What Next?

As soon as they learned about Yeltsin's letter on Thursday evening high officers of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo put forth with enthusiasm that the same recipe (NATO's stick and Russia's carrot) will be exported to other flash points in Bosnia. The idea and its quite similar variations were to be examined over the next seven days that followed. At the end of this week it is considered to be a certainty and a likely short-term strategy of great powers in the future.

Reactions were natural, expected and predictable: cautious field generals of UNPROFOR said that that was O.K. but warned that the situation varies from one place to another so that one need be flexible. The most flexible of all those flexible, General Sir Michael Rose, said on Monday, February 21, that "the same strategy should be applied in other places,'' so that the peace is consolidated, "We've been very successful around Sarajevo over the last ten days, but there is no way to sustain the island of peace in the sea of war.'' John Shalikashvili, the Joint ChiefofStaff of the U.S. Army, warned on several occasions that NATO should not "exaggerate with its engagement'' and find itself in the situation not to know what is to be done next. On the other hand, politicians meditated to the effect, "the beggining is good, now or never, we gained the momentum,'' etc. The White House took the lead, the State Department supported allout exhiliration, the Europeans were happy and hopeful. The Russians appeared modestly proud and pretended they had told the whole world to its face and primarily to Vladimir Zhirinovsky that the policy in the Balkans does not work without Russia.

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic turned the defeat into the victory, relying on a fragile assumption of pathologic Russomania which is so typical of his ruling ideology. Karadzic's Serbs drank themselves into oblivion while waiting for the Russian Army, like in 1944. Since the crux of the matter has been at least temporarily covered up with drinks, food and night skiing, Karadzic is now trying to swing the game back to his favorite terrain: the cold Geneva lake. Reacting to the renewed idea of U.N. administration over Sarajevo, Karadzic wrote to Boutros Ghali and vehemently protested demanding that the matter is first resolved in Geneva.

Meanwhile, in Sarajevo the atmosphere was that of reservations and skepticism.

Now when there is an overall agreement that the momentum has been gained, the next steps logically follow: the first point in Yeltsin's letter is a demand which calls for "strengthening of safe areas''; those reasonable ones concluded that one must stick to the principles since Croatia's involvement in the war has become unbearable; the only logical step was formulated in Bon at the meeting of the European Union, U.S., Canada, U.N., and Russia on February 23 and it reads: Mostar, Maglaj, Vitez, Srebrenica/Zepa and Tuzla (probably in that order).

It would be politically wise to slap Croatia hard in the face because it deserved it. Mostar imposes itself as the next step which comes naturally; Maglaj and Vitez are important to the British; and then come Tuzla (because of 400,000 hungry and frozen people), Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa as the official "safe havens'' according to one of the long forgotten resolutions of the U.N. Security Council adopted in 1993. All assessments point to the fact that the task in Mostar, Vitez and Maglaj will be much easier than the one in Sarajevo: Tudjman's regime survives fearing the word of Europe; the only countermeasure on their disposal is a threat to expel Bosnian refugees from Croatia. The Serb side will not be in a position to protest if someone should give Croatia a thick ear and only afterwards raises the question of those Bosnian enclaves which Serbs hold under siege.

The document from Bon is moderate and clear: they also mentioned "the current momentum'' reached in Sarajevo, offered concessions to the Bosnians for the sake of quality of the territories which will be able to survive and finally listed "shortterm goals in the field.'' The goals were formulated in an intelligent way: the ceasefire in Sarajevo must be stabilised, heavy weaponry must remain under control, the access for humanitarian aid by land routes must be ensured and the life in the city normalised; UNPROFOR troops in the area of Srebrenica/Zepa are to be replaced and the distribution of relief supplies allowed; the airport in Tuzla must be urgently open; the ceasefire in Central Bosnia (Maglaj/Vitez) and the distribution of aid is to be agreed; Mostar will be the biggest challenge: the ceasefire and withdrawal of artillery (which belongs to Croats) are envisioned as well as a free access to humanitarian supplies and establishing the normal life with the help of the European Union. And, finally, gratitude is expressed to the German Government for organising the meeting on such a short notice.

Great powers could force the Croat side to retreat by using only a fraction of the determination shown in the case of Sarajevo; Croatia's political position is untenable. Only after some serious concessions have been secured on this side, can the great powers legitimately request the opening of the airport in Tuzla and concessions in other places. The argument of the Yugoslav side that the airport in Tuzla is "much too close'' to Yugoslavia can be dismissed with ease: the opening of the airport is for the purpose of humanitarian aid which is technically easy to control and should not be a problem, and not for the sake of setting up an air force base for Selim Beslagic, the Mayor of Tuzla. It goes without saying that the Russians would support such sequence of moves; this would only strengthen both the international and domestic position of Boris Yeltsin, which he earned through a practically freeofcharge show in Pale. The Russians will be willing to send several troops of paratroopers for such a political profit; everything will take place under the U.N. flag, and the protests coming from the Bosnians and Croats about Peter the Great and the new Yalta will not be taken seriously. Currently both U.S. and Europe have a strategic interest that Boris Yeltsin becomes stronger and stabilises his power. If the price the west has to pay is Russia's participation in creating peace in Bosnia then the price is cheap.

However, this scenario is not to everybody's liking. The fact that the Bosnians are protesting is a matter of diplomacy and bargaining; the same applies to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the condition which Bosnian Serb Army Commander, General Ratko Mladic, stipulated for the opening of the Tuzla airport that the Serbs open their airports. However, if it is taken into account that "The Washington Post'' on Monday evening accused the Russians of having placed the world before the accomplished fact in Sarajevo by an ``abrupt,'' ``unilateral'' arrangement they "worked out on their own,'' then this may mean a different story altogether. Is it the fear of certain circles in Washington that some heavy army industry contracts will fall through if they become pals with the Russians, or is there someone who wants the Balkan crisis to continue this is not clear. The idea is so strange that it is worth noting.

All roads opened by the momentum in Sarajevo are free at the moment: General Sir Michael Rose is asking for more soldiers, the Bon document creates a possibility that his demand is met, the danger that Karadzic's people could use the weapons withdrawn from the hills around Sarajevo elsewhere is negligible (this would only cause complications), Tudjman is fidgeting in his trap and signing the ceasefire with the Bosnians. All this, however, won't last for a very long time. On the other hand, the slowness of the ``international community'' when it comes to the Balkans has already become proverbial. With the coming of spring the Bosnians will be encouraged to strike wherever they can; this could annul all accomplishments of the success in Sarajevo. What we have now is the establishing of pseudo-sponsorship-like relations: the Russians are meant to be supporting the Serbs, the Germans are meant to be behind the Croats, and the Americans behind the Muslims. Despite its sounding familiar it is not so simple: Bosnia has become an internal issue of the great powers, because it was forced and not because of a strategy or geopolitical interests. This means that a natural and anticipated reaction would be to get rid of the Bosnian crisis as soon as possible and in a least damaging way. If someone cares about the peace in Bosnia he had better act quickly.