One Milan Goes, One Milan Comes, One Milan Rules

Milan Martic, the newlyelected President of the Serb Republic of Krajina, cited the Constitution and legal competencies when he dismissed the Serb Republic in Krajina army commander, Major General Milan Novakovic. Martic appointed Milan Celektic to the post after first promoting him to general. Not many people know what preceded this move. It is worthwhile mentioning that certain diplomatic circles in Belgrade showed a sudden interest in general Novakovic. Briefly: who noticed Novakovic's routine statement that "an attack on the Serb Republic in BosniaHerzegovina was tantamount to an attack on the Republic of Serb Krajina,'' and what can all this mean?

Even though he has been involved in militarypolitical life in Krajina, general Novakovic is not known to the general public. He was a Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) officer in Zagreb, and when the war broke out he fought in the Banija region. He was a colonel when he commanded the "tactical group two'' in the operation "Corridor,'' and made a name for himself during the breakthrough at DebarKula. Things didn't go too well for him after the Croatian army's operation at Maslenica on January 22, 1993, even less so during the Croatian offensive in the Medak pocket. The troops under his command showed a great readiness towards reprisals (the shelling of Karlovac, Zadar, Sisak and Lucko, a Zagreb suburb.) The issue concerned a political decision and not a military one, all the more so as all this did not affect Croatia's breakthrough to villages in the Mt. Velebit area, and the fact that many towns in Krajina were shelled in retaliation. Because of all this, radical men from Krajina, such as David Rastovic demanded that Novakovic's responsibility be determined. At the time there were stories that a military junta held power in Krajina and that it wasn't responsible to anyone. During the fierce clash between Martic and Goran Hadzic (former Krajina leader), Novakovic's refusal to appear before the Republic of Serb Krajina Assembly at Plitvice, where a debate on the defeat in the villages of the Velebit area seemed unavoidable, was interpreted as his siding with Hadzic.

Little was known about general Novakovic, but even less is known about his successor general Celektic. He was born in a village near Kikinda (Vojvodina), and was an active JNA officer. The Krajina Serb Army (SVK) information service has reported that Celektic took part in important battles in Western Slavonija and in operations in Bosnian Posavina (Derventa and Bosanski Brod). Before being promoted to SVK Chief of Staff, he commanded the SVK 18th Corps. The few unofficial facts on general Celektic say that he carried out duties in the JNA and the Serb Republic in BosniaHerzegovina army, and from 1993 was in the SVK.

Martic's changes in the military leadership of his self-proclaimed state came like a bolt from the blue. As there was no explanation, apart from calling on the President's Constitutional right, the rest is just speculation.

General Novakovic and his team had won a reputation as negotiators. The failure of the secret KrajinaCroatian negotiations in Norway were followed by a series of separate ceasefires signed by military delegations between various parts of Krajina and Croatia. The two sides could not avoid giving each other certain guarantees, i.e. agreeing to certain obligations towards UNPROFOR which acted as mediator. These moves were inspired by Belgrade because a normalization of SerbianCroatian relations was on the agenda. Fearing a sell out (e.g. the success of the Serbian Democratic Party of KrajinaSDS, Milan Babic and the Serbian Radical PartySRS at the local elections), the inhabitants of Krajina proved to be rather stubborn. All the more so as Federal vicePM Zeljko Simic's visit to Zagreb left a feeling of disquiet. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's man Milan Martic, was given the task of allaying suspicion and of preventing unfavorable developments. He visited Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic at Pale and showed a greater bellicosity with regard to NATO's ultimatum than his host.

The ultimatum weakened Belgrade's negotiating position in comparison to Zagreb. This is why it was necessary to show Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, that Milosevic still had an ace up his sleeve, at least in dealing with Croatia. The bridge over the Sava River at Nova Gradiska was chosen. Control over this border crossing (the Krajina police chased off UNPROFOR's Nepalese battalion) achieved two goals: no restriction on links between Krajina and the Serb Republic in BH (threatening the UN with acts of retaliation) and a show of "sovereignty" with regard to Croatia (showing that Martic would have to be taken into consideration during the normalization of Serbian Croatian relations).

It seems that General Novakovic did not support this line. He was probably aware that the Croatian army had gained in strength in the meantime, and knew what role UNPROFOR played in the fragile ceasefires he had negotiated. It should not come as a surprise that the crisis over the bridge on the Sava River resulted in an escalation of Serbian Croatian hostilities in the northern Dalmatian front, and threats from the "insulted and surprised'' peace forces that they would regain control over the bridge by force if necessary. It is believed that in spite of his bellicose statement concerning NATO's ultimatum, Novakovic was not prepared to allow relations at home to deteriorate. When it comes to big moves, Novakovic does not have the necessary charisma and clout. This is why he was removed. His place has been taken by a man who carries out orders to the letter, and is perhaps better informed on what is going on.