A Hundred Years Of War

It is very difficult to tell whether the Maslenica crisis has reached its peak. It is obvious that neither Zagreb nor Knin are ready to abandon their ultimate goals. The final solution, ``the introduction of the constitutional and legal order of the Republic of Croatia on its entire territory'' or ``the state demarcation between Croatia and Krajina,'' can be brought to life only by force of arms. However, numerous obstacles sprang up before this option, which seems so dear to the local war-lords. The international community is in a hurry to end the war in the former Yugoslavia. The two sides in conflict have lost their breath, the economy is exhausted, the people are weary, large scale devastation and victims in the offing, along with an uncertain victory have done their share. There is no doubt that both Zagreb and Knin want the war to continue, but it is questionable whether they are capable of leading it and how. Fully aware of this the owners of human lives on both sides are burning with desire not to allow anything to affect consistent carrying out of their national programmes, with which they have conquered the hearts of their subjects.

It seemed that a new and total Serb-Croat war was avoided at the last moment by the Erdut agreement. Everybody was content at first sight: the U.N. since the Geneva negotiations were not mined by a new escalation of the war, Serbia for having preserved its relations with Croatia regarding the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia for having triumphantly opened the bridge and the airport after much trouble, and, finally, the leaders from Knin since Croatia had announced it would pull out its army. Two false witnesses in Geneva, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and his Serbian counterpart Slobodan Milosevic, joined in the overall smirking and shoulder-tapping. They assessed that the agreement represented progress in ``the normalisation of the Serb-Croat relations'' and agreed that whoever violates it must be held responsible.

But, the things took a turn for the worse. The Vienna negotiations of the military experts from Croatia and Krajina collapsed at the same time when the Krajina leaders began settling their political accounts, which traditionally happens in the times of crisis. Namely, it was clear that the Croatian Army will not pull our unless really important concessions are made. The pontoon bridge and the airport under UNPROFOR control represent poor satisfaction for the shelling of Zadar and other villages, besides a six-month-long military control of 30 square kilometers of land. The fact that the Serbs victoriously interpreted the Erdut agreement as Croatia's recognition of Krajina (as several Croatian opposition parties supported it) only aggravated the situation even further.

Having found itself in a fix, the Croatian leadership conditioned the withdrawal of its army by the cease-fire and by putting the Krajina heavy artillery under UNPROFOR control as according to the U.N. Security Council Resolution 802. However, Knin refused this, believing that losing the artillery domination of the Zadar hinterland would enable the Croats to seize the territories which Krajina considers to be its own by applying the same tactics. The political gains achieved in the Erdut agreement would be lost as well.

As the solution to the Bosnian slaughter started to take shape, according to the ideas of Zagreb and Belgrade, the prospects that the Krajina Serbs would stick out in pursuing their goals diminished. Ever since Belgrade began giving up on them, the Krajina leaders gradually differentiated into the hard-line ``hawks'' and the opportunist ``pigeons.'' The latest settling of accounts took place in this framework. Unlike the previous ones, this one was directed by Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). Requests that a compromise solution be found arrived from Belgrade, so that Goran Hadzic, number one exponent of the Serbian President, became a target. According to the tried out principles of the Radicals, he was accused of treason, corruption, crime and the like. It was made clear that any concession which would yield no benefit to Seselj's war lobby was out of question, even if it may be a personal wish of Slobodan Milosevic. On the other hand, the Croatian Army did not pull out from the Zadar hinterland as it was supposed to according to the Erdut agreement. Tudjman could not give such orders as he had been criticised of not being of principle and of being ready to trade the territories.

Although we are unlikely to find out any time soon what Tudjman and Milosevic exactly discussed during their meetings, it is certain that they did bargain and make important, long-term compromises. The situation in the Zadar hinterland could not have been avoided. Following the action of the Croatian Army on January 22nd, Tudjman stated that everything had been more or less agreed with Milosevic. Many tend to believe that Milosevic did not explicitly approve of this, but the Krajina leaders did have a reason to break in cold sweat on the occasion, especially when one considers the reaction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which was nothing more than a mild diplomatic protest. There are no guarantees that there was no approval this time. The fact that Tudjman's policy became more aggressive after he crossed the pontoon bridge only confirmed their reason for fear. He stated that numerous agreements signed during the Yugoslav wars were not respected and there were no grounds to believe that this one would be an exception.

Although Tudjman's statements are primarily addressed to the Croatian public, panic in Knin has reached a critical mass. The Geneva negotiations and the satisfaction which the Croatian and the Serbian Presidents expressed were taken as a gradual letting go of Knin. This impression was additionally enforced by the announced American involvement in B-H, which, as Knin believes, would force Milosevic to make further concessions. Therefore, the Krajina leaders were left with nothing else but to reach for the last available weapon, that is, pulling Serbia into the war. Seselj and his Radicals have remained the only possible allies and the only hope.

After Croatia failed to fulfill its duties from the Erdut agreement, the Serb artillery was activated, and, according to the promises made earlier, put the pontoon bridge out of use. The first reaction by Tudjman was his statement that this attack placed the Erdut agreement into history. Other Croatian officials announced an adequate response. Nevertheless, it appeared that everything will remain under control due to the pressure by the U.N. However, the incidents and fighting multiplied. The Serbs shelled Karlovac and Gospic, while the Croats shelled Teslingrad (formerly Licki Osik) and Korenica.

In spite of everything, the reactions coming from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia seem most striking. Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic advised the Serbs from Krajina to hold back and show patience: you are right, but you don't really have to achieve everything through war. Most of other officials nearly missed to notice that the war has flared up again in Croatia. No one offered volunteers, nor did anything to prove patriotism on the case of Serb Krajina. It is believed that this can be explained with the fact that the Serbian President does not need any disturbing distractions. A historical agreement in Geneva is possible and a big job in B-H can be wrapped up now, so that it would not make any sense if several hundred brains lobotomized by war spoiled all that effort. Speculations go even further: allegedly, Slobodan Milosevic perceives Serb Krajina more or less to be a problem of Croatia, only Tudjman, as a weak political tactician, is not capable of using it.

A two-year-long war in Croatia has exhausted both sides. The Croatian economy is stumbling, while the barter trade has been practised in Krajina for some time now. However, there are no signs of readiness to think about the future--nothing has brought into question the readiness of the authorities in Knin and Zagreb to relent on their relentless positions. Yet, regardless of willingness, there is not enough strength to reach the intensity of fighting as in 1991. The patriotic zeal has subsided, and the sources for financing the war have dried up considerably. The only thing left is to wear out the enemy. The Croatian authorities are convinced that they will tire out the Krajina Serbs by constant threats and provocation so that they will have to move either to Bosnia or to Serbia for the reasons of pure existence, and the remaining lot will have to surrender. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not capable of protecting its own citizens from prevailing poverty. Knin, on the other hand, is relying on its firing power, to be more precise, on that of the Bosnian Serb Army and the Yugoslav Army. The Krajina leaders assume that the Croats will sooner or later get tired of destruction to which they may be exposed any time, and that the Croatian leadership will give up on everything one day. The compensation will be found in B-H anyway.

However, these plans can be realised neither easily nor quickly. Fear that someone might be at an advantage and dissatisfaction of the subjects with ever deteriorating living conditions are forcing the decisions which should show that the final victory is at hand and that everything is going smoothly. That is why the bridges will be built and destroyed, the civilian targets will be shelled, and the people will be killed. No essential changes will or can take place. Such a situation may last very long, too long.