Accidental Opponents

The operation to remove Radovan Karadzic is underway. He was quiet after Dayton and was perhaps on the way to being forgotten or at least until the very end. Then he suddenly ran towards his fate.

He drew attention to himself by dismissing Prime Minister Kasagic who had gotten too close to Carl Bildt threatening to meet some of Milosevic's promises and bring the international community to the point of demanding Karadzic's disappearance.

Since the problem is considered too delicate for US and NATO troops, everyone turned to Milosevic who is hesitating, but no one believes that the issue is delicate for him also. He has proved many times that the more complex and sensitive the problem the more he is prone to use force. Also, the international community is inept and not conversant with local technology and keeps telling Milosevic that he is the best person to get rid of Karadzic since he put him where he is now. They keep reminding him that he promised to do that in Dayton.

The fact that Karadzic, as soon as he ousted Kasagic, said he was withdrawing doesn't seem to be enough. Everyone saw him and rumors that he is still firmly in control is spreading far and wide. It seemed, before everything happened, that he might remain RS president formally up to the elections and now everyone is demanding he step down.

Bildt is complaining that Karadzic is spoiling his operations aimed at bringing Bosnia back to a civilian state and organizing the elections, but more importantly Karadzic is a thorn in Clinton's side prior to the US presidential elections. Milosevic is expected to contribute to Clinton's election victory by creating even a semblance of stabilization in Bosnia.

The word semblance is important at this point. The fact that Belgrade and Pale are offering and promising that no one will ever hear of Karadzic again shows that everyone understands the rules of the game. Will Karadzic be forced to resign or not isn't clear right now and it's not important. He will certainly seem to disappear and what he'll get out of that situation is known to anyone who heard anything about Biljana Plavsic.

It seems the whole problem is Bildt's fault because he's the only one dealing with something real and running up against obstacles. If he hadn't persistently tried to get the Bosnian Serbs to cooperate through Kasagic, Karadzic would not have been forced to show up and spoil the semblance of a good situation. So now Belgrade, Pale and Washington have to set up a new semblance and someone might tell Bildt that he shouldn't take his job so seriously. Some people say this is a time of virtual reality and he should adopt that view of Bosnia.

The problem is that in virtual reality, in a world of semblance, the same rules apply as in the old, real world. Symbolic success is achieved in the same way and with the same difficulty as in the real world and failure takes the same toll. So new diplomatic efforts are needed because Milosevic will now ask for a semblance of support from the world to get rid of Karadzic.

The whole operation, whose outcome will become known soon, is not easy or painless for both Karadzic and Milosevic. No one knows better than they do how wrong it is for the world to think they are so different; viewing one as a war criminal and the other as a factor of peace and stability. Their dialogue, direct or through intermediaries, has to be devoid of anything human under the influence of that fake difference made in the outside world. Because of that Milosevic will have to pretend he has the right to demand Karadzic's withdrawal and Karadzic has to obey.

Luckily, they know each other well and they've had ample opportunity to find out what they can expect from each other. The fact that they are in a humiliating situation is natural to them and deserved many times over, but in this case Bosnia and the Dayton agreement, the great powers, America and Europe seem silly and defeated.

I'm beginning to understand some of the reasons why some cautious Western strategists opposed interference in the war from the start. This isn't about us, nor the fact that we deserve no foreign intervention and arbitration. On the contrary. The problem is that the West has gone too far in one direction to be able to deal with this case. They had and still have huge difficulty in understanding what's happening, creating a feeling for the situation and accepting this war as real.

To achieve that, to really be able to believe reports from Bosnia, they would have to disassemble their entire portrayal of the world and themselves. They haven't gone far enough in that despite TV, the press and all possible evidence that this outburst of violence can be solved realistically. This case remains slightly impossible for them, illogical and unpredictable in the narrow, fictitious repertoire of human behavior they live within peaceful well-ordered countries.

Because of that, reactions by diplomats and politicians were inappropriate and slow from the start. Even when they sent troops in it was because they secured a cease-fire on condition that all violence should stop. It's important to show an image of force and more important not to use it, i.e. not to let it spill over into reality. The West has to persistently try to act indirectly and symbolically through pressure, sanctions, promises which had some effect but some things had to be done for real.

If war criminals can't be expected to run to the Hague, if NATO can't be expected to arrest Karadzic and Mladic, then there's no other solution than to ask Milosevic to deal with the problem. In return, he will inevitably become the only, irreplaceable partner on the Serb side just as Tudjman did for the Croats. So to solve the war crisis they created, to restore an order that does not offend Western tastes, democratic countries will help keep their Families in power in Belgrade and Zagreb. In other words: democratic countries are asking tyrants to produce a democratic result.

Moreover, at least in the case of Karadzic, this is a man who would most probably win the Bosnian Serb elections and democratic countries are forced to limit the democratic choice to secure a democratic result. That paradox is true for all of Bosnia. Truly democratic forces can't win power democratically and the freer the elections the less hope for peace in Bosnia. If there is no readiness to postpone the elections until the people get their breath back, the best thing would be for IFOR troops to count the ballots with a nicely planned outcome just like after the previous war.