The Iron Heel

Those who had repeatedly warned that the situation was ripening and that one wrong blow, considering the current psychological tension, could have bloody consequences have been proven right. The circumstances were ominous, but let's take it step by step.

The prevailing mood - On June 1st the political public was already irritated and frightened by the humiliating execution of General Zivota Panic, Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, and his Supreme Commander Dobrica Cosic. The motives were not debatable, but the manner and the choice of an executioner certainly were. The manner (and the choice of an executioner alike) showed the lack of taste; the message read: shut up, or else I'll unleash Vojislav Seselj,leader of the Serbian Radical Party, you don't deserve anything better. While the two key figures on the Yugoslav Political scene were being removed, Slobodan Milosevic was away and silent. That is a well know tactics: let everyone else butt in and decide, and then pass judgment in the end when it is easy to do so. This is what made both the authorities and the opposition additionally nervous: the former felt lost without a general line, while the latter, who are already lost in the political space in Serbia, could not orient themselves. The atmosphere was already tense, brimming with frustration as well as with premature arrogance and triumphalism.

The element of surprise - No one could expect what actually happened: neither the authorities, nor the opposition. The MP's of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) had for some time systematically driving Vojislav Seselj's Radicals crazy, which is to be understood as one of the parliamentary customs; Branislav Vakic, a parliament member of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) did knock out Mihajlo Markovic, a parliament member of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), but these things happen in parliaments and are solved within them. There were no reasons to expect anything like this. Milosevic's absence in the moment when the incident took place left the authorities on their own, and it is well known that they do not know how to handle authority. Surprise helped create panic and raise the level of violence on both sides.

Wrong timing - The incident started at the moment when neither the opposition nor the authorities could count on a substantial support form their people. The Belgraders left the city center and went home, the police was on a usual alert (the afternoon shift). There was no wind, the reactions of both sides were confusing and clumsy in the first key hours.

Faced with the first several hundred citizens gathered in front of the Federal Parliament building, the police mainly remained composed and reacted according to the procedure: they stalled at first and called reinforcement in the meantime (not only the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, but also the reinforcement from the brotherly Serbian lands, the Center of the Security Service of the Republic of Serb Krajina has not been situated in Ilok for no reason, rather than in Knin or Benkovac). The critical moment occurred between 9 and 10 p.m. on the steps of the Federal Parliament building: according to the accounts of witnesses and reporters of VREME who were on the spot, a policeman, Milan Nikolic, was hit in the head by a stone (he would succumb to his injuries later) while fierce shooting from fire arms coming from both sides erupted at about the same time. The difference between dull shots from the rifles for breaking up the demonstrations (38mm caliber, rubber bullets, CS gas (tear gas), at least three seconds for re-loading) and sharp subsequent gut shots could be heard clearly. If there is something positive to be found in the event in the night between the 1st and 2nd of June, then it is a fact that both sides restrained from continuing to use fire arms after the fist exchange of fire; which is the fortune, equaling a miracle.

Meanwhile the police emptied the Parliament and escorted Seselj out. They also resisted the pressure put on the main entrance, while tacticising and stalling. the atmosphere at the main entrance was relatively tolerant until the shooting began and policeman Nikolic was wounded. At that point high police officials advised the journalists to leave, as the situation was no longer funny. The police fired the salvos of rubber bullets to clear the area around the Parliament's main entrance, in which they eventually succeeded. The police, then, started laying down a systematic barrage of tear gas on Nikola Pasic Square, from the left to the right, thus pushing the crowd back towards the main post-office building and creating access to the reinforcement. That would be an end of the operation: water cannons and armored police vehicles arrived, Bulevar Revolucije Street on one side and Terazije Square on the other were cleared. Public peace and order were restored, unlike safety of the citizens who were there, as we shall see later.

One has to admit that the police observed the rules of the tactics on this occasion (as opposed to the events on March 9th, 1991): there was little of the direct physical contact with the demonstrators, whole the benefits of the technical advantage (rubber bullets, CS gas, armored vehicles) and proper maneuvering were used to the maximum. According to some sources, about 2,500 policemen were called which is much more than what a real necessary proportion of the two sides called for, when it comes to the demonstrations is general; that is why the operation was so fast and efficient. Some say that Draskovic, who was visibly pale and concerned, realized that the battle had been lost and withdrew. The major advantage which the demonstrators could possibly have - a supremacy in numbers was not realized: the demonstrations began too late, when the majority of potential supporters had already left the center of the city. The lack of wind made the tear gas more efficient and turned it into a precise means which is easily controlled. The composition of the demonstrators - 3-5,000 at most at one point - was disadvantageous: a minority (the kids of 15 to 20 years of age, who are into fights and action) and a large majority of decent citizens who wanted to express a protest and not to fight. The kids are not specifically politically articulated (even though one of them enthusiastically called on the citizens to join in, "What are you staring at? You earn 15DM, what are you waiting for? The salaries of 5DM, to make you happier?") but they want to fight. The citizens opposition was politically literate, but they loathe violence by definition, which did not help them in the end.

The critical period in all demonstrations in Belgrade (and elsewhere) ensues immediately after the demonstrators have been broken up and dispersed, and lasts for the following two to three hours. Then, the police has an absolute control over the area, feels triumphant and has to satisfy the statistics of the arrests, but its own frustration caused by the difficulty of the service as well. And that is how it was on the 9th and 10th of March, 1991, and in the night between the 1st and 2nd of June. According to some sources, that night the trouble was wrought by the rumor that three policemen were dead. Such rumors shot up the adrenaline level as the police force is known as a guild, where the greatest solidarity is shared. A hunt on the gathered citizens began under cover of darkness. Such hunts of demonstrators only multiply the numbers of "state enemies", as the actual participants, the kids, had already disappeared, leaving behind the well-intentioned citizens who have for centuries now lived the illusion that the innocents cannot be harmed. The practical lesson - that no one should be there during that time - fell on deaf ears. The police spread around the Tasmajdan Park, for example, where vicious beating took place in the darkness, far from sight. Similar things happened on Terazije Square and Republic's Square in nearby passageways and streets. At one point about 15 policemen entered the garden of the Madera restaurant. They spread and went around the tables. The guests and several journalist made a dignified retreat, with their eyes fixed on the glasses, not uttering a word. The policemen jumped over the hedge and continued to "clear" the park (they beat up some poor wretch right behind the hedge). They could have gone around the Madera's garden (which would have been easier for them), but they didn't; they passed through it hoping that someone would tell them something (but, fortunately, nobody did).

Such a stand points to a basic problem of the Serbian police in these political times: abuse in the service which is a criminal act, by the way. Nobody, not even the police, lives in a political vacuum. That service has been used and abused from the very beginning, in Kosovo, in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, in Sandzak, and to this very day. Vuk Draskovic (the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement) may have it that "a half of the police" support the SPO, but the fact is that the police identify Draskovic as an arch enemy, while the state which is behind the police keeps repeating it to them. The police have never clashed in the streets with Seselj's Radicals... In a confusion over the so-called "non-party" nature of the state administration (and over the "non-party" army), the policemen, who are realists by the nature of their profession, have got the message: it is clear who is in power.

Abuse in the service is encouraged and incited by not being prosecuted. Even if it is prosecuted, abuse in the service drives a wedge between the people and the state. Even if someone wishes for armed conflicts next time, as a provocation for setting up a dictatorship, he will not penalize the abuse in the service, since it best illustrates the arrogance of the authorities.

At 2.30 p.m. on June 2nd the police entered the premises of the City Board of the SPO, where a large number of the party's leadership and its MP's were at the time. According to consistent and repeated statements of the witnesses present, the parliamentary immunity was not respected, while the police beat the arrested, even though they gave no resistance to the superior and armed authorities. No one disputed body injuries which Vuk and Danica Draskovic suffered while in the hands of the police, there are even medical reports. No one among the authorities even feels ashamed of this. Instead of a hypocritical apology, the familiar old-communist-like charges of a "putsch" could be heard (which remarkably resembles the campaign against Cosic). Even if Draskovic and his wife Danica had tried to topple the authorities and killed the thousands of policemen by doing so, the law and the Service's internal rules prohibit beating after an arrest has been made: that is the abuse in the service. No one, however, care for the law and Service's rules. Does this mean that Milosevic's regime has "revealed its true face"? The proposal, which the Republic Public Prosecutor's Office sent to the Serbian Constitutional Court, to ban the SPO, could back this, but Milosevic is capable of preventing it any time. If he doesn't, the situation is clear. He was the one who reminded that the Constitutions, laws and regulations don't matter, but what does is "the balance of power." He not only reiterated it, but has always behaved that way, since 1987 until today. If he decides to use "the balance of power" until the end and get rid of unpleasant presence posed by Vuk and Danica Draskovic on the Serbian political scene, there is no limit to his power: an absolute power is a complete absence of somebody else. But, somebody else will always remain, as it is in the nature of the absolute power to keep fighting against somebody else. Milosevic surely knows that the absolute power, the authority which does not restrict itself with the Constitution, laws and rules of the game, has a built-in mechanism for self-destruction: it falls into pieces because of its own inertia. The process begins with unpunished arrogance (Vojislav Seselj, Radoman Bozovic) and ends in one of the ways, well know in history.