How to make the road to international financial organizations short

However, a number of competent bodies finally confirmed that all three governments had supported the Program. It remains to be seen whether and how it will be implemented.

The most obvious thing is that the Program has been insufficiently (if at all) interpreted from its political side. From the solely economic perspective, it can probably be criticized on a number of points, particularly its insufficient elaboration of various measures.

In addition to the well-known economic effects, the dinar's devaluation and the introduction of the market, real currency of the dinar, are at this time and place of great significance, because they render impossible the possibility of someone paying one dinar for one German mark and the others paying three or four dinars for it. This measure creates equal conditions for all economic protagonists in this field of operations and eliminates the possibility of collusion between the authorities and certain business entities.

The further elimination of arbitrariness and preferential treatment of one economic entity to another is contained in the liquidation of business banks' overdrafts. Not only would this measure put an end to "grey issues"; it would also end the privileged status of some banks, which can be financed in such a way and often fail to return the borrowed money, particularly if it is spent to ease social tensions.

The cancelling of export and import permits is an exemplary measure in line with the general commitment to abolish the preferential treatment of the chosen ones, in this case, of foreign trade firms and individuals. Easy and big profits made by those granted these permits enabled various kinds of corruption, abuse and manipulation.

Finally, there is the strong commitment to privatization, which has been interpreted as an indispensable and integral part of the whole Program.

In short, the implementation of all the above-mentioned and other anticipated measures would in essence mark the beginning of the economy's divorce from the state, which is probably one of the chief commitments and goals of most Yugoslav political parties.

It would thus be normal to expect of them not only to support the Program, but also to accept it as their own, explain it to the public and take part in its implementation.

In order to implement the Program, two conditions must be met. The first is to secure foreign financial support. The second is to carry out privatization relatively quickly and successfully. Privatization is also a prerequisite for introducing competition in the Yugoslav economy, which the Governor says is the key to a successful market economy. As regards foreign financing, the IMF's funds would be the most suitable to the character of the country's current needs, to initiate production and exports at a large scale.

Yugoslavia cannot expect its foreign trade to gain full momentum nor can it hope for major inflows of foreign capital until it regulates its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

As talks on its reintegration will be neither easy or fast, steps should be made to shorten and facilitate this process. Moreover, since the Program is based on measures and policies which are fully concurrent with the philosophies and policies the two institutions are promoting in their respective fields.

It is impossible to predict what kind of an arrangement might be made, but it is worth a try. The two institutions' interest would lie in Yugoslavia's speedier integration in their activities, which would both be in everyone's interest and useful from the perspective of the success of the peace process in the former Yugoslavia. Finally, it should be underscored that such an arrangement would involve the IMF and the WTO in the implementation of the Program, which would not only facilitate its accomplishment, but also prevent any deviations from the adopted measures and policy.