Recognizing Croatia

Political interests are forcing Serbia to become the first country to recognize Croatia. This would cause a positive shock in Europe, it would discipline the puppet governments in the rebellious krajinas, it would stop the private warfare between the Military Headquarters and would gain the support of its population. The Belgrade opposition would in such a case become an ally of the Socialist government which would result in national unity. Immediately after this, Belgrade could offer a new political alliance on the entire Yugoslav territory. From it the new loose economic unity of customs and monetary system could evolve. The recognition of Croatia does not necessarily mean the recognition of her present administrative borders, since in the international law the recognition of government and the recognition of the territory which it governs mean two different things.

One of the difficulties Serbia is facing today refers to the fact that it will not be in the position to efficiently control Knin and the Slavonian rebels. Despite the fact that the forcible creation of Serbian autonomies is in the spirit of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, the ancient truth that the empire starts falling apart on its outer borders is being confirmed here. This process is quicker if the metropolis is poor. Serbia has no strength to administratively embrace the krajinas, even less to provide continual economic help for them. It is not advisable for Serbia to encourage their political separation from Croatia, since it is thereby aggravating its own international economic and political isolation with a serious threat from the outside armed intervention. Recognizing the independence of Croatia, along with the introduction of the protectorate of the United Nations in the Knin and Slavonian Krajina, and with the international guarantees of ethnic rights to the Serbian minority in Croatia, Serbia would, with an acceptable arrangement, be prepared to leave the conflict. It has already announced that it has no claims over the Croatian territory. That does not go against the Parliamentary statement of the President of Serbia that the issue of borders is still open, considering that he did not specify what borders he had in mind, although that was definitely a war statement, regardless of what territories he had in mind.

By recognizing Croatia, Serbia is throwing the Army out of the game. The Army could no longer protect Yugoslavia by destroying its achievements while at the same time expanding its territories under the military rather than under the civilian rule. That is not the aim of Serbia anyway. Its aim was to use the Army for its expansion, and not to turn it into a separate political force with its own territory. The scandalous destruction of the Dubrovnik riviera and the siege of Dubrovnik compromise Belgrade. The destruction of Vukovar is seen more as a war crime than as a triumphant victory. The Army is gaining political independence by using the Serbian recruits and the Serbian excuse in Croatia. Thus it should be replaced by international forces in Serbian krajinas before it becomes administratively recognized. The government in Belgrade could, out of gratitude allow the Military Headquarters a reception party at the Terazije square, but it should stress that it did not ask of the Army to throw hundreds of thousands of Croatians out of their villages and towns.

The interests of the military and the interests of Belgrade also differ in whether Belgrade needs a Serbian Army. And it can not be created until Croatia is recognized. Until this condition is fulfilled, it is, in effect, extending the life of the Federal army, while the generals are creating their own state on the Croatian territory and, at the same time, entrusting Serbia with the duty of reconstructing the demolished villages and towns as well as the infrastructure.

The problem of the Federal Army can not be solved by its dismissal until the careers of the active officer staff are secured in new armies, until they guarantee the payment of pensions to all the Army retired staff and until they have guaranteed the preservation of all the benefits to the general and the officer core. This could not be done without the financial alliance of the Yugoslav republics. The decision concerning the creation of the Serbian Army would mean that Belgrade would take on only its own fraction in the financing of the former Federal Army personnel, but that the Army would pay no attention to this unless Bosnia and Herzegovina do the same and threaten the Army that it will throw it out unless it accepts its transformation. Bosnia can not do this without Serbia, and Serbia, in turn, can not make an ally out of Bosnia as long as it is persuading the Karadzic's (president of the Social Democratic Party in Bosnia) Serbs to claim that Belgrade is their capital and not Sarajevo (the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Serbia, let it clearly be understood, can not recognize Croatia and be freed from the Army and at the same time not recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Army will be on its knees as soon as Belgrade finds a common ground with Sarajevo. In the opposite case, we are faced with a paradox: the Army and the Serbs in Krajinas are warring with all their might and doing what they like, whereas Serbia is incurring the wrath of the world.

Milosevic still has time to gracefully retreat from the war. Even Tudjman. They both have to accept the lining of the United Nations troops along the rebellious Krajinas. Krajinas would only formally stay in Croatia, but they would not be under its government and would have to be placed under the international protectorates. Tudjman should not refuse this. He has already made a historical error of judgment by not offering the autonomy to the Serbs over a year and a half ago. It is now too late. Croatia can no longer be guarded by autonomies, but by the United Nations. The very fact that the Serbs in Krajinas would be placed under the international protection with the possible protectorates for the customs free zones means that Milosevic would give the "outer" Serbs the absolute security and considerable scope for further economic growth. Even bigger than Serbia itself would have. He would give them the maximum, something they could only have dreamt about: the autonomy, the international troops, the civilian supremacy over the Croatians and the tax-free economy. This is the most he can do anyway.

The recognition of Croatia would settle everything and bring about peace. It is a big step, but the result is even bigger. Does Belgrade have the strength to win on diplomacy?