A Chair on Two Legs
How would you assess the quality of the constitutional and legal regulations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the way in which the federal and republican constitutions are implemented?
In view of the fact that it has been over nine months since the formation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, one can say that it has not been constituted, even by far, as a state in the constitutional and legal sense. Unlike Montenegro, which adopted, in October 1992, a new Constitution that is coordinated with the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia has not done this. No actions to this effect have even been launched in the Republic itself.
The essence of the problem lies in the fact that in 1990, when the Serbian Constitution was adopted, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was already largely destabilized. For this reason the Serbian constitution was conceived as an integral Constitution of an independent and sovereign state, regulating all constitutional matters. However, due to the fact that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did function, albeit extremely inefficiently, article 135 of the Serbian Constitution expressed loyalty to the Federal Constitution in regard to the competencies defined in it as being federal. Along with that, provision two of the same article gave the right to republican organs, in the event that Serbia's equality or interests are undermined, to adopt, contrary to the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, documents that would protect the interests of Serbia. If the parallel existence of two very different constitutional systems were to last, this would increase the danger of destabilization, that is, it would postpone the stabilization of the situation in Yugoslavia.
Because of all this, it is necessary, when the federal assembly is constituted, that the new Government accelerate the adoption of the key laws that are under the jurisdiction of the federal state in the fields of foreign and internal affairs, defense and the economy.
How much of a handicap for the successful functioning of the federation is the fact that one republic is extremely superior over the other according to almost all criteria? In this light, how do you view Slobodan Milosevic's statement given to Television Serbia: "Any way, how could such a federation get into conflict with 95 percent of itself, how large a percentage does Serbia account for? What would that be like?"
This is a political statement which is absolutely contrary to the basic principles on which, according to article 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the new federal state lies, and that is the principle of the member republics' equality. The statement was made in October 1992, therefore, when "small Montenegro" was an insurmountable obstacle for "Greater Serbia" in replacing Prime Minister Milan Panic, so that it had to be made clear who the "boss in the house" is.
Two-member federations are very rare and the only one in Europe was former Czechoslovakia. Federations are usually multi-membered even in modern western states such as Switzerland and the United States. Their main integrating factor today is the high level of economic and technological unity and interests based on this. Apart from that, these federations are not constituted according to the national criterion, which many analysts consider to be the magic formula that makes possible their stability, and even the strengthening of the central authorities which, again, results from the awareness of the necessity of a modern economic life and technological development. The next integrating factor is, of course, the developed political pluralism which goes beyond the borders of the federal units and makes it possible to articulate interests and to successfully coordinate them.
Here, none of these criteria are adequately represented, with the exception of the relatively clearly expressed need for an economically unified space. It is because of all this, and not because it is not internationally recognized, that the prospects of the new common state are still unclear.
Where do you see the main differences between the interests of Serbia and Montenegro in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
From the way the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been functioning so far one gains the impression that Serbia sees the federation as a firmer, much more centralized state, in which the confederal elements should soon be eliminated. One also gains the impression that the request for full equality, which was also present at the time when the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was being drawn up and adopted, is absolutely dominant in Montenegro. The best confirmation of this lies in the question posed at the referendum that brought Montenegro into Yugoslavia on March 1st 1992. Citizens of Montenegro then opted for continuing to live in a common state as a sovereign and fully equal republic. The other confirmation lies in article 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which defines the federation as "a sovereign federal state based on the equality of citizens and the equality of the member republics". This article guarantees protection from outvoting because of the enormous difference in the size of the two republics, and especially the size of the electorates (there are 16 times more voters in Serbia than in Montenegro). The equality of the republics defined in such a way represents the basis for certain constitutional provisions of a confederal nature. This especially refers to the provision on changing the Constitution with the consent of both the republics' assemblies and on taking decisions in the federal assembly's chambers on the most important economic and other questions by a qualified, two thirds majority.
Do you think that Montenegro would agree to an unequal position in the federation under any conditions? Montenegro's vital interest to have an equal status stems from the fact that this republic is, with reason, jealously guarding its state individuality and long-lasting state tradition which is, to say the least, no shorter than that in Serbia. Due to such a state of affairs there is no doubt that the new federation has a future only if its "third member" is the resolute respect of equality. Without that the state would look like a chair with two legs. Probably aware of this fact, Montenegro has included a provision in its new Constitution saying that "a change in the republic's status, in the form of governing and in the borders cannot be decided on without previously holding a referendum". Thus, through its Constitution it legalized its right to leave Yugoslavia in case of necessity in the same way as in entered the common state - through the will of the people. How, from the constitutional standpoint, do you view the request of the Serbian Radical Party for the dismissal of the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Dobrica Cosic?
This is a political, not a constitutional conflict. The confirmation of this lies in the reasons that were formally set out when the question of the president's dismissal was raised. They brought into question the president's right to sign the agreement with Croatia, the agreement that was previously verified by the Yugoslav leadership. The thesis that the president has no international and legal authorization, that he is a protocol figure, can hardly be corroborated. The president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is authorized to represent the country, which is basis enough for a series of fundamental international activities. The unbelievable accusation that Cosic agreed with Tudjman on the attack on the Republic of Serbian Krajina is so absurd and immoral that it does not deserve to be spoken about.
Where do you see the most flagrant examples of the violation of the Constitution? Milan Panic was dismissed contrary to the Constitution. According to articles 103, 104 and 105 of the Constitution, a vote of no confidence can only be passed in the entire government. And the prime minister can either resign, which also entails the resignation of the government, or to ask that the Assembly have a debate on confidence in the government. It was not possible to dismiss Panic and to retain the government with an acting prime minister. Namely, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia envisages a so called office government which is not elected by the Assembly, but rather by the prime minister, so that it shares his fate. He has an obligation only to inform the Assembly about the appointment and dismissal of ministers. Still, the real attitude to the federal state was best expressed when the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs was, contrary to the Constitution and unlawfully, occupied by its colleagues from the Republican Interior Ministry.
Cosic cannot answer for his political activities
How, under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, can a president of the federal state be dismissed? Under the Constitution, a vote of no confidence cannot be passed in the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, like in the case of the federal government, but according to article 97 he can be dismissed only when the Assembly determines that he had violated the Constitution, and he can resign. Under the Constitution, he cannot answer for his political activities, and all the accusations against him are of a political nature. At the request of the federal Assembly, the Yugoslav Constitutional court determines whether he had violated the Constitution or not. In any case, one needs concrete evidence for the accusations against president Cosic and not a fist on the table. The risk of the initiative for his dismissal if, God forbid, it were formally also to be backed by the Socialist Party of Serbia, would be enormous in regard to Yugoslavia's stability and its international position, but also regarding the basic political stability in Serbia. It is almost certain that this would have a negative impact on relations between Serbia and Montenegro. One should hope that those who are to decide on this will attach greater importance to the fate of Yugoslavia than to the interest of a militant party and the vanity of its leader, or more precisely, its owner. (An allusion to Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Radical party - editor's remark)
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