Public Opinion Poll (2)

Under  the  surface  marked by  the  opposition's  political exhaustion and weakness, as well as the authorities' reliance  on force  rather than politics, it is obvious that the  deep  social crisis does not produce political behaviour. In the first part of the  research conducted by the Institute of Social Sciences  that we  carried in the previous issue of Vreme, we noted the radicalisation of  public opinion and the increased  xenophobia.  It seems that all but one man are losing on the political plane.  He too, however, seems to be gaining strength in a vacuum.

We  shall present this major opinion poll in the form of  an interview with comments.

Did  you vote at the December elections? What party did you  support for the Republican Assembly?

Out of Serbia's electorate, 30.1% remembers it had voted for  the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and  as  much as 47.1% of the polled Montenegrins  remember  they voted for the Democratic Party of Montenegro (DPS CG).

If  the pollsters have not made a mistake, these  data  from the  belated  exit  pool may imply that  depressed  citizens  are currying favour of the authorities. It turns out that the  ruling parties boast more voters in memory than ballots in their  favor. What  is more interesting is that one out of ten  pollees  cannot remember whom he or she had voted for. Researchers are to  unveil the  mystery  of such "forgetfulness". The  greatest  differences between  the election results and the belated exit  pool  present themselves  in the case of the Radicals, three-fourths  of  whose voters  have  meanwhile been lost. In Serbia, only  7.6%  of  the pollees  say  they voted for SRS, 17.5% say they had  cast  their ballots  for  Depos, 6.5% say they had opted for  the  Democratic Party (DS).

One  out  of five pollees say they have not  voted  at  all, which  might  be an expression of discontent. One  out  of  three unemployed pollees (29.9%) say they abstained from voting.

Depos  is the most popular among high-school and  university students  (25%),  private businessmen and citizens  with  college degrees  (18%) and the unemployed (22%). It is interesting  that, in addition to Depos, the unemployed (mostly young people with an above-average  education)  respect  only the  Farmers'  Party  of Serbia (17%) and the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (13.5%). The tottering group around Depos could, therefore, stand a chance if it realised that its voters are young people deprived of  their rights and banished from society and if it drew  up  an appropriate  social  program and tried to  undermine  the  social coalition  of  the government and the  endangered  working  class employed by the state-owned sector.

If elections were held tomorrow, whom would you vote for?

These responses widely differ from the election results  and

prove  a  point:  21.1% for SPS, 7.3% for  SRS,  8.7%  for  Depos,

4.6%  for the Democratic Party....

Is there a party the views of which conform to yours, a party you might vote for?

SRS (11%), Democratic Party (6.5%), SPS (3.9%). SPO  (1.9%), Depos (3.2%).

These  data show the identity confusion among Depos  voters.

The  strongest  impression  arising from this  question  is  that Seselj is winning over the Socialists' votes. During the December elections,  around 40% of those who had voted for the  Socialists said  the  Serbian  Radical Party was their  second  choice.  The current  data in regard to the few pollees prepared to vote  show that  Seselj  would now maybe win over more  of  the  Socialists' votes  because, according to this estimate, the Socialists  could

add  to  their  certain 21.1% of votes another  3.9%,  while  the Serbian Radical Party could increase its popularity of  7.3%  by another 11%, most probably at the expense of the Socialists.  The Radicals enjoy the support of 10.6% of the workers, 8% of clerks, 8.9% of private businessmen, 6% of the  farmers. Judging by these data, extremist nationalism is not a proletarian  phenomenon but that of the lower middle class, as it  had been  in Germany. However, Seselj's potential voters, judging  by the question about second choice, might come from the very classes where the Socialists are the strongest - the farmers,  workers and housewives. The researchers have again failed to "grasp"  the volume  of voters of the Serbian Radical Party, their  percentage in  the  questionnaire  eludes the election results,  as  it  has

eluded all opinion polls so far. Although this research  reflects the  increase in radicalism (Vreme, previous issue),  which  does not  characterise only those who had voted for the SRS, the  pollees,  who had supported this party, for some reason do not  like identifying themselves.

Is there a party you would never vote for?

SPS  (15.8%), SRS (15.8%) is the answer in Serbia, 28.8%  of the  polled  in Montenegro would not vote for  SRS,  12.2%  would never vote for Depos, 22.6% for SPO....

Do you personally support Slobodan Milosevic's policy?

Yes (42.6%)

No (40.1%)

Undecided (30.5%)

Leaders  of  some opposition parties are  talking  about  staging demonstrations  against President Milosevic. What is the  likelihood of you taking part in them?

None (63.1%)

Hardly likely (13.4%)

Quite likely (7.7%)

Very likely (6.6%)

Were the previous elections fair?

The  previous elections were fair for 43.7% of the  pollees, unfair  for 26.2%, while 30.5% are undecided. As much as  61%  of the  polled  electorate says the media had no  influence  on  its decision who to vote for!

If  you had to choose between the policies advocated  by  Dobrica Cosic,  Slobodan Milosevic, Momir Bulatovic and Vojislav  Seselj, whose would you choose?

Dobrica Cosic (28.1%)

Slobodan Milosevic (25.5%)

Momir Bulatovic (10.5%)

Vojislav Seselj (8%)

Which politician do you trust the most?

None (26%)

Undecided (20.8%)

Slobodan  Milosevic,  therefore, holds first  place  in  the vacuum  with  21.3 % of freely formulated answers;  his  rating  in Montenegro  (24.1%) is somewhat better than in Serbia (20.5%);  at the time the poll was taken, Dobrica Cosic was the runner-up with 13.5%,  and was followed by Momir Bulatovic (3.5%)  and  Vojislav Seselj  (3.5%). The fact that the public supports Milosevic  both when  he  is  a conducting a war policy and when  he  is  turning towards  peace  may be proof that his influence is based  on  his actual power and his will for power that he has shown particularly to his rivals, such as Panic and Cosic.

In  October  1992, S. Milosevic had 50%  "super-pluses",  in December,  at the peak of his campaign, he fell to 46%  and  now,

after  winning the elections, has risen to 57.8% positive  (32.7% extremely  positive and 25.1% partly positive)  points,  although some  of his moves regarding Karadzic could not have been to  the liking of the nationalists supporting him. This might mean  that, with rivals eliminated in such a way, he would gain a  considerably greater number of votes at elections (if they were to be held now) than at the December 1992 elections.

Criticism  of this politician has abated since last  autumn: while  he  had received 42% minuses in October 1992  and  40%  in December,  35.7%  of  the polled  electorate  expressed  negative feelings  about him in May (11.7% mildly negative and  23.6%  extremely  negative). Such intensive support was also  extended  to Radovan  Karadzic  (with  30.5% extremely  favourable  and  28.9% somewhat  favourable assessments); he is followed by Momir  Bulatovic  (with  18.8% "extremely favourable"  and  35.5%  "somewhat favourable"  points. Bulatovic had received four times more  support  in Montenegro than in Serbia, while the percentage of  most favourable  assessments  of Milosevic was relatively  greater  in Montenegro than in Serbia. The following examples show that  part of his rating might be based on his power.

Dobrica  Cosic scored 83 positive and 9 negative  points  in October 1992 and recorded 70 "pluses" and 8 "minuses" in December last year, which can be described as a mild decrease in popularity;  in May, Dobrica Cosic came in first with an improved  rating (79.8%  positive assessments, 33.1% of them extremely  favourable and 46.7% somewhat unfavourable assessments). The question arises whether  Cosic's  rating would have been more favourable  if  the opinion  poll had been conducted after he was ousted. Our  public acts  as a scared teacher: as a rule, it gives higher  grades  to the people in power.

During  the election campaign, Vojislav Seselj  reduced  the number  of  negative points from 56% to 46%, while  in  May  this year,  the  number of pollees who cannot stand the sight  of  him further  fell (40.3%). On the other hand, he has  maintained  the percentage of positive points -- last October, he had been  positively  assessed by 34% of the pollees, last December by 38%  and this May by 35.5% of the pollees; 14% gave him extremely good and

21.5% medium positive points.

Support  for  Dragoljub Micunovic (Democratic Party leader) has remained at  the  same level  -  late  last year he enjoyed the support of  33%  of  the pollees, this May of 29% (5.2% of the very good and 23.8% of  the average positive points, while he reduced the number of  negative points from 51% to 30% ahead of the elections (he now has 53%).

Vojislav Kostunica (Democratic Party of Serbia leader) retained the percentage of those respecting  him (around 31%) while the number of negative points,  which he reduced from 41% to 27% ahead of the elections, rose to  52.3% in May.

Vuk  Draskovic has emanated the most energy in  the  opposition;  after the liberal politicians, with lesser influence,  he has been the one to clash with the current regime the longest and has  made  himself a lot of enemies. Owing to the  election  campaign,  the percentage of his negative points fell from  67 last October to 58 in December and the trend continued with  Draskovic receiving  54.9% of negative points in May. As  regards  positive points,  his  popularity in May in percentages  does  not  differ greatly  from  last autumn (in May 19%, last year 21%  and  22%).

This  means that he has survived the major depression that  overcame  the  opposition in the first half of  1993  relatively  unharmed.  (Of course, the opinion poll was conducted before  Draskovic was arrested and before the campaign against him. After his arrest, the political balance in Serbia has probably begun shifting and its effects are yet to be seen).

There are indeed no dramatic changes on the rating list.  As the  December elections show, assessments of politicians are  not directly linked to election behaviour. They are an indication  of the  limits  of  politicians, of the inferiority  of  the  public opinion and of general exhaustion. The variously expressed criticisms of all protagonists on the political stage indirectly bring

to  surface a positive fact - the public says there is no  incontestable leader and that the political resultant should be sought in the Parliament.