The Technical Coalition By the Nationalist Opposition

None of the nationalist opposition parties who joined the so-called technical coalition formed for joint appearances at local elections really want a coalition; not the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), not the Serbian Democratic Party (DSS), nor the Democratic Party (DS). Although these parties advocate virtually the same national program (Greater Serbia and ethnic cleansing) they have long been considered separate political groups and elites by both the authorities and the public. They compete with one another in business dealings and lean towards monopolies.

The warmongering opposition block could score success at local elections but until they are called it has to survive politically. These three large parties could certainly increase their influence on the authorities at the expense of smaller parties. That does not have to happen if small parties attack both the ruling Socialists and the warmongering opposition, sharing the blame equally among them for the political and economic catastrophe. They could score election victories at least at the expense of the Socialists in that case and win over parts of the electorate who are disappointed with the rest of the opposition.

The Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) is refusing to join the nationalist block. The SPO is peace oriented and presents itself as a civic Serb party with stands close to European solutions for the war in Bosnia and Croatia.

SPO leader Vuk Draskovic still doesn't see clearly if he can stand in elections independent of the rest of the opposition. He isn't satisfied with the possible 10% of the vote because he fears other parties will win more of the vote. The SPO was a coalition party at elections in 1990 and 1993 but always took care to surround himself with moderate nationalist and civic politicians. Now Draskovic is hesitating to join the nationalist extremists led by Seselj and Kostunica whose political orientation overshadows the covert extremism of Djindjic.

The leaders of the three coalition parties and Draskovic are strong individuals but burdened by delusions of their own political importance. DS leader Zoran Djindjic certainly has the smallest burden in that sense because he is a pragmatist with a scandalously wide interpretation of political morality and honesty, Draskovic has a low estimation of Djindjic's policies but he does fear it. Many feel that the four of them can't last long together.

There's still a lot of time till the federal elections in 1996 for political regrouping and independent tactics. There's even more time till the republican elections in 1997. Some people underrate the importance of local elections (also in 1997) but they can be extremely useful to the nationalist opposition block. Local authorities have an unimaginable logistical role regardless of whether the country is headed towards a disintegration of centralized authority or change of ruler in Belgrade. The nationalist block wants to present itself as the only opposition force and will try to defeat the rest of the opposition at local elections.

The nationalist block believes it will have the best opportunity to face off with Milosevic and the Socialists once they recognize Croatia and Bosnia but Milosevic certainly won't do that before he weakens the internal resistance in Serbia and removes the belligerent generals, unreliable police officers and diplomats. He isn't in a hurry to recognize the former Yugoslav republics because of other reasons: the status of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia hasn't been resolved and it still isn't clear when the UN sanctions against Serbia will be lifted. Milosevic wants to end the excommunication of Serbia from the international community before he recognizes Bosnia and Croatia so that it would appear that Serbia never even dreamed of Greater Serbia and did not succumb to pressure. He understands that the solution to problems with those two states conditions the solution of the Albanian problem in Kosovo and he doesn't want to make any commitment there just yet. Belgrade's negotiations with the international community on recognizing Bosnia and Croatia will last a long time, not under a year, and in that time the nationalist opposition block will have a hard time surviving. If the Serbian president uses propaganda to turn public attention away from economic and social issues he will manage to weaken the opposition and force it to turn to Serbia's problems not Bosnia and the Croatian Serbs.

Independent radio and TV station Studio B chose the nationalist block to defend it from Socialist threats. Studio B needs the nationalists because of the support of Karadzic in Bosnia and Martic in Knin not to prove that they want freedom of the press.

Seselj has been saying openly that freedom of the press has to be viewed in the context of the national interests his party advocates. The nationalists won't enter a risky clash with the authorities over Studio B until the authorities say farewell to the Serb warriors across the Drina. They won't fight for a free TV but for their nationalist programs and won't develop a full political front against Milosevic as long as he is working for the Serb cause outside Serbia. Their main goal is all-Serb unity followed by solutions to Serbia's internal political problems.