The Night at the Villa

by Ivan Radovanovic

The Bijeljina event had, apparently, taken place in the head of Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, much earlier. A Serb and an opposition leader, who had an opportunity to meet Karadzic on his last visit to New York, has said, "He was convinced that everything was over, that foreign troops would enter Bosnia and impose their solution, and, then, he said - it is better not to sign the plan, we won't be remembered as traitors at least."

Many days later Karadzic arrived in Belgrade, whole many are claiming nowadays that nothing else, but what actually happened, could not have been expected.

That hot weekend Lord David Owen, the peace negotiator, arrived at the "Srbijanka" villa escorted by six members of his team and with a proposal on a blue corridor. Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, was accompanied by the Head of his Cabinet, Goran Milinovic; Yugoslav President, Dobrica Cosic was with his advisor Vladimir Matovic; Zoran Celebic was there with Montenegrin President, Momir Bulatovic (who joined the negotiations in the "Srbijanka" villa on Sunday), while Karadzic was escorted by Momcilo Krajisnik, the Speaker of the Bosnian Serb Parliament, all the time.

Everything was over quite quickly on the first day, on Saturday. Owen and Karadzic did not manage to agree. Having lost the nerve, Milosevic left the negotiations (with Karadzic) shortly. Dobrica Cosic, who later, after everything had fallen through asserted at the press conference that he continued to "be hopeful" stayed with Karadzic the longest.

Even before they started persuading Karadzic, the members of the Yugoslav delegation demanded firm guarantees for everything Owen offered to them. The domestic negotiators are still keeping it secret who was supposed to be the guarantor, agreeing only to reveal that "many, many people including the diplomatic representatives and the heads of states" were involved in the "guarantees" business.

Owen's trip to Zagreb on Saturday, and the statement, Dobrica Cosic made at the news conference, that "waiting for some answers from the Croatian and Muslim sides" is one of the reasons why the letter to the Assembly in Bijeljina came so late, leads to the conclusion that the other warring sides were involved in the Belgrade negotiations.

When it comes to foreign guarantors, the statement which later came from Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, where he asserted that he would not be a guarantor to the Bosnian Serbs, drives one to believe that the President of the Russian Federation was involved in the deal, quite probably through a promise that he "would be a guarantor" of a loud "yes" to the Vance-Owen plan arrives from Bijeljina.

The members of the Yugoslav delegation had two other big problems, besides confused Karadzic. But, they were aware of only one problem, which was to seal their doom later. Firstly, the negotiations took place over the weekend, which is why, as we were told later, it was very difficult to get hold of everybody supposed to approve the Owen's proposal. That is also the reason why the Assembly in Bijeljina, in whose obedience Milosevic strongly believed, as it is being claimed now, was late. The Assembly session was scheduled for 6 p.m., and then postponed for 8 p.m.. Finally, a suitable performance was put on before the Assembly started its work, so that the first item on the agenda was dedicated to free Serb forests and roads...all for the purpose of awaiting the definite piece of news from Belgrade.

It is also known that Karadzic and Krajisnik set off from Belgrade to Bijeljina at a quarter to six, with assurance that everything would be fine and that the plan would be accepted. Furthermore, a half an hour after them a special envoy of the Belgrade trio, who was armed with an additional package of guarantees, left for Bijeljina. It is also know that upon his arrival in Bijeljina Karadzic had a 45 minute phone conversation with Milosevic. "The lines became red-hot", a high official, attending the whole thing, has told VREME.

But, what the members of the Belgrade negotiating team did not know, as they are claiming now (and, if they did know, they certainly deserve to be remembered as some of the biggest frauds in history), is the fact that Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, used to roam over Bosnia and Krajinas in the days before the Assembly in Bijeljina. The leader of the Serbian Radicals also attended the first joint assembly of the two self-styled republics in Okucani, and then spent the time rather excitedly instructing and persuading the Bosnian deputies that they should not accept the Vance-Owen plan in any case. The outcome of Seselj's activity is well known - he managed to double-cross even Milosevic himself.

"We spent several painful hours convincing Karadzic and Krajisnik to accept the plan. At a quarter to six on Sunday it seemed that we succeeded in it," is what President Cosic stated afterwards. But, what Cosic did not say, and what leaked into the public soon after the negotiations were over, is that the number one man of the Yugoslav Army, General Zivota Panic, also took part in "working on" Karadzic and Krajisnik. Some sources claim that Panic, who officially take a rather belligerent stand (which should be understood), calmly pointed out to the Bosnian Serb leader that a possible war against the world would be lost very quickly, which was obviously unnecessary and only proves that the local negotiators had no idea of what was in Karadzic's head. Anyhow, the Belgrade team despatched him to the Assembly, positive that the plan would be accepted, later supporting its conviction by the fact that the President of the Serb Republic in Bosnia "did not offer much resistance at all."

"It was only ate 11 p.m. that it was clear that the Assembly in Bijeljina had taken a different course, and it was then that we decided to send them a letter," Cosic continued his version of the events, failing to disclose several "operative details." Firstly, the letter was primarily made up a list of proposals and memoranda which had for a while circulated between Belgrade and Pale. Secondly, both Cosic and Milosevic started writing their versions of a letter simultaneously, each of them believing that he was the only one doing so. The two versions were then put together, while severe messages to the Bosnian Serbs are Milosevic's doing. The last paragraphs, with references as to who has the right to decide on the destiny of the Serbian people, were written by four hands, but initiated by Milosevic.

It is well known what followed next. Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Vladislav Jovanovic, left for Bijeljina, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the Vance-Owen plan, Cosic stated that he was hopeful and started writing to furious Yeltsin, while Milosevic kept his opinion to himself.