The Dirty Cop Syndrome

The rise of crime in Belgrade and Serbia has reached unprecedented heights. In 1990 some 2,000 cars were stolen in Belgrade, in 1991 the number rose to 5,000 and in 1992, this number doubled. All other forms of criminal activities are on the rise, including the grave ones: the number of murders and robberies tripled in 1992 in comparison to 1990, while racket burgeoned. The citizens are arming fast, so that Belgrade police have recorded three times as many requests for permits to carry arms in 1992 than in the previous year. In one Belgrade municipality every tenth citizen has one, and the situation does not differ much in other parts of the country. Pressed by increasing robberies, private businessmen in Vrsac (Vojvodina) have threatened to set up their parallel police, which they believe would protect them more efficiently.

Faced with the citizens' growing dissatisfaction, the newly-elected Socialist-Radical authorities have been forced to do something, or at least to create the impression of undertaking some kind of action. It is questionable, however, if the authorities possess the necessary instruments for a broad-based action. The penal code is outdated and vague, the prison regime often unnecessarily repressive and inefficient, while the judiciary faces collapse. Judges' January salaries stood between 378,000 - 650,000 dinars (30-60 DM), so that there is growing talk of a "quiet strike" by the judiciary (a classic strike being banned in this profession), because cases wait a long time before being dealt with.

The situation with the police is even worse. The long announced de-politicization of the police never got off ground, and it is not rare for members of the police force to cross over to the other camp. Dragan Ivkovic of the Pozarevac police was recently apprehended at the Horgos border crossing with four "business partners." They were found to be in possession of the following: several passports with altered names, blanc passports, insurance policies, two sets of registration plates, 10,000 DM, half a gram of cocaine, and the Pozarevac police round stamp. "Confiscating" foreign currency from street dealers has become a popular pastime among some police officers. Some street dealers mention a weekly payment of 100 DM, which they have to hand over to "their" cops. A group of Serbian policemen who acted as security to the current head of the Yugoslav Army security department Nedeljko Boskovic were recently found to be involved in such activities. Thanks to his police connections, one of Belgrade's best known heroin dealers, has been operating without problems for years, and the price is paid by his customers, addicts and the small time sellers.

The dirty cop phenomenon is not unknown or unusual in the world. The problem arises when cooperation between the police and the underworld is institutionalized.

Arms smuggling usually goes along with drug trafficking. Surplus arms from the Warsaw Pact depots in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany, have found their way to buyers in the former Yugoslavia. Since the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) possessed impressive arsenals, it is clear that the surplus of arms can be found on the market here now. Arms are being used to pay for deficit products needed by a country under sanctions. How else can one explain an Italian government member's statement last autumn, when he claimed that the Sicilian mafia had acquired Stinger and Strela missiles in Croatia and Serbia. Among the few Italian tourists who visited the Montenegrin coast last summer, there were faces reminiscent of Sing Sing wanted posters, as were the faces of the hosts. Despite all this, the local populace welcomed their arrival because it meant that they would receive their salaries soon.

The increasing oil smuggling must not be overlooked. Serbian Radical Party leaders in a Serbian provincial town quarrelled immediately after the elections, and the most often quoted reason was linked to the fuel issue. In explaining last summer's decision allowing the sale of fuel for foreign currency, the Montenegrin government said that "Mr. Jezidimir Vasiljevic (owner of Jugoscandik enterprise) would provide oil through his private channels." In the civilized world it is difficult to find a state which openly admits that it tolerates smuggling. No one has checked up on Vasiljevic's "private channels," nor did they try to find out who were the persons involved. The origin of the money invested with Boss Jezda or Mme. Dafina Milanovic (Dafiment Bank owner) is not checked, so that Yugoslavia has become a Mecca for laundering money. It is not rare to find foreign investors with suitcases full of foreign currency staying at the Hyatt Hotel. The banks and for that matter the state authorities, do not care who these people are, or the origin of their money. In October 1992, the social accountancy department inspectors peeped into the books of the "leading banks", but the public has not yet been informed of the results. Regardless of what they found, the inspectors will probably not be able to publish their finds, since, as Mme. Dafina said lucidly, "Dafiment is the keeper of social peace." Links between state organs and exceptionally rich bankers, are not being denied. Boss Jezda imported military equipment at his own initiative. The fact that a criminal wanted by Interpol and half of Europe has found a place in the new Serbian Parliament, speaks sufficiently of "Serbia as a state governed by law," and of the scope of the aforementioned anti-crime drive.

Compared to world capitals, Belgrade had, until recently, been known as a peaceful city without organized crime. Experts used to say that Belgrade did not have an underworld. The police, however, still deny the existence of organized crime. But, they do admit that certain forms of organized crime do exist in the chain of automobile thefts where the job is shared: (500-1,000 DM) for the theft, people who secure the documents get (2,000-3,000 DM) and there are also the chiefs in charge of re-selling. Prostitution is also taking on an organized form, but the police categorically claim that there is no classic mafia-like division of the job.

However, increasing showdowns on Belgrade streets are a warning. The days of "Belgrade's big shots" whose names filled the rank and file with fear and respect, and whose authority kept a hold on some kind of order in the underworld fluid, have gone forever. In a relatively short time, several of Belgrade's tough guys have been killed. It is not difficult to find a common denominator in all the cases. The attacks have remained unsolved. None of the victims had strong backing in the police, and they were not friendly with Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan. It is too early to speak of political motives with regard to these murders. The impression gained is that those with strong individualities were liquidated because they would not be able to accept a subservient position in the "new order" which is expected to take root in Belgrade's underworld. The disappearance of leading individuals will certainly result in a temporary lawlessness, showdowns and the rise of mini criminal stars who will quickly rise and just as quickly burn out. At an auspicious moment, the "big boss" will show up, and his war authority, supported by an army of 400 bodyguards, will certainly impress the boys with guns. Each will have his territory and task, and contract violations will be punished much more brutally than so far. Since the "boss" has long been under the control of the police, the state will have an insight into the underworld's global actions; it will arrest the "small fry" and caution the bosses when they go too far. In return, the regime will, as it has so far, have strong support in the event of new mass demonstrations, as those of March 9, 1991. It seems that the citizens will have to wait for a really serious showdown with crime. For, who would kill the goose that lays golden eggs?