Panic Ate the Lamb

A paradoxical situation emerged after the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed over a year ago and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) became the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ): while, on the one hand, the newly-proclaimed state insisted on being the successor of the former Yugoslav Federation (SFRY), it, on the other hand, denied any connection between its armed forces and the former army. The aim was to show that the army of the new Yugoslavia is not the same one that declared war to prevent the disintegration of the former Federation, but a new armed force, whose sole concern is the protection of all Serbs in the world and, possibly, the guarantor of their unification. That is how the process called the transformation of the Army of Yugoslavia was launched.

The first step taken by the transformers was the ethnic and ideological purge of the officer corps. It began in February and reached its climax in May, 1992, when over 70 generals and an undetermined number of other officers were pensioned off. In addition to retiring used-up superiors such as General Blagoje Adzic (who was at the time regarded as Milosevic's man in the Army), the chief aim of the purge was to drive away all those, particularly non-Serbs, who would sooner or later start wondering for what and for whom they had fought. What ensued were scandals such as "Opera" and trials of certain generals, "the battue of traitors and Ustashi spies", all with the aim of finding scapegoats for all the defeats and failures of the former JNA and proving the new military leadership's resolution to introduce order. Finally, when even this purge criterion was exhausted, the 'transformers' began clashing amongst themselves - the hitherto chief "beaters of the game", Generals Boskovic and Domazetovic, were replaced or pensioned off, the "Kentaur" scandal broke out, etc.

As matters stand now, it is clear that the chief protagonists of the mentioned transformation of VJ had neither the ideas, nor the will, nor the strength to truly transform the former ideological army they had arisen from themselves. They merely succeeded in destroying the little that had still been functioning, such as the Intelligence Directorate. It is hard to believe that Serbia's political leadership had been unaware of the consequences of a transformation conducted in such a way. Namely, the former JNA simply became superfluous in Milosevic's nomenclature of power after it had played the role Serbia's President had assigned it in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The topmost priority of the Serbian regime is to retain its power at any cost and the army is simply not technically adequate for that task. That is why the VJ has been left on its own, i.e, the transformation was initiated although no laws clearly regulating military matters existed and without clearly set means of financing. In other words, the principle was: do as you like. The whole problem is additionally explained by the fact that the chief military transformers are the generals who converted from ardent communists to fervent nationalists overnight.

Left on its own and with economic collapse looming, the VJ has literally been reduced to poverty. After JNA officers withdrew from the former Yugoslav republics, the Army faced an acute shortage of apartments for its personnel - 25,231 requests for housing have not yet been fulfilled and over 17,500 military personnel have no place to live.

The salaries of VJ employees are still set under the old law, which effectively cripples them. Furthermore, the salaries are rarely paid out on time and by the time they are, hyper-inflation devalues them totally. For example, in June, the Commander-in-Chief received the salary (excluding bonuses) of 74,180,600 dinars (around 140 DEM), while a sergeant's salary stood at dinars 26,730,500 (around 52 DEM). Also, the Army admits its technology is ramshackle, that training can hardly be conducted, that various suppliers of elementary training material and food are halting deliveries since the Army owes them over 40,000 billion dinars (roughly 400,000 DEM). In other words- collapse.

It would therefore be ironical to speak of ousting politics from the VJ, of its professionalization and modernization in such conditions. It is much better to opt for demagoguery and restraining what has been left of the army, and the true master of this art is Serbian Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Seselj - both when he is working for his own or for Milosevic's benefit. The VJ was forced to closely follow all the political curves the Serbian authorities were making, which is not easy at all. It was forced to be both belligerent and peaceful, depending on the moment, and it is common knowledge that it is no cinch to hold a responsible post of General at times like these. Seselj, as the chief state inquisitor for traitors at the time when "patriotism" is the sole key measure of superior officers' abilities, called the shots in the VJ. For example, last year he deemed himself competent to conclude that the visit former Prime Minister Milan Panic and a group of journalists made to an ordinary base in Kosovo represented the revealing of a military secret, but did not qualify as such a visit General Panic and the press made to the Podgorica airport (witnesses claim that underground aircraft shelters were opened and shown to the guests). No lesser was his influence on the personnel policy, which is best illustrated by the fates of Generals Boskovic and Domazetovic. Under the principle manus manum lavat, he had first offered the two men strong political support ("honourable men and patriots") for their career manoeuvres and, in return, they not only provided him with key information he used to deal with his political opponents but also with "material and technical aid" for the Radical Party's various activities.

When part of the General Headquarters headed by General Panic realized that the Radical Party's influence in the VJ has acquired such proportions, particularly among senior and junior officers, that they might easily become "traitors" unless they agree to comply with all of Seselj's whims, it decided to take advantage of Milosevic's peace-making phase and the famed Bosnian Serb assembly sessions and pension off Seselj's most prominent players - Generals Boskovic and Domazetovic. Seselj reacted at once: General Panic was accused of many things, from being too lenient on deserters and unnecessarily razing Vukovar to supplying the VJ with potatoes and toilet-paper via firm "Kentaur" trading company owned by his son Goran. The language used in the charges carried by the daily "Vecernje novosti" and the information voiced by Seselj, clearly show that military sources had supplied Seselj with the material for his accusations. The Radicals did not even bother to hide that: they said they had received tons of complaints about Gen. Panic from their sympathisers in the VJ.

Panic, however, was not replaced when Seselj insisted because of his skillful manoeuvring during the ousting of President Cosic. However, the Radicals did not withdraw either - they attach importance to the VJ as no other party.

Draft laws on the VJ and Supreme Defence Council discussions of them at June 12 and 14 sessions, however, show that something significant is underway in the armed forces. The communique says that professionalization and ridding the VJ of politics are being firmly implemented, and that the commanding and leading posts are finally put in the hands of professionals in the VJ, which is to be completely commanded by the Supreme Defence Council.

Milosevic has probably decided to introduce order in the VJ, to discipline and centralize it, and, in these circumstances, this is most easily achieved by "professionalization" - as it had been in the case of the Serbian Interior Ministry. Of course, new, fresh staff will be needed, so purges will resume. The VJ will rid itself also of those upon whom money should not be lavished in the reigning economic chaos - officers born outside Serbia. General Zivota Panic will remain the Commander-in-Chief long enough - so that when he goes down, he does not go alone.