To Bomb Or Not To Bomb

WASHINGTON---In the vocabulary of contemporary American politicians there is a term that has an ominous ring to it: "Self-fulfilling prophecy." It is defined as a situation evoking new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true.

Last summer Bill Clinton, the Democratic candidate for President, spoke of the need of the moment in international affairs, to launch air strikes against Serb gun positions in Bosnia to stop the slaughter of innocent Muslim civilians in besieged Sarajevo.

This spring, that proposal---made to embarrass a dawdling President Bush, his Republican opponent---has come back to haunt President Bill Clinton as he wrestles with the still intractable ethnic struggles under way now for 22 months in former Yugoslavia. On April 16, confronted with the rapidly deteriorating situation in the beleaguered Bosnian Muslim town of Srebrenica, Clinton said he felt compelled to consider "options" that had been "previously unacceptable"---including air strikes.

Is the proposal from the election campaign trail beginning to fulfill itself as prophecy? At the moment, it looks that way.

An endlessly deep abyss yawns open before the hitherto happy, lucky President. A shout into that great hole echoes back: "VIETNAM, Vietnam, vietnam..." There are not very many, but still a few potential parallels between the two debacles.

The United States stumbled into Vietnam after a European power---France---exhausted itself and departed. In former Yugoslavia, the European Community has been involved since late June 1991 and is also becoming exhausted.

In Vietnam, the Soviet Union was the strong backer of Hanoi's Communists. In former Yugoslavia, the Russians have begun backing the Serbian faction (although not as forcefully).

There the parallels pretty much stop.

At the end of January there was a moment when the incoming Clinton Administration might have spared itself from making their leader's Bosnia proposal of last summer into a "previously unacceptable option." At that stage the peace plan of Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen was still gathering momentum of the basis of partial acceptance of the Bosnian Croats, Muslims and Serbs. The two co-chairmen of the Geneva conference on former Yugoslavia decided to move the venue of the negotiations to the very Security Council of the United Nations that gave them their mandate in the first place. Vance and Owen are counting on the endorsement, and weight, of the United States to push through their plan for a comprehensive cease-fire and a re-creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a republic of ten highly autonomous provinces.

They were also buoyed by the private assurance of Alija Izetbegovic for the Muslims and Radovan Karadzic for the Serbs, that only a few more adjustments were needed for them to sign on to the whole package. The Croats' Mate Boban had already accepted the entire plan.

To the astonishment and bitter disappointment of Vance and Owen, President Clinton's foreign policy aides began assailing the plan as too soft on the Serbs and too hard on the Muslims (although they offered no alternative). Following Clinton's inauguration, more than two weeks passed before the new Administration chose to pass official judgment of the Vance-Owen plan and much of that time was devoted to fresh criticisms. Then on February 10, Secretary of State Warren Christopher issued a statement of support for Vance-Owen coupled with the announcement that the United States was joining the negotiation process by dispatching a special envoy, Reginald Bartholomew, and pressing for still more stringent sanctions on Serbs.

This pause had pernicious effects among the Muslim and the Serb leaderships. Encouraged by the Clinton people, who had meanwhile practically adopted him as a client, Izetbegovic began holding out for, and gaining, more concessions. Karadzic also held out for changes---understandably, since under Vance-Owen, the Bosnian Serbs have the most to lose. At the same time, using the pause before new sanctions were to take effect, Serb forces began pressing harder on Srebrenica and other isolated Muslim enclaves in Eastern Bosnia, with horrors resulting for all the world to see.

In short, it was as if almost everyone pursued their own worst instincts.

To be sure, after much cajoling, Izetbegovic accepted the entire Vance-Owen plan, although he gave himself all kinds of loopholes to escape from the commitment. Karadzic, too, accepted the portion of the plan involving cease-fire and control of weapons, although he continued to hold out on the proposed provincial divisions and interim government arrangements that had been made more favorable to the Muslim side.

But on the ground, the situation continued to deteriorate. Not only was Srebrenica reduced to a pawn on the Serbian chessboard, but an excruciatingly negotiated cease-fire between Croat and Muslim forces in central Bosnia around Vitez collapsed. Hundreds of Croat and Muslim civilians were killed in ensuing clashes, according to British spokesman.

This left President Clinton coming to grips with the ugly reality of what had once been mere campaign rhetoric: To bomb or not to bomb. To arm the Muslims or not to arm. Secretary Christopher said on Tuesday, "Clearly we're at a turning point in connection with the Bosnian situation..."

As it were that simple.

No matter that General John Shalikashvili, the commander of NATO, said at a Congressional hearing on Tuesday that air strikes were unlikely to push the Serbs back to the negotiating table. On Capitol Hill, would-be presidents like Senator Robert Dole, George Mitchell and Joseph Biden, (one Republican and two Democrats!) urged Clinton to hit the Serbs as soon as possible with the US. Air Force. So did newspaper columnists and editorial writers.

White House officials indicated even after a 50-minute discussion by telephone with Prime Minister Major of Britain and others on Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, that the President would not decide on committing American military power in the Bosnian conflict until after Boris Yeltsin faces the April 25 referendum on his, and Russia's future. The Russians were already mightily upset at having the U.N. Security Council go back on its word and push through the vote on tighter sanctions for Serbs last Saturday---instead of April 26.

So now Clinton is facing the prospect of having dented Yeltsin's chances and of dealing with a more difficult Yeltsin even if his friend of Vancouver wins.

That, however, is only one slope of the abyss.

The steeper slopes involve what would happen if the American president, feeling mounting pressure to "do the right thing" signs off on air strikes against the Serbs, however limited.

One does not need to be a Balkan expert to guess how armed Serbs would react toward the nearest Americans on the ground, be they journalists, diplomats, relief workers of officers attached to the peacekeeping forces. What about the peace keepers themselves? They, too, would become even more vulnerable than they are now---the Britons, French, Canadians and Spanish. Already, 30 members of U.N. Protection Forces have been killed in the cause of making peace.

The French and the British have threatened to pull out their humanitarian mission if the United States wants to start bombing in Bosnia, or Serbia. It would not be stretching the imagination to conceive a scenario in which representatives of the European governments with forces on the ground confront the United States saying: "This is a Balkan do-it-yourself-kit. You want to bomb the Serbs? It's all yours, Leader of the Free World. We are pulling out."

The possibility of that kind of prophecy fulfillment has begun to dawn on the new people in the White House and it explains why there have been so many mixed signals coming out of the Administration in what is shaping up to be a cruel test of Bill Clinton's statesmanship before he has even gotten used to the furniture at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.