Dzakula the Leader Of Serbs Without Land

Veljko Dzakula is a Serbian leader in Krajina who was the first in many things. He was President of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Pakrac when the first armed SerbCroat clash erupted. However, even though there were no dead on March 2, 1991, and the war hadn't started yet, it was clear where things were leading to. Later, as President of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Western Slavonija, Dzakula took part in the relocating of the local, rural Serbian population from the area. Some called it treachery, claiming that there was little possibility of the Croatian National Guard (ZNG) capturing the area. Others, however, claimed that an exchange of population had taken place, considering that Western Slavonian refugees were installed in houses belonging to Croats who had been expelled from Eastern Slavonija and Baranja. A third view held that the matter concerned the ``sale'' of Krajina for the good of the regime in Belgrade. Dzakula was one of the first Krajina leaders to reach an agreement with the Croatian authorities with regard to the realization of the Vance plan in the five Western Slavonian communities under the protection of UNPROFOR. This agreement, dubbed the ``Daruvar agreement'' was violated by both sides as soon as it had been signed on February 18, 1993.

Seven months later Dzakula was arrested by the Krajina police, along with Dusan Ecimovic and Mladen Kulic, two of the five members of the negotiating delegation. The accusation was: endangering the territorial entity of the Republic of Serb Krajina and espionage. The accused were detained in Knin and later in Glina until December 1, 1993, when the investigating judge decided that there was no reason for them to be kept in jail any longer. Two months later, Dzakula became the first veteran fighter for the Serbian cause in Croatia, to be kidnapped in broad daylight in Belgrade. The whys and wherefores of this case are still not clear, unless they are supposed to serve as a warning to other Krajina leaders. Namely, most of them had fought in the war, and were later forced to negotiate, only to be discarded later by the Serbian regime, without any reasons being given. If they were to continue being disobedient, then Dzakula's example was there to serve as a warning.

The 1991 census shows that Serbs were not the majority in Western Slavonija. For example, they accounted for 44.9% of the population in Podravska Slatina, 46.4% in Pakrac, 32.2% in Daruvar and Grubisino Polje each, and less than 25% in Novska. Therefore, the Serbian Autonomous Region of Western Slavonija was untenable without the setting up of Serbian Radical Party (SRS) leader Vojislav Seselj's borders along the line ViroviticaKarlovacKarlobag, and many believe that this was not a part of the secret deal between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Karadjordjevo.

Following an example set by the Knin police chief Milan Martic in August 1990, the Pakrac policemen of Serb nationality rebelled against the ``odious checkered Croatian flag'' and disarmed their Croatian colleagues. But Pakrac was not Knin, and when Croatian police special units from Zagreb and Bjelovar were sent to sort out the situation, the local population did not rise. The SDS and its leader Veljko Dzakula were the only ones to stand in their defence. The shooting lasted two days, with Croatian commandos in the city and SDS members in the surrounding hills. It all ended with the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) acting as a buffer and negotiations with Yugoslav Presidency member Stipe Mesic and Federal Interior Minister Petar Gracanin. A status quo was reached. The Serbs were protected by the JNA, the Croats by the Croatian Police.

There were good reasons why things happened the way they did in Pakrac. The hawks in KninMartic and Milan Babic wanted as many Serbs from Croatia as possible to clash openly with the Croatian authorities. Namely, they did not have the opportunity of defending ``endangered and deprived Serbs threatened by genocide'' in Knin; the lack of which could jeopardize the entire Krajina project. Serbia also needed bloodshed, and there was no better way of threatening Croatia with the JNA than this. It was also necessary to hike national paranoia in an attempt to preempt the Belgrade demonstrations of March 9, 1991. It is enough to remember the invented number of dead inhabitants of Pakrac disseminated by the Belgrade media. The Croatian authorities, used the situation in Pakrac to cleanse community structures in Western Slavonija of reconciliatory former Communists. Be as it may, Dzakula found himself in a situation in which the conducting of any real politics became impossible. The Serbs were being armed by the Serbian Police, the Federal Police, the counter espionage (KOS) and the Alliance of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia (SKPJ). The Croats were armed by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).

The war leaders were not much interested in how things would affect the ordinary people. Dzakula, however, cared. Pressed by relatives of captured Serbs from Pakrac and incarcerated in Croatian jails, and by others who realized that a normal, peaceful, everyday way of life had come to an end. Dzakula also realized that being a Serb in Pakrac was not the same thing as being a Serb in Knin. Together with Milorad Pupovac, who had ambitions of representing urban Serbs in Croatia, they went to negotiate with Tudjman in Zagreb. Their goal was achieve the freeing of prisoners, and some kind of a normalization of SerbianCroatian relations. Knin viewed the meeting in Zagreb as treachery and Dzakula got the reputation of a man prone to compromise.

But, regardless of Dzakula's real intentions, he became the President of the Serb Autonomous Region of Western Slavonija and the war in Croatia started spreading. Serb units had at their disposal the JNA and Krajina Interior Minister Milan Martic. Even though the Western Slavonian Serbs controlled a great part of the territory they had pretensions to, they shelled Daruvar, Novska and other towns. It was clear from the beginning that there were too few of them to hold onto their self-proclaimed creation. Cutting through Croatia in order to reach the Hungarian border was a highly dubious reason for the introduction of war in this area. There were practically no JNA units in Western Slavonija. The garrisons in Varazdin and Bjelovar were not in combat zones, and the aid arriving from Serbia, can only be described as a mess. It consisted of various paramilitary units, made up of the worst elements of society. There are many witnesses who claim that these units spent a lot of their time liberating kitchen units, washing machines and other household appliances. This testifies best to the importance of Western Slavonija, or lack if it, for those promoting Serbia's national interests.

Be as it may, the JNA captured Vukovar, and the Croats were expelled from Ilok, and the war started to abate. Tudjman however, could not accept a ceasefire without some sort of a military victory. In early December 1991, Serbian fighters and their families withdrew from Western Slavonija, even though no one knows who gave the order. ZNG units captured their positions without much resistance. After stopping off in Banja Luka for a short while, the inhabitants of Western Slavonija were moved into abandoned Croat houses in Eastern Slavonija, Baranja. Vojvodina witnessed a second round of colonists. A ceasefire was signed in Sarajevo, and then came the Vance plan.

Veljko Dzakula became the leader of Serbs without a land. His fellow Slavonians started on the road to nowhere. The disposessed Croatian owners of the houses in Eastern Slavonija telephoned from abroad and compared experiences with the new Serbian inhabitantsthey shared the same feelings of being uprooted, and the same experience of living on someone else's property. Those who couldn't exchange houses and property legally, started pressuring Croats and Hungarians in Vojvodina to move out. The case of Rade Cakmak is an example to point. He and his desperate compatriots are the main allies of Ostoja Sibincic (a local Vladimir Zhirinovsky) in Hrtkovci. As time passed, most of them wished to return to their real homes. They never found happiness in other people's houses. They were tortured by feelings of uncertainty, no future and uprootedness.

It must be assumed that all this must have affected Veljko Dzakula. Even though a great number of Serbian houses in Western Slavonija had been ridden with boobytraps, their owners wanted to go back, ``even if we have to live in the pig pens.'' ``We want to live on our property.'' Dzakula exerted pressure on the Republic of Serb Krajina Government (he was the vice prime minister) for certain steps to be taken within the Vance plan. As a result of his efforts, a plan for the return of Serb refugees to Western Slavonija was drawn up (but hasn't been made public to this very day). Dzakula was authorized to negotiate on its implementation. On February 18, 1993 Dzakula met with Croatian representatives near Daruvar and signed the document. Croatia got entangled in the Maslenica bridge adventure, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not wish to show any flexibility. The Krajina leaders in Knin were showing maximum bellicosity and intolerance. Vance's plan was not in the game, so that Dzakula was left emptyhanded.

Veljko Dzakula is certainly not a man to be amnestied over Western Slavonija's tragedy. He does, however, belong to those who understood, albeit at a later date, that there was no single Serb interest in Croatia, let alone that of ``all the Serbs in the world.'' Dzakula saw Vance's plan as the Serbs' only chance of remaining in those parts of Western Slavonija where they had lived for centuries. But, if this plan were to be implemented, then it would endanger the entire concept of the Republic of Serb Krajina. Mile Martic would find himself facing embarrassing questions. For Martic, the perspective of Serbs and Croats living together in peace was unacceptable. In the event that the Vance plan is implemented in one place, what is there to prevent it from being applied to the whole of Krajina? Martic probably does not have a ready answer, and his ritual pledge of allegiance to Slobodan Milosevic and the concept of allSerb unity during the campaign, do not make much sense. Another question would deal with responsibility for what happened in Western Slavonija. Martic and his helpers in Western Slavonija, men like Krste Zarkovic and Veljko Vukelic would have to answer why they distributed arms and instigated war. The SKPJ leadership would also have a lot to answer for, men like retired general Dusan Pekic. Finally, Republic of Serb Krajina sponsors, embodied in the current Serbian regime would also have to come up with some answers. They would all have to explain the meaning of the war with Croatia, and the idea of all Serbs in one state. Western Slavonija is a good example of how the Serbs have been manipulated for personal power and the murky interests of the warlords.

Dzakula has been kidnapped. Everybody stands to gain: the Serbian political leadership, its war lobby, the leaders in Knin, even the hawks urging a Greater Croatia. The fear of talking openly of the Serbs' real interests in Croatia, has passed the ``critical mass.'' Veljko Dzakula's disappearance will encourage many to ask why is it that Serbs living a few kilometers away from Osijek, can live without their regional centers. The same holds true for Zadar, Gospic, Karlovac... Dzakula has tried, albeit a bit late in the day, to solve all these problems at the only level at which they can be resolvedat the level of normal living. This however, wasn't to the liking of the creators of the Balkan horror. The uprooted, killed and maimed are only bit players in the plans made by those in power. The power brokers will reach an agreement when the political moment is right. Those personally affected must not be allowed to have a say in the matter. That is why Dzakula had to disappear after his first public appearanceso that the others might not forget their place.

Weapons and Sense

Veljko Dzakula was kidnapped less than 12 hours after he appeared as a guest on the programme produced by the Independent Television Station in Belgrade, Studio B and called ``The Viewers' Interview'' (Thursday, February 3). This fact strongly indicates that his testimony about the events linked to the war operations in Western Slavonija and the attitude of Serbia's leadership towards Krajina may have frightened somebody. The most interesting excerpts of his interview follow.

``I was one of the group of men from Western Slavonija, that held talks with the Croats in Doljani on February 18, 1993. The talks occurred upon the initiative of the members of UNPROFOR, General Zabal and Mr. Fisher. Prior to that, in September and October 1992, we toured 93 Serb villages that were under Croat control. Following the Croat offensive on Maslenica in January 1993 there was a danger of renewed fighting in Western Slavonija. Therefore, we decided to talk with the Croats about the return of refugees, the motorway, the installations, etc... We agreed to form a joint commission. An agreement in principle was a sign of good will. That is the reason why Dusan Ecimovic, Mladen Kulic and myself were arrested on September 21, 1993. We spent five days in a solitary confinement of the Knin prison, and were later transferred to the prison in Glina, where we received fair treatment. We were released on December 2, 1993.''

Dzakula also spoke about the contacts he had with the authorities in Serbia before the talks with the Croats were to take place. He put emphasis on the meeting Slobodan Milosevic held with the delegation from Western Slavonija.

``The representatives of five municipalities in Western Slavonija, Ecimovic and I took part in the meeting. Milosevic said that no one had the right to stop the people from returning to their homes, but that the action had to be thoroughly planned. Subsequently, we drafted a program for refugees' return and submitted it to the Assembly of Western Slavonija, the Government in Knin, and to the Governments of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There were no reactions from them whatsoever.''

When asked whether it was true that he was told at the meeting which was also attended by Budimir Kosutic, the then Federal Deputy Prime Minister, way back in 1991 that Western Slavonija had been given over to Croatia, Dzakula said:

``Ecimovic and I managed to make it to Belgrade on August 22,1991. The meeting was attended by Kosutic, Stanko Cvijan, the then Minister for the Serbs outside Serbia, Nikolic, who was in charge of crisis areas, and the then Health Minister (surgeons were badly needed on the front). Ilija Koncarevic, the then Speaker of the People's Assembly of Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem, and Ilija Petrovic, the Minister in the Government of Eastern Slavonija, were also there. At one point, Koncarevic raised a question why Western Slavonija ever rebelled if the resettling and assimilation of the region had been planned. Only Ecimovic and I reacted to that. On all occasions that ensued (the Serb Krajina Assembly session and elsewhere), I tried to take on Koncarevic because of that statement, but he kept dodging the topic. Some people from Eastern Slavonija turned up in Western Slavonija, urging the people to move there, which meant that Koncarevic was either meddling in what was not his business or was aware of something we weren't. I never perceived anything similar in my contacts with Milosevic, on the contrary. I remember him saying that the people of Western Slavonija should not allow `others` to represent them. He was most likely referring to Babic.''

Dzakula also commented on the role of now retired General Dusan Pekic (``his contribution to Western Slavonija was significant, he used to come and help us wage the war'') and mentioned some other people as well:

``We were besieged for 52 days, scattered all over, with no support. The people of Grubisino Polje, with the then Territorial Defense Commander Rade Cakmak, were the first to take up arms on October 15, 1991. He was the one who led them to Baranja and is the right person to give an explanation. Other municipalities followed suit: Territorial Defense Commander Krsta Zarkovic headed the people of Daruvar, the Commander of the Territorial Defense in Pakrac evacuated all villages from Kusonja to Bucja and ordered retreat. I tried to stop the people, but the psychosis of fear fueled by unrealistic promises took over. Before that, in September, I had been in touch with Professor Milorad Pupovac. He arrived in Bucje from Zagreb and reported that an agreement on the ceasefire, the Serb police staying in Serb villages and the accord concerning the villages with the ethnically mixed population had been given the upper hand by the Croatian Parliament on his insistence. But, Commanders Veljko Vukelic and Jovo Vezmar turned it down, and insisted on the fight to the last man.''

When asked about the people who arrested him, Dzakula mentioned Krsto Zarkovic, the Deputy Interior Minister of the Republic of Serb Krajina, and described his as ``the man obsessed with power.''

``He made a big mistake in Western Slavonija. We stood in his way, so that he could hardly wait for an opportunity to get rid of us.''

When the cameras were turned off, Dragana MilicevicMilutinovic, the host of the programme, asked Veljko Dzakula whether he was happy with the interview. He replied he was, and added that he regretted not saying one more thing, ``Krajina cannot be defended with weapons, but with good sense.''

The Daruvar Agreement

1. The list of participants who meet in Daruvar, on February 18, 1992 in the presence of the representatives of UNPROFOR (illegible):

Serbian side: Croatian side:

Veljko Dzakula Zlatko Kos Dusan Ecimovic Zdravko Sokic Milan Vlaisavljevic Ivan Volf Mladen Kulic Vladimir Delac Djordje Lovric Zelimir Malnar Milan Radakovic

2. The following provisions will be applied in the entire area which encompasses former municipalities: Daruvar, Grubisino Polje, Nova Gradiska, Novska, and Pakrac, under the protection of UNPROFOR:

a. complete reconstruction of water and electricity installations; b. free passage of private traffic on all roads, including the Zagreb Belgrade motorway; commercial traffic will be discussed separately; c. enabling reconstruction of the NovskaNova Gradiska railroad; d. repairing telecommunication installations (in accordance with the preliminary inquest in August 1992 together with the representatives of both sides); e. founding of the joint commission for the normalisation of life in UNPA's, with the special emphasis that this provision be reexamined and work on setting up of social and healthcare service, education and sports activities; f. unhindered and regular meetings on the checkpoints controlled by UNPROFOR; g. enabling the return of all refugees; h. allowing the citizens who own land on the other side of the demarcation line to pursue their work (especially urgent to guarantee the profit to the farmers during the harvest later in the year); i. meetings between the representatives of the local authorities to discuss the methods of cooperation in the future; j. enabling the placement of containers in accordance with an earlier agreement; k. a joint commission will be formed to ensure preparation, implementation and supervision of all listed provisions.