Clear Skies Over Tuzla

"Don't even presume to teach me what a C-130 Hercules is and what it sounds like! I've listened to them all my life and can recognize them even in the dark!", an indignated UN military observer said in Tuzla after reading general Lapresle's statement that there was no proof to back up the claims that transports were flying in the Tuzla area. At least three experienced military observers (A Norwegian, American and Englishman) saw and heard "large turbo-prop transports escorted by jet fighters" flying low over Tuzla airport on at least four occasions in February. The flights were recorded on February 10, 12, 17 and 22 at dusk but the nights were relatively light and the observers were using fourth generation night and vision enhancement gear. They reported to their command in Zagreb and the UN asked NATO for an explanation. They were told that the observers were wrong; that they heard regular commercial flights; that NATO night fighters were practicing troop support ground attacks.

A joint UN-NATO statement, submitted to general De Lapresle to sign, was written by a US officer in NATO southern command in Naples. De Lapresle signed the statement on the last day of his mandate. It said "there is no clear proof that any aircraft landed at Tuzla ... or that, if there were any aircraft, they dropped cargo".

That statement was followed by a chorus of unofficial statements to the press mentioning pressure to sign it and words to the effect of: "the AWACS are theirs so it's easy for them; Clinton is making fools of us so he can get better ratings" etc. One military observer who insisted on anonymity said he saw a Hercules and two "twin tail" fighters as escort flying low over runway 3 at Tuzla. Observers in the Tuzla area added that they had been denied access to the airport by Bosnian Muslim troops but had seen scores of trucks waiting nearby.

As soon as the whole thing went public, the entire press (including the New York Times and Zagreb's Globus) called it the secret arming of Bosnia and accused the US of smuggling modern weaponry to the Sarajevo government abusing the fact that its planes were patrolling the skies over Bosnia.

The scandal exploded.

Ever since the war in Bosnia began in April 1992, the Sarajevo government was faced with unfavorable conditions for supplies: it is surrounded on all sides by enemy territory (the Bosnian Serb Republic) or doubtful allies (Croatia and Herzeg-Bosnia). At first the only way to import weapons was through Croatian territory but that cost a lot; the Croats charged up to 70% of the value of the shipments paid for mainly by rich Islamic countries. Sometimes the Croats handed over faulty or antiquated weapons to the Muslims (Romanian made Kalashnikov rifles for example) out of their arsenals and kept the more modern weaponry. Croatia's open war against Bosnia in 1993 cut off those supply lines.

That year, the Bosnian Muslim government changed its strategy and turned to another of the former Yugoslav republics: Slovenia. Slovenia came out of the laughable several days of war in 1991 to become one of the more important arms dealers in the Balkans (both in terms of the weaponry left behind by the former Yugoslav army and arms bought from former Warsaw pact members on the black market) and got rich from the Croats and Bosnian Muslims selling them goods at high prices. One of the best deals Slovenia did was the sale of four Mi-17 combat helicopters which were last seen at Maribor airport before suddenly appearing in Zenica in November 1993. Informed sources said the machines flew in from a ship in the Adriatic flying low at night. One more of those gunships came into Bosnian Muslim hands from the Serb side with a Russian crew.

Logically, the Muslims turned to supplies by air especially for the enclaves in eastern Bosnia (helicopters from Zenica and Tuzla) and Bihac (light aircraft and helicopters from Croatia). In Bihac the former Soviet block is increasingly active. On August 1, 1994, Krajina Serb anti-aircraft gunners downed an AN-26 over Bihac. The aircraft was registered in the Ukraine and was carrying three tons of weapons, six crew and one passenger. Its documents said it was carrying concentrated orange juice from Bihac to Kharkov and added that it was on a Kharkov-Pula-Bihac-Kharkov route. What was never explained is where it was supposed to land in Bihac since the local airport is behind Serb lines. Not even the Russians are innocent in the whole story: at least 30 Il-76 (40 tons of cargo each) flights were recorded between Russia and the Croatian port of Pula from May to August 1994. Their cargo was later transferred to Bosnia by light aircraft. At the same time Croatian defence minister Gojko Susak said (November 1994) that Croatia is regularly buying arms for itself and Bosnia in Russia, Poland, Bulgaria and other countries.

During my stay in Sarajevo (August-September 1994), I heard first hand accounts of the construction of at least one airfield in central Bosnia (the logistical center of the Bosnian Muslim army). When asked for a comment by several reporters, the US ambassador in Sarajevo just kept quiet but he was obviously embarrassed. It's clear that the Americans have been up to something in Bosnia since last summer. Officially, UNPROFOR includes 836 Americans (a liaison officer in Sarajevo and the rest in Macedonia and a military hospital in Zagreb). The increasingly frequent presence of US officers in Bosnia stands out: they're not medical personnel since they all have airborne insignia and there's no need for them to come to Sarajevo from Macedonia.

Another detail stands out: UNPROFOR observers patrolled the Visoko area to check out the reports of an airfield under construction. Their report detailed the wrong facility: an old sports airfield in the wrong place. At the same time (late August) Sarajevo's Onasa news agency reported that the government and Energoinvest company had set up Air Bosna airlines.

What the Bosnian government needs now are airports to set up supply lines. Tuzla airport is a logical choice with its three runways capable of taking transports and relative security. The operation was carefully prepared: suddenly early in February an outcry was raised over helicopter flights across Bosnia and everyone forgot that there was a silent agreement on helicopter flights which practically exempts them from the no-fly zone. The logic was that the mysterious flights over Tuzla would not be noticed after accusations of helicopter flights from Serbia.

The former Yugoslav army failed to destroy Tuzla airport: in May 1992 they mined only the main runway and some of the buildings but they were repaired quickly. The Serbs were quick to withdraw approval for flights once the first UNPROFOR transport landed there. In May 1994, NATO aircraft almost bombed Serb tanks firing on a UN aircraft which was off loading supplies. UNPROFOR's Nordic battalion demonstrated the superiority of its Leopard III tanks and a balance was established.

The incidents since February 10 mark a new stage in the Bosnian war: NATO and the US are demonstrating unbelievable arrogance towards the UN. It's clear what happened; trained personnel saw it with their own eyes. The blame was later laid at Turkey's doorstep by the CIA but that is no less arrogant since Turkey does not have the aircraft for night flights nor any way to refuel fighters in flight.

To cut a long story short: only the Americans can do what was happening over Tuzla and get away unnoticed. There are strong political reasons for all this: the opposition in the Republican congress has to be calmed after shouting "Arm Bosnia" for so long and the crisis in NATO has to be overcome.