Together Again

There is no doubt that the relations between the leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) Dr. Vojislav Seselj and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) are at their best since 1993. Caught at the electoral theft and exposed to the pressure of the local and international public as a consequence, the Socialists and JUL (Yugoslav United Left) members launched on December 24 of last year, through the mouth of the President of Serbia, the thesis that they might employ at the upcoming elections as well, that "Serbia shall not be guided by a foreign hand!", a replica of the slogan from 1992's "Serbia shall not bend". State media propaganda interpreted the civil rebellion with various phantasmagorics of international conspiracies. The children on the urban town streets naturally made fun of this propaganda, however that password was understood by both the proto-communists and the radical nationalists. Seselj, in a Mundhausen-like way, poured oil over fire in this very field. For example, he claimed that SRS "had proof" that psychological warfare specialists from America and Germany were managing the events in Serbia, that the students were invited to Washington to be drilled on their future conduct, that the student leaders have been bought, that the student protest is financed by a certain American spy which is exactly what certain retired security agents were also claiming in state newspaper feature stories etc. At the beginning of March in southern Backa, Seselj states that the U.S. is totally disinterested in the democratization of Serbia, and that America's only goal is to bring our country into a vassal position. The radicals represented "key witnesses" in government propaganda, the platitude that the members of the coalition Zajedno are "marching under foreign flags" was repeated through their mouths. The SRS leader is especially aiming blows at the new mayor of Belgrade against whom he is employing all means and is constantly repeating that he is a "thief appointed as mayor".

Practically, there is no regime campaign against Zajedno in which Seselj's radicals did not take part and where they were not loudest in passing on the favorite tune of state media propaganda against the liberated local radio and TV stations.

Not quite unsubstantiated speculations and unconfirmed rumors of direct meetings between Seselj and SPS top officials fortify the possibility that a formal decision has been made on SPS's new "national turning point" within this party's leadership. One of those speculations says that Dusan Matkovic, a top official and one of SPS's directors, met with Vojislav Seselj on March 3. Whether contacts exist or not, all seems to point towards a new establishment of a "patriotic bloc", and Seselj is endeavoring to become the spokesman and ideologist of the new isolationism.

To a large degree Seselj's rhetorics coincide with the thesis of Dr. Mirjana Markovic who had, as we remember, claimed that Serbia was the last country in Europe which wasn't a puppet. In radical terms Mrs. Markovic is no longer the "red witch from Dedinje". Those terms were used in 1994 when Seselj was arrested twice (once on account of having spat with the president of the citizens council in Bozovic) and when the radicals had held protest rallies every single week for eight months - in Belgrade, Kragujevac, Sabac, Cacak, Loznica, Valjevo, Borca, Novi Sad, Sremska Mitrovica, Leskovac...

Now Seselj is saying that he is no longer using harsh words against the ruling couple because the repression towards the Serbian Radical Party has lessened in comparison to the period between 1993 and 1996.

Seselj is denying his collaboration with the Socialist Party. He claims it's a lie, deception and a special war, that he has not met Slobodan Milosevic since September 1993. He repeats that he refused to enter the government in 1992 at the time when the radicals, even according to Seselj's admission, were on great terms with Slobodan Milosevic. Seselj stresses that there is no way he would enter the coalition government now with a party which he blames for having surrendered the Srpska Krajina and a third of the Serbian Republic. So what exactly does Seselj want? He wants to form an alliance with a stronger party to eliminate the third player from the game - the coalition Zajedno.

Even though he himself had attempted to organize street events, just as on other occasions when the regime was threatened or disgraced (1991, 1992 at the time of the St. Vid's day rally and in 1993, at the time when Vuk Draskovic was arrested and beaten) during the 96-97 civil protest he potrayed himself as a factor of order and discipline. Judging by public opinion research which had been conducted at the time of the protest (December 1996) by the Center for Political Research of the Institute of Social Sciences in Belgrade, Seselj was not in complete accordance with his voters - the radicals were somewhat more inclined to justify the civil protest (54 percent of them) than to condemn it (45 percent). Otherwise, as a group they are located right in the center between the leftists (96 percent of its voters condemn the protest) and the Zajedno voters (95 percent support the protest). The radicals were in a similar position over the issue of confidence in President Milosevic - half of them supported the demand for his resignation while the other half were against it. Therefore, after all the events, they are wavering whether to join the government or the opposition.

Endeavoring to send a message to his voters that once again he is the "admissible opposition", Seselj is trying to activate the old syndrome of dual loyalty amongst that wavering category ("not only for Milosevic but for both Milosevic and Seselj"). Acting as though he is the only one who knows what he wants, the Duke (a Chetnik title) is once again trying to present himself as someone who is announcing the future moves of the regime, who is uncovering enemies and is testifying against them and, most important of all, as the person who is first in line. When Milosevic signed the agreement on special relations with the Serbian Republic and when Biljana Plavsic, due to her personal reasons, refused to ratify that agreement, Seselj, regardless of his former closeness with her option, demanded her replacement. Plavsic's answer came back in a certain interview saying that Seselj was known to be a person with dictatorial inclinations.

On March 25, Vojislav Seselj sent hearty congratulations to the Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic upon Milo Djukanovic's resignation from the position of vice-president of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), stating how happy such news had made him.

In the previous period Seselj was internationally isolated mostly by the Serbian government, yet he still tried to play at diplomacy - he talked to a delegation of the Russian parliament which was headed by the leader of the alliance Power to the People Sergej Nikolajevic Baburin, complaining that the coalition Zajedno has support from the West which is trying to force the government in Belgrade to hand over concessions which would harm Serbian national interests.

At the height of the election crisis in Belgrade, he brought over Jean-Marie Le Penne, leader of the French National Front. In Pinki Sports Hall's conference room Seselj repeated in front of this model-guest that the radicals would not join the coalition Zajedno due to Djinjdic's close ties with Germany, because Draskovic cannot be a boss even in his own house, because they do not wish to be commanded by Danica Draskovic to throw bombs and take up guns, not to mention Vesna Pesic.

That visit was widely covered in state media. The difference between the official treatment of that party visit and the treatment, let's say, which Seselj's guest, the Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovski had in 1995, points towards this regime's interesting change of guard against the "nationalistic international". When, following that event, the French minister of foreign affairs refused to issue visas to Seselj and Nikolic who were invited to attend the convention of the French National Front, Seselj blamed the French government for continuing their anti-Serbian policies, and also proclaimed that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Hervet de Charet had met with the leaders of the coalition Zajedno due to his anti-Serbian orientation. All other international contacts of the coalition Zajedno were evaluated in the same manner by the Radicals, Socialists, JUL members and personnel in charge of state media propaganda.

Where can this collaboration of the Socialists and the Radicals lead?

The electoral body of SPS and SRS had, at the time of the 1992 elections, coincided in a large measure - it was then shown that the readiness to vote for SRS was expressed by 38 percent of SPS voters, while 39 percent of the Radicals regarded SPS as its reserve party. Following the conflict of the Radicals and the Socialists at the 1993 elections, the "Siamese twins" separated; only 7 percent of SPS voters named SRS as a party they would vote for, and the same was expressed by only 6 percent of the radical voters, as presented in Vladimir Goati's book The Stabilization of Democracy or a Return to Monism.

Some recent analysis, however, shows that now the percentage of eventual change of sides has increased and that around 15 percent of the Socialist's voters might vote for the Serbian Radical Party in case JUL starts dominating over SPS.

It seems as though the Socialists and the Radicals are finding voters amongst similar social classes. The latent radical ones have in the previous period (1993), according to Dragan Pantic from the Institute of Social Sciences, encompassed 38 percent of the population, radicalism was discerned in financially more modest classes, amongst those whose position has been socially threatened, people from the suburbs or those in transition from non-urban into urban environments, and in a large measure amongst qualified workers. No above average radicalism was discerned in the villages. The largest group amongst SRS voters are non-qualified and partially qualified workers (18 percent), followed by employees (16), qualified workers and highly-qualified workers (14 percent), unemployed (12), farmers (8), pensioners (8), experts (6), housewives (4), private businessmen (4)...

That radicalism actually presents a Belgrade and Vojvodina phenomenon was manifested by the election results in the autumn of 1996. Seselj's radicals appeared as the strongest party at the previous federal elections and have strengthened more than the other parties at the following electoral units: Sremska Mitrovica (where Seselj won 28 percent of the votes, and in 1993 22); Novi Sad (25:19); New Belgrade (SRS 26:14); Sombor (22:17); Prokuplje (22:14); Vrbas (21:18); Vozdovac (21:13); Cukarica (21:14); Sabac (20:14); Nis (20:16).

In most of the regions where Seselj was most successful, SPS stagnated, and in five had also increased the number of voters - in Smeredevo (they rose to 45 percent of the votes in comparison to the previous 37); New Belgrade (39:33); Vrsac (46:35); Vozdovac (38:29); Cukarica (47:32).

The allocation of Seselj's voters manifests a connection with deep crisis, the deepest being in large agglomerations where migration has arrived from far-away regions, with frustrations pertaining to the loss of Serbian ethnic regions which is shaking generations of the first and second colonizations which had taken the refugees in...

After the one million votes which he had won in 1992, with the direct help of the then war-mongering television, Seselj had, after he had stood up against Milosevic's turning point in Bosnia in 1993 and having sustained the media campaign, retained only around 60 percent of his previous votes (595.467). The campaign against him continued for another year however he survived only to have more than one hundred thousand new voters in 1996. This was due to the dissatisfaction on account of national defeat, the rise of the authoritarian syndrome in jeopardized suburban classes or, fortified with his new isolationism which emerged from the proto-communistic propaganda which had been, throughout last year, persecuting free media and announcing the existence of a special conspiracy.

Throughout the previous winter months many analysts delved into whether this or that coalition Zajedno leader has a mark on his back, whether he is a hidden or forgotten nationalist, whether the church is interfering with politics or not. During this time the Duke inaugurated himself in Zemun, he is strengthening his positions with the assistance of the regime and can only wait before the growing social crisis supplies him with more voters. The ruling circle is preparing to divide the terrain with him and to once again disable a consolidation of a democratic center in Serbia.