No Wedding and One Funeral

1. General Mladic was attending the funeral of a close brother-in-arms. Death of Bosnian Serb Army General Djordje Djukic's followed a serious illness and his release from Scheveningen, The Hague Tribunal prison. He had first been arrested by Bosnian Federation authorities under strange circumstances, charged with war crimes and finally, he was the first to be extradited to the Tribunal in this manner. Most of the local public believes General Djukic was actually "killed by The Hague". Milosevic could have hardly won support for Mladic's arrest from anyone in Serbia in such circumstances. He responded to Western diplomats who had protested against General Mladic's presence in Belgrade by explaining that "funerals are a very important matter for the Serbs". Even those in Serbia urging the Bosnian Serb Army commander's arrest would have probably condemned an arrest at the funeral and claimed Mladic simply should not have been allowed to enter the country.

2. Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic said Mladic's trip to Belgrade was "negligence on part of the state authorities" and underscored that "this should not prompt any major conclusions about Yugoslavia's stand on the international Tribunal". If Mladic is already slipping through the fingers of the IFOR troops deployed in Bosnia, why shouldn't he slip through the fingers of the Serbian police? The local state authorities, as IFOR, too, can only contemplate whether he wears a wig or dresses as a nun when passing the check points. Also, General Mladic telephones NATO officers, sends them faxes, regularly contacts commander of the IFOR ground troops Gen. Michael Walker on the phone, signs valid documents on the Bosnian Serb Army's relations with the international forces...

3. The question also arises who in Serbia would arrest General Mladic - the Interior Ministry or the Military Police. The latter would hardly agree to this (although it is within their authority) and they probably would not let the former do it either. Many Yugoslav Army members consider General Mladic not only a "war friend", but a symbol of their own dignity as well. A dissatisfied army, no matter how marginalised on the political stage, is definitely not an asset in an election year.

4. Where elections are in question, 93% in the Bosnian Serb Republic support Mladic and 83% Milosevic according to a recent public opinion poll conducted by the US International Affairs Agency (USIA). Were Mladic arrested, Milosevic would not stand a chance at the Bosnian elections scheduled for September. Not one Bosnian Serb opposition party would forgive him, including the Socialists. Ex-Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic, the most cooperative Bosnian Serb according to Western mediators, said not one nation extradited its leaders.

5. Taking risks and waiting for major events to shift the current balance of forces are the essence of Milosevic's policy. They are now reflected in his bet on Gennadi Zyuganov and his Communists at the Russian elections, as he had once hoped for a putsch against the last Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. It also explains his ante on the failure of the Moslem-Croat coalition, collapse of the West's single policy, etc.

All these are reasons why Milosevic did not arrest General Mladic. An additional reason, which many consider the most important one, is that Mladic could tell the Hague in detail how the war in Bosnia was waged and to what aim. Notwithstanding all agreements and accords, it is hard to believe the Tribunal could avoid raising charges against the Serbian President.

At the time this text was written, Belgrade-based independent news agency Beta quoted informal sources as saying Milosevic was meeting the Bosnian Serb leadership - Radovan Karadzic, General Ratko Mladic, Nikola Koljevic and acting Bosnian Serb Republic President Biljana Plavsic - in Belgrade. The reason for the meeting was for Karadzic to sign a statement that he was withdrawing from public life. It seems to be all Belgrade is offering for the Dayton-envisaged Bosnian elections. The international community is facing a "take it or leave it" option, i.e., if it believes General Mladic and Karadzic are the chief obstacle to the elections, it should order its own troops to arrest them. Somalia and the General Aidid incident show why IFOR is not involving itself in this task, for now at least.