Dangerous Dreams

The town of Sid was planned to become a war victim, it served merely as a pretext for spreading the war and is the object of mutual political interest, no matter who attacked it. This incident suits Zagreb perfectly, because it hopes that the war, which might lead it to the victory, will go on. It needs this war to gain international recognition of the state of Croatia within its present borders, and to get the territory "cleared" of the Serbs. The dream of a little dictator from Zagreb is to be remembered as the creator of an independent Croatia on the territory taken over from the overthrown communists. He has discarded with the communists in order to live on what, in effect, is the achievement of their lifetime.

Belgrade has also benefited from the Sid catastrophe. It seeks a purely a war for the new territories "cleared" of the Croatians. Instead of the expected attack by the people of Zagorje (Northern region of Croatia) on Backa Palanka (town in Backa), which would have been used as a pretext for Serbia to declare war to Croatia - Sid was attacked. Was that just an ostensible Serbian concoction? I don't think so. Croatian superiority? No, just another suicide attempt. It does not disturb the dream and the stale air of the Belgrade dictator's darkened rooms. The only thing he wants is Great Serbia - although he is beginning to realize it can never be achieved - since Belgrade is mistaking politics for violence, for unscrupulous and immoral marching towards its aim.

Who has the advantage here? Zagreb does. The international opinion is on its side because the war is being waged on the Croatian territory, because Milosevic was, two and a half years before Tudjman appeared, provoking the nationalist unrest in the country and defending socialism although he knew it was finished, because he has abused the role of the Army - thanks to its own stupidity, since it is challenging Europe by forcing it to deal with its past and the politics of passion. Belgrade has but one advantage over Zagreb: an appropriate opposition, which, unlike the opposition in Zagreb, would still like to be in power, but by deceitful kissing up with Milosevic. Its highest attainment is irony and cynicism. It underrates Milosevic, but dares not clash with him.

It will take long for this war to end unless there is an intervention from the outside. If Serbia could accept its borders, if it would only argue for the absolute territorial and personal autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia with international guarantees and protectorates and if, in return, it would ask for long-term Western credits for all the devastated regions and for itself, it would be in a much more favourable position than it is right now. In return for signing the Hague document it would gain peace and development. Declining to sign that paper, it faces the risk of a total war, of losing not only what is left of the world's sympathies, but also of dealing with internal conflicts, which would cost it more than any punishment from the outside. Neither side is strong enough to win on its own. The economic and political blockade of Serbia will fail to stop the conflict, not because of the existence of the black market, but because there is no political force in Serbia which could chase the nationalists out. On the contrary, the blockade prolongs the war, providing moral strength for Serbia.

Belgrade has but one convincing argument against the chauvinists in Zagreb: the atrocities of the barbaric and uncontrollable Croatian formations against the rural Serbian population.

Dubrovnik is becoming Milosevic's and Army's nightmare. Conquering it would mean taking over half of Dalmatia and framing Bosnia by an Army penetration from the North and the South to the sea. Even if it wasn't true, the siege of Dubrovnik is a convincing propaganda argument of Zagreb against Belgrade, which exceeds all the sympathy of the outside world for the terrorized Serbs in Slavonia.

The Army does not know how to retreat from Dubrovnik. It would have to explain to the Montenegrins what it was looking for there in the first place. If its aim was to overthrow Tudjman, it should have marched in Zagreb a long time ago. If it wanted to protect the Serbs in Croatia, it should also have gone to Zagreb, since there are forty times more Serbs there then in Stradun (the main Dubrovnik street). It renounced its final aim (Zagreb) and came to Dubrovnik, which it neither dares to rule openly, nor use it as a trump card against Milosevic in the negotiations. Milosevic might even curse the day Dubrovnik was attacked, since many will attribute it only to him and not to his generals. The Serbo-Croatian crisis can by no means be solved solely by Bosnia's neutral position, but its neutrality helps reduce the temperature. Mr. Izetbegovic (the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina) is doing a good job. In order to stay alive, all the Serbs in B&H should try to diminish the authority of their Belgrade and Zagreb "representatives" to speak on their behalf. Karadzic's (leader of SDS /Serbian Democratic Party/) generous gesture of transferring his authority to Milosevic means depriving the Serbs in B&H of their right to independence and a reserved attitude towards the Belgrade plan. Ethnic differentiation of the Serbs and the Croatians, argued for by the orthodox clerical circles in Belgrade and by one part of the opposition, cannot eliminate the danger neither of spreading the war, nor of migrations of the refugees on both sides. New borders would just provoke the "escape of nations" to their mainland.

Stubbornly refusing to adopt the Hague document, Milosevic has proved to be a rigid politician. Many believe he would be in war even if he eventually decides to sign it. In the view of this, it is even less clear why he declines to do so. He is perfectly aware of the fact that nobody here was bound by their word so far. His plan may be to create the illusion of "sanctity", but the war itself, its victims and the devastated economy clearly refute that ideal. It seems that Milosevic is not ready to wage an openly declared war against Croatia and to destroy the alleged Yugoslav army in order to create the Serbian army. However, he is not alone. Everyone who is aware of the meaning of his theory of ethnic borders knows that Milosevic would be destroyed without the support of the respectable orthodox priests, old Academy members, writers who even in taverns do not raise their glasses in memory of the Serbs killed in Croatia. He is not strong enough to be obstinate and abandon them.

Political temperature is rising. Serbia is steadily losing its direction. To the unreasonable the war seems the universal cure for all the evil. Croatia, by destroying itself, is beginning to differ from Serbia only by name.