Throw a bone, then divide...

Even the most cursory look at political life in Serbia shows that with the nearing of the elections, the approach of the ruling coalition is becoming more organized and attacking, while the opposition is becoming (once again) more divided and helpless. Instead of citing evidence in support of this view, it is far more challenging to attempt to go into the ways and reasons behind the present, seemingly paradoxical phenomenon of the resuscitation and continuation of an unsuccessful government. It found itself, only a few months ago, in a final, defensive and losing position. Faced with strong opposition from within, and with strong international pressures, the government was forced to recognize the results of canceled local elections, and to accept the responsibility of guaranteeing democratic pre-election conditions for the coming parliamentary and presidential elections.

In such conditions, the refusal to accept responsibilities and the eventual unified boycott of the elections by the democratic opposition would present a very unpleasant political fact. Even if, despite the boycott, more than half of the electorate in Serbia were to show up at the ballot polls, a government won in such elections could hardly be described as legal and legitimate; in other words, it could not be stable.

On the other hand, equal and fair conditions for elections present too great a risk to every ineffectual, unsuccessful government in losing its position of authority. Should we add, in our specific political climate, the added risk of losing privileges acquired under irregular conditions by many of that government’s representatives?

OBSTRUCTION OF AGREEMENTS: The only possible way out is for election conditions to be arranged "somewhere between" the acceptable and the unacceptable, which would force at least a segment of the opposition, led by their partial calculations, to accept elections at the last moment. Of course, only to be defeated once again. Therefore, it is necessary to be tactical, to procrastinate, to appear ready for an agreement, to propagandize one’s own (un)acceptable demands, and at the same time, to obstruct every complete and binding agreement. In practice, this means avoiding binding decisions regarding complete conditions for elections, arrived at in an equal dialogue at a round table, while at the same time initiating discussions about specific questions (media coverage, finances, the election system) in which it must be insured that beside political cliques, there is a place for "scouting" members of particular opposition parties. The proven SPS tactic, which is once again being put to good use, is first to raise its own demands in the game, then to attempt to compensate concessions on one side (media) with gains on another (raising the number of election districts), and then, in the finishing stages, to offer a compromise which suits only a part of the opposition, or, as a last resort, to accept a generally accepted solution only when it can no longer yield concrete results. For instance, the matter of 50-70 election districts in the republican elections met with a nearly unanimous refusal by the opposition. The suggested 29 election districts — i.e. 7-12 representatives to a district — is already something which the "big" opposition parties are seriously calculating. Hypothetically, the ruling coalition’s concession of "only" 15-20 election districts would be interpreted as cooperation and proof of "readiness for dialogue", with further divisions in the opposition resulting. At the same time, it would be realized that the elections hurdle of 7-8% of votes continues to be a barrier for many "big" opposition players.

SELECTIVE CONCESSION: A similar effect, or more precisely the absence of any concrete effect, is achieved through an agreement on opening the media and government financing of election activities of parties, only a few months before the elections, and in the midst of the dead, summer season. Selective concessions to finance the campaigns of established, parliamentary parties will certainly cause further division in the opposition, beside the fact that no one will get any money in time from the already empty government funds.

The proven rule and order of moves — first irritate and/or discourage, then lure ("throw a bone") and divide, and then rule happily and (un)successfully — continues to prove successful. Why not spin the political humming top in front of the gullible (and divided) opposition which is learning so slowly the rules of a successful political tactic? In any case, the government has a spare option in the event that they lose the game this time. From experience they know that pre-election and post-election coalitions are not one and the same thing — namely, that even after elections, a majority can be had by luring (or buying) one of the election (quasi)competitors. The more there are who can be bought by crumbs of power, the better for the buyer, because the buying price is accordingly smaller. If a deal could be cut with Seselj and the radicals, and even with a few leaders from the "democratic" opposition, then with one shot, new democrats, overly ambitious members of JUL, and the inexperienced from one’s own ranks will be disciplined.

FUELING HOPES: Of course, the whole scenario is based on two solid suppositions — division in the opposition and a support of 20-25% of the electorate, that is to say at least of a third of the voters who come out to vote. The disillusioned supporters and the undecided voters are now clearly being recruited with suggestions of (staggered) reforms — with promises of 15,000-20,000 DM in shares, and the postponement of the question of surplus of the employed; that is to say, with the buying of civil peace.

The unfounded conviction that some of the money from the sale of PTT will be used to pay out unpaid pensions and salaries is also used for this purpose. Even if it does not happen, hopes have been fueled. According to this scenario, the thick-skinned opposition voters will only observe resignedly that "they’ve been had again", and will continue to hope that their leaders will come to their (political) senses at the last moment.

On another elections scene, that of presidential elections in Serbia, the situation with the Coalition SPS-JUL-ND is far more complicated, at least on first glance. After Milosevic, they do not have a convincing, undisputed candidate.

Whoever it will be from those mentioned thus far, they will be in his shadow and will owe loyalty to him. The only thing that can be done is to hold such a candidate out of sight for as long as possible, to appeal to one’s voters to support the "freely chosen candidate", and to look for mistakes in the competitors.

Realistically, the fact that the opposition does not have a dominant party, nor a leader with undisputed authority and charisma, nor can it guarantee coalition unity, are circumstances that lend themselves to full exploitation. The opposition, not including the Radicals, must "produce" its candidate through a complex procedure — through lengthy discussions, negotiations, guarantees and (self)limitations, which has not proven successful or possible within the present political scene.

What follows is the logical conclusion that in the event of an absence of unified support, the candidate(s) of the governing coalition will be destroyed in the first round, leaving voters with the very uncomfortable prospect of choosing between Seselj and a candidate of the governing coalition. It can be expected that in such a situation the majority of the opposition could unwillingly support the candidate of the Socialists, especially if, after the first round, Seselj has the best standing, especially given the likely international pressure that would be exerted by foreign allies.

CANDIDACY AND CONFUSION: Finally, on the federal scene, there is a suggestion that Milosevic be chosen in general elections that would soon follow, which would mean a change in the Constitution and a strengthening of the position of President. This caused complete confusion among all political players.

For nearly all political players in Montenegro, a change in the Constitution and direct elections of the President of SRY are unacceptable, because the position of Montenegro as an equal federal player is continually uncertain. The party most at odds is DPS, especially that part of it which openly denounces Milosevic. It is one thing to be against changing the Constitution, and something completely different to denounce the election of Milosevic according to existing procedures. The insistence on one and the other would certainly cause a coming apart in the cooperation of two ruling parties at the federal level, and would constitute an ultimate beginning of one party confusion and conflict, which is quite different from losing power. There is too much risk in the heightened possibility that Milosevic would be elected — albeit, according to existing procedures. That is certainly not without risks for him, as it puts him in a position of hostage, dependent on the relations within the ruling party in Montenegro. However, he has already resisted greater temptations. In Serbia, this suggestion caused further division in the opposition. The majority of the democratic opposition is against direct elections because they see in them the danger of a shift of real power with Milosevic to the federal level. In such a way, an ultimate win by the opposition would be discounted in the presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia.

The extent to which the local authorities, lost by the Socialists in elections, are being discounted and controlled is evidence enough and speaks eloquently of the extent to which the Socialists are ready to assume the position of the opposition. On the other hand, SPO thinks that in direct elections an opposition candidate supported by a majority of Montenegrin voters would win over Milosevic, which would relegate him to the political past of Serbia and the SR of Yugoslavia.

However, Milosevic should certainly not be discounted yet. For objective analysts, and even those who dislike him, he is still the politician whose tactical talent, and especially the ability to maneuver in tight situations make him an uncontested force on the present political scene. His strategic power and the effectiveness of his politics are an all together separate thing.

(The author teaches at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade)