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August 16, 1993
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 99
Sarajevo's Fate

The Clinical Death

by Ljiljana Smailovic

The Spokesman of Co-chairmen, Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, on Wednesday resolutely refuted the writings of ``The Washington Post'' and ``The International Herald Tribune'' that the Co-chairmen are allegedly putting pressure on the Bosnian Presidency to give a considerable part of Sarajevo to the Serbs in exchange for a comprehensive peaceful solution. At the briefing session in Geneva, Spokesman John Mills compensated for his unconvincing rebuttal with the energetic tone of voice and the look of indignation on his face when he said, ``We have proposed that Sarajevo remains under the patronage of the United Nations for a year, which differs from both the Bosnian and the Serb proposal.''

``The Washington Post'' wrote on August 8, that strongly pressured, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic had agreed to the division of Bosnia, but that in the case of Sarajevo he had apparently decided to ``offer resistance'' to the international factors. According to that version, Owen and Stoltenberg forced him to accept the partition of the Bosnian capital city along with making considerable territorial concessions to the Serbs. Jim Hogland, commentator of ``The Washington Post'' wrote that the absence of a rebuttal clearly pointed to the fact that Lord Owen had actually asked the Bosnians in Geneva ``not only to capitulate, but also to accept the political death of the city, for whose salvation they bled.''

For a long time no one in the West dared utter the words ``the division of Bosnia.'' However, the recent history has taught us that once one political taboo is broken, the fall of the remaining ones follows suit. The division of Sarajevo is no longer a taboo. The only taboo left is--the fall of Sarajevo.

It was apparently the thought that the fall of Sarajevo is not only possible but also imminent that made U.S. President Bill Clinton snap out of his lethargy. He remained fully conscious for only so much time needed to make it clear to the Serbs that they would cross the invisible line which the West had drawn around its interests in Bosnia by seizing Sarajevo. The commentator of ``The Washington Post'' concluded that the readiness to carry out military threats is missing as Owen and Stoltenberg themselves are ``pushing'' the division of Sarajevo.

It has never been clear whether Bosnian Serbs truly want to seize Sarajevo. They have never launched such an attack which would annihilate the city's defense. According to the circles close to Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic the Serbs do not want to ever set their foot in the city; yet, the proportions of destruction lead one to conclude that the Serbs are not aiming at conquering the city for themselves, but at destroying it for the enemy. Namely, it was Banjaluka which was mentioned as the natural capital in the heart of the Serb lands. Karadzic's occasional statements that he was ready to trade Sarajevo for the corridor through Posavina, Zepa, Srebrenica or Gorazde were also misleading...

These statements were not made to please the international community, but to please Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. It goes without saying that the Serbian President is more interested in the belt along the Drina River and the ethnic make-up on the western border than in the fate of the property located in former Yugoslavia's geographic center. The political goals of Radovan Karadzic and Slobodan Milosevic may have been identical at one point in time, but that is no longer the case. As the time passed, Milosevic's interest in Sarajevo decreased, while Karadzic's interest increased. The current Bosnian Serb leadership can remain in power in the post-war period only if the power is located in Sarajevo or in its surroundings. The reason for this is a complex balance of influences of different Serb regions in Bosnia which can be easily disrupted. More specifically, the Bosnian Serb leadership needs its capital to be close enough to Belgrade and yet equally far from Bijeljina, Banjaluka and Eastern Herzegovina.

No one can force Karadzic to swap Sarajevo. In comparison with his maker, Karadzic is now stronger that he has ever been. If there is no bombing, a great war victory is in store for him, while Milosevic is faced with a total economic disaster, winter and poverty. Karadzic is in no hurry, since his voters are not afraid of winter and depravation, so that he need not be afraid of them. The situation is quite contrary for Milosevic. This only partially explains the fact why Bosnian Serbs who have destroyed Sarajevo are now putting at stake everything they have achieved throughout Bosnia only for the sake of entering the city they had once left. The Serb fighters tend to believe that the war is not won unless Sarajevo falls. Bosnian Serb Army Commander, General Ratko Mladic did have genuine intentions to enter Sarajevo, but it is still uncertain whether Clinton woke up on time to prevent him from realising his intentions. However, any division of the city is still a good enough solution for the Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian Croats have still not spoken up with regard to Sarajevo, but it could be heard that they also have their interests there.

It is relatively easy to answer the question why Bosnian Muslims perceive Sarajevo to be their ``last defense line'' both in Geneva and in the field. For them, Sarajevo cannot be a war gain, as it is for the opponents. Sarajevo is their symbol, which they believe they've created by surviving in that appalling place, by not fleeing (even though they may have been prevented by force from leaving it). The city has acquired a mythical character in their eyes. ``The republic of citizens'' did not survive this war, but the myth about Sarajevo did (however, the myth may one day outlive the city itself).

The myth about Sarajevo says that the Bosnian war is an indisputable example of the eternal conflict between good and evil, justice and injustice, civilisation and atavism, freedom and atavism, freedom and tyranny, cosmopolitanism and primitivism... This may only be a myth, but Izetbegovic's international, interior, political and military strategy is in its entirety founded on that myth...

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