The Game Of Yes And No

Russia and the European Union accepted the map prepared by the Contact Group for Bosnia on July 5. A day later the map was presented to the warring factions. Charles Redman, the U.S. envoy to Bosnia, specified that the Serbs will have to return a considerable part of terriory in Northern and Central Bosnia, which may prove to be a touchy subject for Bosnian Serb Army Commander General Ratko Mladic since the corridor that links Knin and Banja Luka with Belgrade would become ``thinner'' and come under international control.

On the other hand, the Bosnian Serbs would get to keep the corridor, which was nonnegotiable for them. But they do not seem to be overly satisfied because the entire area apart from five kilometers around the corridor would be under control of the MuslimCroat federation and because of the fact that the width of the corridor would be reduced to the width of a road on several sections. The DerventaDoboj, Gradacac ModricaOdzak, and GradacacBosanski Samac roads would intersect the corridor. Associated Press specified that the MuslimCroat federation could use two flyovers spanning the Serb corridor which would be controlled by United Nations forces.

The Serbs would have to hand over the area west of Brcko and north of Doboj and return the towns they now control: Modrica, Derventa, and the fortified Doboj. AP said that it will be very difficult for the Serbs to give up Doboj because of the strategic importance of this town.

The most disputed town of Brcko would be declared a demilitarized zone, and placed under the administration of the Bosnian federation. The road corridor, under international control, would run through the town.

In the western part of Bosnia, the MuslimCroat federation would get the town of Jajce along with the area around Kljuc, including the road link BihacJajce. The Bosnian Serbs would keep Banja Luka, Prijedor and Teslic. The area around Bihac would be considerably enlarged in favour of the MuslimCroat federation (the socalled Bihac pocket is important because it allows control over the railroad).

The U.N. protected Muslim enclaves in Eastern Bosnia, Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa, would be connected with each other and with Sarajevo, and the entire area would be under control of the European Union. Foca, Zvornik, Visegrad, Vlasenica and Rogatica would be divided.

Associated Press said the Serbs will not easily accept the division of Visegrad because it is close to the border with Serbia. The Belgrade weekly ``NIN'' also assessed that total control over both banks of the Drina River will be one of the Serb strategic demands. According to that proposal the road from the town of Zvornik that runs along the river should be under U.N. control.

In next two years Sarajevo would be under U.N. protectorate thus escaping a division in that time period only to be eventually divided on the 2:1 principle.

This plan was presented to the warring sides in Bosnia in a form of the socalled peace ultimatum (the Russian method of persuasion, seemingly softer than the American way that relied on airstrikes against Serb artillery positions). The warring sides were warned against possible military consequences that would follow in case they refused the plan. This time it was Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, who said that the maps will be offered together with the stick and carrot. In Bosnia, where the first year of a low intensity conflict has started, none of the sticks were long enough and none of the carrots were sweet enough to make an impression on the leaders who grew callous to war, just like their subjects, who are showing the symptoms of warweariness, but from the perspective of the warring sides this weariness takes the form of stong willingnes to settle accounts once and for all.

That determination on the Serb side is combined with a growing number of deserters, but also enforced by propaganda that scoffs at announced Muslim offensives. Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, was resolute that they are in full control of the situation. ``No one can fight us out of thirteen towns. It is up to us to decide whether we will give them or not,'' he said. The Muslim leaders, who are no longer trying to impress the world with their victims, are making belligerent statements. The people in Bosnia do not harbour any illusions that the signing of a peace agreement means anything.

14 ceasefire agreements were signed from the beginning of the war in Croatia to the moment it turned into a low intensity conflict at the beginning of 1992. 77 ceasefires were agreed from the beginning of the war in Bosnia in MarchApril 1992 to May 1994, but only two held partially. Few mediators can accept the fact that such wars can be stopped only before they have begun in the first place. Once they begin their murderous inertia knocks down all obstacles.

Bets are already being laid on who is going to reject the plan first. Many believe it will be the Serbs. Experienced diplomats familiar with Balkan affairs were quietly saying in Geneva that the factions will not say either ``yes'' or ``no'' to the peace plan until the deadline expires. They may say ``yes, but it doesn't matter'' which effectively is the same as turning down the peace plan while shifting responsiblity over to the other side. These source say that a great war is more likely instead of ``a great peace'' and warn the West that it has got the means to convince both sides to end the fighting.

Alija Izetbegovic has clearly hinted at the tactics ``yes, but it does't matter,'' when he said that his government will almost certainly sign the new maps for Bosnia, ``for no other reason than because of his convinction that the Bosnian Serbs will reject them.'' Izetbegovic went even further in this game of ``yes'' and ``no'' by promising that his side will say ``yes'' since he expects that the Serb side will say ``no,'' and if the Serb side should say ``yes'' then, according to him, the Serbs haven't got a clue why they waged war at all. Even Karadzic thinks that the Serbs are in the worse position. Before Geneva he mentioned ``the worldwide mafia'' and ``playing with fire'' of the world stongmen, only to replace the ``mafia'' line with talk of ``the American dictate'' after he saw the official version of the document of the Contact Group several days later. In a recent interview he described himself as a ``moderate pessimist,'' disappointed with the Conact Group that ignored Serb interests. He also expressed his readiness to continue to negotiate frequently mentioning that the division of Sarajevo is a key issue. ``If we got Sarajevo we would be more generous than what the 49:51 split implies,'' Karadzic said. When asked whether he expected to come under pressure from Belgrade to accept the plan, the Bosnian Serb leader replied that it goes without saying ``the plan will be studied together with Belgrade and all other Serbs.''

After meeting Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in Belgrade last Wednesday, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic seemed willing to settle for everything, but with some conditions. If Karadzic listens to what the majority of the opposition parties and the Church are urging him to do, then there is no dilemma what the vote of the Bosnian Serb Assembly in Pale on the proposal by the Contact Group will be. ``One has to have the guts and sayno,'' Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), stronly advised Karadzic and all those who are in two minds regarding the plan. Seselj also warned Milosevic not to accept the plan, and in case he does, Seselj promised him the same fate that befell Aleksandar Obrenovic and Draga Masin (the Serbian King and Queen killed by rebelling officers in 1903).

A day before the map was presented the heads of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) issued a statement appealing to the world leaders ``not to impose forceful solutions and decisions like those we had in sinful fascism and communism on the Serbian people,'' since such decisions would represent a new source of injustice and unrest. They also warned the great powers that ``they will be fully responsible for a, God forbid, even bigger and wider war in the region.''

The only party to raise its voice against the statement of the heads of the Serbian Orhodox Church was the Serbian Civic Alliance (GSS). GSS described the statement as a war cry at a crucial moment in reaching a peace agreement in BosniaHerzegovina and when there is a chance for the revival of our country.

Radovan Karadzic changed the tone when he spoke about the proposal of the Contact Group upon his return from Geneva. Addressing the journalists, he said that the maps could be ``a good base for the continuation of the negotiations,'' on condition that the constitutional principles are defined more clearly and the Serbs get access to the sea, which seems to be back in the game after a long period of time. He promised that Pale will seriously examine the proposal in the upcoming days and added casually that ``he did not see Milosevic because of the holiday (Veterans Day, July 7).''

After the long meeting with Kozyrev, Milosevic commended the proposal because ``it is not in a form of ulitmatum.'' This could well be a manouver aimed at avoiding fuelling the socalled Serbian spite that played an essential mobilizing role on previous occasions when Serbs rejected ``the dictates of the world,'' or perhaps a new attempt at bargaining. Slobodan Milosevic tried to create the impression that he was seriously interested in a peace settlement and called on ``the sides in Bosnia'' to demonstrate constuctive engagement. From the point of view of those who claimed that the new plan is based on the ``take it or leave it'' principle, this could be interpreted as the dilution of the issue.

It seems at first signt that the most important new element of this proposal is not the quality or the quantity of the territories, nor the length of the stick or the taste of the carrot, that have been waved in front of the eyes of the warring factions for months in vain. The sole novelty that seems important is the apparent determination of the Contact Group that their plan should have a special ``psychotherapeutic'' effect this time. This was stressed by Andrei Kozyrev in Geneva, ``We are at the crossroads, since we have realized that the passions over Bosnia could lead to an international confonation. We opted for the only possible alternativejoint action against all who this war has deprived of common sense.'' As far as the crossroads is concerned, there was a number of crossroads before but it was the wrong way that was chosen on each occasion.

On the other hand, a possibility for last minute bargaining has been left open. Just as it happened a hundred times before, this time the West can clearly say what it actually wants while the partners in the Balkans will seek some hidden meaning. Moreover, it is not clear to what extent the new approach is coordinated. The reports coming from Canada, Great Britain, and France, that they will pull out their troops from Bosnia if the end of the war is not in sight, have not been denied. On the contrary. Many analysts believe that this is what is likely to happen. It is also possible that new forms of pressure are being considered. The trial for war crimes has again become the topic in some media. Russian diplomats informed their American colleagues that it will be ``antiSerb revenge'' if the main prosecutor for the tribunal in The Hague comes from the U.S. or any other NATO member. Some Western countries, like Great Britain and Canada, still haven't appointed their representatives to the prosecuting team.