Playing With Fire

Amidst the tension which set in after the Bijeljina Assembly no one noticed a subtle nuance in the interview of Yugoslav Army Chief-of-Staff, General Zivota Panic, with "Der Spiegel": when asked whether the Yugoslav Army would react to possible air-strikes on the Bosnian Serb positions, the General said the following, "As long as the borders of Yugoslavia are not endangered we have no reason to get engaged in any fighting." This time the Yugoslav Army Chief-of-Staff did not mention "biological survival of the Serbs", which might make a big difference. The General once again denied that the Yugoslav Army is helping the Bosnian Serbs, but no one believes it anyhow, nor is it being hidden; the General's statement can be interpreted in this whole new ball-game (after the Russian referendum) as certain anticipation. Namely, it is well known that the Bosnian Serbs are greatly relying on their technical and combat supremacy and that they have to deal with a growing problem on the manpower for their army. The Federal Yugoslavia may deprive them of this advantage by adhering to what General Panic said - provided that the letter of the Yugoslav trio was genuine.

The big Western media immediately took the outcome of the Bijeljina Assembly as a signal to start beating the war-drums even more loudly, instead of noticing that the famous letter was sent at a bad time only after the first preliminary reports on the outcome of the Russian referendum had arrived.

The entire idea of more or less limited military action against the forces of the Commander of the Bosnian Serbs, General Ratko Mladic - as it was promoted in the world's public opinion - neglects two extremely important political circumstances in a harebrained fashion. Firstly, the attacks on the bridges over the Sava and Drina Rivers will in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia be taken as an act of aggression. Secondly, any attack on any military target of the Serbs in B-H will also be interpreted as an act of aggression. Once again there is a thorough lack of understanding of the situation, which has been explained to them may time before: Karadzic's people will nave no understanding for the implied subtle nuances, such as: we aimed at the artillery which unselectively bombed the settlements and civilians. The rule of the game is different from the one in the field: the total Crusades against the heathen and the rest of the world are underway in the field. The fact that all the remaining Christianity (including the Orthodox Russian brothers) are unable to understand Karadzic and his extremists is not particularly important.

Too many different objects, some of which perfectly irrelevant, have been cited as possible targets (due to being insufficiently informed). The general agreement both here and there concerns primarily the bridges: over the Sava River at Jamena, over the Drina River Sabac-Bijeljina, near Zvornik (Karakaj and Zvornik), Ljubovija-Bratunac and Bajina Basta. It has been overlooked here that there are two hydro-electric power plants on the Drina River (Zvornik and Bajina Basta) and that a road can cross over their dams - if necessary. The attacks on the bridges would also claim civilian lives, and be interpreted as the aggression against the FR Yugoslavia. Politically, this would mean the elimination of any alternatives except of a total conflict, the inevitable bringing closer of all Serbs to the regime and a blank check to Milosevic to rule Serbia however he wants because there is a war going on: he will finally be able to say that Serbia is in the war. The opposition would, thus, be put in an utterly untenable position, which goes without saying.

On the other hand, such attacks on "the supply lines" would fail to achieve much tactically: the traffic would only be steered southwards, to the part of the Serbian and Montenegrin border with Eastern Bosnia and Eastern Herzegovina, which is quite porous as it is and runs through the woods and mountains. All this resembles a more serious version of the Ho Shi Min's road; the attacks on the bridges are more likely to encourage the further supplying of the Bosnian Serbs, rather than prevent it, as these attacks will practically get the Bosnian and the Yugoslav Serbs united. There are no grounds for putting an end to supplying due to the lack of fuel and vehicles, because of the air-strikes on the roads; the process will only be slowed down.

The artillery positions around the cities and towns such as Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa, etc., are primarily being cited as possible military targets within the Serb Republic in Bosnia; they are followed by Han-Pijesak and the local complexes of underground warehouses and commanding premises of Karadzic and Bosnian Serb Army Commander, General Ratko Mladic; besides, the Bosnian Serb airports are also in question, both the big ones around Banjaluka and Bihac, and the small airfields, the leveled meadows and heliports as well. Some military industry capacities (Banjaluka, for example) could also be a target. On Wednesday the Serb commanders warned the British officers in central Bosnian that UNPROFOR troops, and, especially, the British, as the Serbs have a down on them for some reasons, would be attacked if there are air-strikes on the Serb positions in Bosnia. The British Major on the spot told the BBC afterwards that he had "taken the threat seriously." There is no reason to doubt that the other 25,000 members of UNPROFOR also take the threat seriously. The problem is that they are scattered in small groups throughout former Yugoslavia, from Pancevo, through Bosnia, to Krajina and Zagreb. Objections, if not anything worse, are being equally hurled at them everywhere. The seriousness of the threat should not be doubted: the United Nations epitomize the Great Satan in the eyes of Karadzic's extremists; Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Radicals, has laid down the rules of the game, which the state television spread around before an abrupt political turn of the Yugoslav trio took place: "if they fire a single bullet we shall attack them." Even if there is willingness, it will take months of the media treatment to overcome the spiritual, psychological and political inertia of the Serbs outside Serbia, nourished with hatred, instigated by flattery and seduced by sweet-talk of the professional patriots from here and from their centers. The Serbs outside Serbia have already for months now been filled with foreboding that at some point they might get bitterly disappointed by the "treason" Cosic and Milosevic; this feeling psychologically results in the final, accomplished act, as the only available answer, "We all shall die, and you'll bear the responsibility," or, more maliciously, "We are all moving to Serbia, and, then, you figure out what to do..." Everybody is now everybody else's hostage: UNPROFOR, the Serbs outside Serbia, the Serbs and the Montenegrins. Milosevic and Karadzic are holding each other by the throat: Karadzic with his moral obligation and threats that he may speak out how everything got started; Milosevic with supplying and simply with the threat of cutting off the Bosnian Serbs and politically (they realize that they have gone over the top). Milosevic still has an open door to step back before the world, Karadzic is a hostage to his own extremists. Both of them got cut by the knife which they themselves sharpened.

Unaware of this dialectics, not realizing that after Yeltsin's success in the referendum a new card game has started, where Milosevic and Cosic might topple Karadzic, instead of Karadzic and Milosevic toppling Cosic, as has been the case until now, failing to understand that everything is perhaps a great pretense, which should never be ruled out, the world politicians are quite mechanically resorted to the escalation about they have learned in the book. The reasoning approximately goes like this: the sanctions have failed, we are moving on to military intervention (which will not succeed either, the success here is a result which leads to the political goal, and that goal is not visible - except as a fervent wish that the Bosnian crisis disappears). Military intervention, from the air, moreover, (rather spectacular for the CNN), with faraway common posts, from comfortable rooms with air-conditioning, over the horizon, with "smart" missiles, and all this - according to the General Powell's doctrine, if possible - with no loss of life.

While all this is underway, NATO planes are flying over Bosnia. They occasionally violated the air-space of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but this is settled in a friendly and peaceful manner, they say. The problems will occur only when someone stars firing; in the air, on the ground, or somewhere in between - it does not really matter.

There are assurances that several hundred Canadians in Srebrenica will not be left alone in the world should they be attacked - regardless of what might be thought about that. It is assumed that the same is to be applied on all members of UNPROFOR; why would the Canadians be more precious that they? The Bosnian Serbs claim - in tune with an old custom of the Yugoslav People's Army - that they are capable of repelling any attack, etc.. It is known that out of anti-aircraft weaponry they possess the 20, 30, 37,40 and 57 mm caliber artillery with visual aiming (radar aiming is immediately ruled out due to counter-measures); SA-2 and 3, SA-6 missiles, as well as different variants of SA-7.

SA-7 could represent a serious threat itself, because it is a missile which is guided by the source of heat, without the radar aiming susceptible to interference. All the rest is the matter of the warriors' luck: whoever has more skill. As long as the planes are flying and there is tension, the world under the UN flag is risking being involved through the will of someone in the field into the conflict it had not planned, but where someone might end up with a black eye without much trouble, and then whatever happens; but, there is no way back.

Whatever side tries the military escalation (the West or the Serbs, it's the same) the political damage will be far greater than the tactical gain. Namely, both concepts - damage and gain - are exclusively in function of a political goal, if the fact whether they aid or hinder its achievement is concerned. The political goal is still not visible, if we disregard the generalized statements about "peace", but the damage is greater than the gain in this sense as well.