Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

Fikret Abdic joined the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) only after it had become a relevant factor on the Bosnian political scene. He laconically explained his decision by the will of the people from Cazinska Krajina, insisting that he was pro-Yugoslavia. The benefit was mutual: the SDA gained a member whose popularity in Cazinska Krajina (a Muslim enclave in north-western Bosnia-Herzegovina) bordered on worship, while Abdic himself gained a reliable political backing for raising "Agrocomerc" (the state farm, whose director he is) from the ashes, as this farm is everything he has always put before everything. Once again "Babo" (Abdic's nickname, meaning "daddy") started from the very beginning. As a candidate of the SDA in the elections in November, 1993, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Abdic received the largest number of votes, even more than Alija Izetbegovic (President of B-H) did. However, he did not go into high politics, as his turkeys in Velika Kladusa were more important to him.

When the war broke out in Croatia, "Agrocomerc" worked at full steam, and, Abdic became one of the main suppliers of the self-styled Serb Republic. He believed that business was more important than politics, and that whatever is good for this company cannot do any harm to Cazinska Krajina. It is well known that the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) bought up everything "Agrocomerc" produced, primarily the poultry, while it is still a mystery what it asked in return. Abdic, on his part, showed keen interest in meeting General Veljko Kadijevic (Defense Minister of the former Yugoslavia), which never took place, because of the pressure the Serbian war lobby put on Kadijevic, as some claim.

An open crisis in the Presidency and Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina took place while the war in Croatia was still underway. It reached a peak when Uzice and Titograd corps entered the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina due to opening of the Dubrovnik front. At one of the joint sessions, the then Defense Minister of B-H, Jerko Doko, demanded that the Territorial Defense be mobilized and the JNA be labeled as an aggressor. He was backed by Stjepan Kljujic, Ejup Ganic, and even Izetbegovic himself. On the other hand, Alija Delimustafic, Minister of Interior Affairs, opposed him, warning of the strength of the JNA and the consequences of a conflict. It was Fikret Abdic who provided crucial support to Delimustafic, so that police reserves, with their ethnic make-up unchanged, were mobilized instead of the Territorial Defense.

Biljana Plavsic accepted and commended the stands which Delimustafic, but also Abdic, had taken. Generally speaking, these two were assessed as "the most constructive Muslims" by the Serbian bigwigs. There were some speculations about a putsch in Sarajevo, where Abdic and Delimustafic, as moderates, would replace Izetbegovic and Ganic with the help of the Counter-Intelligence Service (KOS). Although Abdic clearly distanced himself from those plans, he still remained a suitable person for negotiations. Thus, he left for Bijeljina, together with Biljana Plavsic and Generals Brascevic and Jankovic, where he spent three hours of nerve-racking negotiations with Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan (leader of Serbian paramilitary formations and MP in the Serbian Parliament). Arkan handed Abdic an automatic rifle, which was made in Croatia, asking him to give it to Izetbegovic as a proof that the Croats and Muslims were arming themselves with an intention to perpetrate genocide against the Serbian people. After the two had made a round of the town, they addressed the citizens over Radio Bijeljina convincing them that peace had returned and that they could freely come out to the streets. However, Abdic's report to Izetbegovic upon his return is much more important than the negotiations. "Babo" was able to gain a deep insight into the situation on the Bosnian terrain, as, even prior to April 1992, he frequented the crisis areas which sprang up one after another, just like the one in Bosanski Brod, unlike most SDA officials who were preoccupied with the international constellation of power.

He knew that the Bosnian Serbs and Croats were armed and ready waiting for the first war-flames. He was also aware that the JNA was siding with the Serbs, regardless of all statements, and that the Muslims were not prepared for war, having found themselves "between the devil and the deep blue sea." Therefore, he advocated compromising and waiting for some better times, rather than radicalization. Abdic's stands were supported neither by the SDA nor by the Presidency of B-H. Izetbegovic and his closest associates assumed that Bosnia will fall unless it offered strong resistance, and that Serbia would abandon the plan of its won expansion under the international pressure, and that JNA, which was still multinational, would not be able to act in the conditions of an ethnic "leopard's" skin. Believing in all this, they decided to reply to fire with fire, so that Abdic found himself in the minority, advocating agreements as a way to avoid the war, regardless of yielding to numerous blackmails, as he was convinced that shrewd and pragmatic policy with time could lead to independence even, when the balance of power has changed. The moment when Abdic represented a ray of hope for all Bosnians who, in spite of everything, insisted on indisputably positive inheritance of a pro-Yugoslav determination was short lived. Death, killing and destruction proliferated so much that reason became exclusively an abstract noun. Abdic, who was unable to exert any influence on Izetbegovic and his policy was left without anything else but to return to his hometown.

Upon his return to Velika Kladusa, Abdic's main task was to save as many lives and as much peace and property as it was possible. However, the clashes with the Serbs who surrounded Cazinska Krajina were inevitable. Yet, they were never as fierce as elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the exception of a conflict in Bihac at one point. Abdic, the man whose words are received in the area as God's revelations, did not allow any offensive action. As much as it was within his power, he tried not to tamper with anybody, but he made it clear that he was ready to fight to the last man, in case of the attack.

More or less, he was successful in everything: the fighting with the Serbs was mostly on the level of skirmishes, not a single shell fell on Velika Kladusa, Cazin, and the majority of near-by village (excluding the border belts), which means that most lives were saved. Many were ready to ascribe this fact to Abdic's connections with the Serbs from Croatia, that is, to the pay-off of their debts from the times when he used to supply them. But, what more likely explains this is that "Babo" may have realized on time that Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unitary state had been lost, so that he simply began to behave as the Serbs and the Croats had for a long time - to each his own. Basically, the Serb Republic in Bosnia was in need of a compact Muslim enclave with which it would not have any large conflicts in order to prove that that is the only way of ethnic co-existence in B-H.

However, it turned out that Abdic maintained more than good relations with the Republic of Croatia, apart from carrying on the trade in oil, food and arms with the Serbs. Humanitarian convoys which departed from Zagreb were never forced to change direction, while sports and agricultural airplanes transporting the arms which were in short supply made their landing almost on a daily basis. Meanwhile, numerous politicians from Croatia, including Chief-of-Staff of the Croatian Army, General Janko Bobetko, paid visits to Velika Kladusa. The goal of their visits and talks with Abdic was formally interpreted as a need to coordinate their joint fighting. However, as nothing would usually happen on the war-fronts after these visits, an assumption that something else was at issue would be valid. Namely, the Croatian outlook on the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its solution is widely known, as well as the fact that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and his Defense Minister Gojko Susak have not taken Izetbegovic as an adequate interlocutor for a long time. "Babo's" model of organizing the life in Cazinska krajina has launched him as a potential ally of Croatia in a future partition of B-H, who would provide for an illusion of spotless reputation before the world.

Fifteen days before his first public promotion in Zagreb as a member of the Presidency of B-H, which took place after more than a year of his membership in the party, Abdic severely attacked the policy of Alija Izetbegovic on Radio Velika Kladusa. Among other things, Abdic condemned Izetbegovic for waging a suicidal war, saying that he himself would have never done it that way, which can be seen best in the region where he is the boss and the way of life there. Even prior to this in his rare interviews to the Croatian press, he made it clear that he didn't care much about the Presidency in Sarajevo. When asked whether he went to Sarajevo and how he did it, Abdic replied that he didn't as there was no need for it, in other words, he had more important business at home where he could be reached over the satellite telephone should they really need him.

At the moment, when the Vance-Oven plan is being buried and when the Croatian and Serbian regimes have laid their cards on the table Fikret Abdic appears to be the only possible figure who could overbridge the rift created by the impotence of the international community to stick to the idea of unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina and Izetbegovic's refusal of dividing the state. As it is believed that most Muslims would be ready to continue to live in the areas which have not been seized by the Serbs or the Croats, even after being subjected to massacres and expulsion: "Babo's" krajina is offered to them as a model.

However, a spectacular change at the top of the B-H Presidency shouldn't be expected. While the majority of Muslim politicians made rounds of European and other capitals in the world asking for help, "Babo" took on tiring work in the field. Pragmatic and energetic Abdic is aware that the Army of B-H which is loyal to Izetbegovic represents a big stumbling block to him as well as that whatever he signs, regardless of the office he is holding will have little value until all relevant factors agree to the new peace action. Therefore, Abdic will strive as much as possible to avoid an open conflict with Sarajevo, and even more so to get rid of a burden of the main protagonist from his back.

All things considered, he will opt for a series of small steps and compromises in relation to Sarajevo but to all other factors in the B-H war as well. He will become a leader only after he has assessed that such a thing was opportune. Just as he, with his sobriety, provided a ray of hope at the beginning of the war that the worst would be avoided, Fikret Abdic now represents a slight chance that some peace settlement can be made after all. At the beginning of April his theses envisaged that B-H would remain dominated by Serbia, at least for some time, nowadays his acceptance of a plan made by Tudjman and Milosevic means a definite partition of the country. There are few reasons to believe that Abdic is not aware of this.