic will, obviously, still be around for a while. Who knows by whom, and when, he will be asked about his responsibility for the war. But, for the time being, he must be allowed to get out of it, if he has really decided to do so. His relation to Seselj will make this clear in Serbia very soon. Even though he might find it very convenient to threaten constantly that he will let Seselj loose, Milosevic would then find himself in an open conflict with this merry criminal.

In fact, they are in conflict already, both over Bosnia and Serbia where Seselj's men are quickly and brutally entering all structures of power, primarily television. Seselj upheld Karadzic's initial "No" in Geneva, and then invented a strategic justification for not accusing Milosevic of capitulation. He then expressed the belief that the parliament of Karadzic's republic would reject the Geneva principles. If this were to happen, no one would believe in the sincerity of Milosevic's peacemaking, and in Serbia it would look as if Seselj had defeated him. The world will send new punishments, and the authorities will start vacillating.

There will be no coalition with the Radicals. Someone who is used to ruling alone, cannot easily ask for help. Milosevic should, however, turn to Cosic first, and then to the entire democratic opposition. Both he and they dread the idea of cooperation, they don't trust each other and they overestimate their own strengths. However, such a dialogue would be the first lesson in democracy learned in Serbia, albeit, under the refreshing influence of that fountain in Geneva.

No one has much time left. We cannot continue living in the humiliating hope that nothing will happen to Milosevic, that he will continue in good health, because, if that is not the case, someone must stop Seselj, and that means war in Serbia. It could have been expected that the plan for a Greater Serbia would threaten Belgrade with a reign of terror. Abstention as such, does not bring democracy, but offers some kind of a chance. And, it must be taken.