A Fragile Pontoon Link

When Croatian President Franjo Tudjman announced the opening of Zemunik airport and the pontoon bridge in the Maslenica gorge, the authorities in Knin reacted by saying that they would thwart his plan by force. A statement by Croatian Vice-Prime Minister Vladimir Seks followed, to the effect that in that case the Croatian Army would carry out a wide-scale action. It seemed that a new Serbian-Croatian war was imminent, all the more so as both sides did more than just make verbal threats. After a year, the Serbs pounded Karlovac again, and the Croats fired on Korenica, for the first time since the start of the war. The daily "Slobodna Dalmacija" wrote that Croatia could enforce its sovereignty in Krajina only by arms, and that the controversy over Maslenica was an ideal occasion. At the same time, the Republic of Serb Krajina government and assembly, issued the usual pathetic and dramatic statement saying: "An enormous enemy army is just a kilometer away from Krajina's border which is being defended in blood. Brothers, volunteers, we need you again, we need you more than ever."

United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) deputy commander and Director of Civil Affairs Cedric Thornberry said that he understood Croatia's wish to link its southern and northern parts, but that it had gone too far with its unilateral moves. He added pragmatically that if the Serbs wished to, they could destroy the pontoon bridge at any time and close Zemunik airport. A UN Security Council statement of July 16, echoed this tone, and demanded that Croatia refrain from its announced line of action until an agreement had been reached with Knin.

In the beginning, the Croatian army's action over Maslenica received unanimous support from the Croatian public. It was presented as a total military success, and gave rise to a feeling of self-confidence after the 1991 frustrations, thus boosting Tudjman's popularity and the ruling Croatian Democratic Union's (HDZ) relative success. However, as time goes by, the opposition has started describing the action as an unfortunate move. They say that the captured 30 sq. kilometers are not a sufficiently large safety zone for the building of a pontoon bridge, since Serbian forces pound settlements on the Adriatic coast daily, from Zadar to Sibenik, and that losses are growing, making January's euphoria suspect. But, as far as Tudjman is concerned, a rift in the HDZ, after the situation in Zadar's hinterland became clear, is more important than criticism by the opposition. The "Ustashi" led by Defence Minister Gojko Susak and Vladimir Seks, underscored that the Croatian Army had more members than the Krajina did population, and they insist on radical solutions. On the other hand, the "Partisans" headed by Croatian Parliamentary spokesman Josip Manolic and Croatian Parliament Vice-President Josip Boljkovac, favor a compromise solution. Tudjman, under pressure from the increasingly difficult economic situation in Croatia and great dissatisfaction in Dalmatia, inclined at first to the "Ustashi". That was the situation in January when he needed a spectacular move. The same situation repeated itself when he had to justify this same move six months later. However, the international community's pressure and the open division of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia, forced Tudjman to lean towards the "Partisans" in the latest crisis over Maslenica.

On the other hand, Serb leaders in Krajina found themselves in a dilemma, just like on January 22, above all because of Belgrade's new war priorities. The annexation of the Serbian krajinas in Croatia to an alliance of all Serbian states, became something that was difficult to achieve. A new escalation of war would bring the legalized Serb Republic in B-H into question. That is why it was made clear to Knin that the Krajina would not be abandoned, mostly because of the possibility of exerting pressure on Croatia, but neither would Bosnian Serbs be pushed into a corner.

This was a great shock for Serb leaders in Krajina. Their primary goals - the drawing up of demarcation lines with Croatia and unification with the Serb Republic in B-H, left them with no space for political manoeuvering. Fear that they would be left to themselves, i.e., in Croatia on a long-term basis, made them risk total war in order that they might, while things hadn't finished in B-H, force Serbia to intervene. For the same reason they are urging unification with the Serb Republic in B-H, an idea that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has long dropped. He only needed it as a means of blackmail. That this is so, was confirmed by Karadzic's last visit to Knin. Using a lot of rhetoric, he adroitly avoided the issue of unification citing procedural reasons - the setting up of committees, the drawing up of draft documents, etc.

After signing, in Erdut (Eastern Slavonija), the document offered to him by deputies of the co-chairmen of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Republic of Serb Krajina Foreign Minister Slobodan Jarcevic expressed skepticism that the Croatian side would agree to it. When it was signed a day later, Minister Jarcevic was skeptical again as to Croatia observing it, saying that he did not believe that the Croatian Army would withdraw by the agreed deadline.

The Serbian side has expressed its doubts from the very beginning. It is interesting however, that while war tensions were growing, none of the Krajina officials paid much attention to public opinion. It seems that Belgrade, via various channels had reached an agreement with Zagreb, so that none wished to shoot themselves in the foot. After the dangers had abated somewhat, Republic of Serb Krajina Prime Minister Djordje Bjegovic, assessed that negotiations and mutual concessions were the only way of avoiding war, and started making statements. He threatened Croatia that, if it failed to honor its obligations, he would order his army to destroy the pontoon bridge and the airport. For certain, Bjegovic, Jarcevic, RSK President Goran Hadzic and others, are not having an easy time. After all those bellicose statements, they have been forced to accept a rotten compromise, regardless of the fact that it is being trumpeted as a victory of Krajina's diplomacy, in fact, as if Croatia had recognized the Republic of Serb Krajina. The nature of the pressures exerted by Belgrade can be gleaned from a statement given by Bjegovic to the German daily "Die Zeit", when he said that: "a loose confederation with Croatia could be envisioned". It is certain that Tudjman and Milosevic have finally decided to come to an agreement, or, as cynics have said, to realize that which they had agreed on long ago.

Their last summit in Geneva passed idyllically. First they both said that, God forbid, they would never divide Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then issued a statement with three points. As far as the Krajina is concerned, the third one is the most interesting. It expresses satisfaction over the solution arrived at with regard to the Maslenica crisis, and that "each individual or group which violates it, will have to bear full responsibility". In other words, it has been made clear to the leaders in Knin that Belgrade and Zagreb have decided to normalize "Serbian-Croatian relations completely", regardless of what this may mean to them. Naturally, all this caused panic in Knin, since few believed in speculations that Milosevic was prepared to abandon Lika, Banija, Kordun and Kninska Krajina in exchange for Konavla and Eastern Slavonija. Since Croatia's vital communication lines pass through these areas, a "complete normalization of relations" cannot be achieved before problems concerning these areas are resolved.