Before The Election

The atmosphere in this republic is no less strained than it was at the time of the presidential elections last fall, nor than it was during the unsuccessful attempt in January by Slobodan Milosevic and former President of Montenegro, Momir Bulatovic, to prevent with violent demonstrations the inauguration of President Djukanovic.  On the contrary.  Deep political divisions still remain, there are calls to arms at Bulatovic’s pre-election rallies, and gasoline is being added to the fire by an initiative from Bulatovic’s People’s Socialist Party (SNP) to replace the federal government (which is being interpreted as an attempt to institute martial law in the country so that the holding of parliamentary elections in Montenegro could be prevented).  What could the elections bring?  As things stand now, “The Coalition for a Better Life — Milo Djukanovic” (including the Democratic Party of Socialists, the People’s Party and the Social-Democratic Party) has a 2.5 percent lead over Bulatovic’s SNP.  Even though a basic rule in politics is that the party in power enjoys a lead in the election, it appears that Bulatovic, who is going into this election only as a party president, has not lost many voters from the election when he ran as acting President of the Republic.  This fairly unusual political phenomenon can be explained by the stability of his electorate, by the fact that his party never did accept the regularity of the election in which Djukanovic won, and by efforts of Milosevic’s propaganda machine to continue to present him as the legitimate President of Montenegro — regardless of the fact that Bulatovic is no such thing.  Thus, DPS of Milica Pejanovic-Djurisic did not manage to attract Bulatovic’s supporters, which means that the balance of power is fairly even (just as it was at the time of the presidential election) and that there is small likelihood that any party could get an absolute majority in parliament and constitute a government on its own.  Had the Liberal Coalition of Montenegro — which can count on ten or so percent of the electorate — entered into an election coalition, the position of Djukanovic’s forces would be very different.  However, the Liberals of Slavko Perovic did not want to go into the election alone, and who they will join after the elections in probably the biggest unknown on the present political map of Montenegro.  Even though the Liberals are fighting for an independent Montenegro, while Bulatovic’s socialist compatriots are literally fighting for physical melting that republic into Milosevic’s Serbia, the leader of that party, Slavko Perovic, has mostly attacked Milo Djukanovic during the his campaign, despite that he had offered the latter support during the second round of the presidential elections.  Montenegrin analysts are mostly explaining this with Slavko Perovic’s vanity and his personal dislike for the charismatic Djukanovic.  Still the majority of interviewed analysts in Podgorica do not believe that Perovic will enter into an open coalition with Bulatovic, first, because “he could no longer appear in Cetinje”, the traditional stronghold of the liberals, and second, because “a pact with the devils” (Bulatovic and Milosevic) would ultimately mean the death of that party.  However, Slavko Perovic could blackmail Djukanovic after the elections for the position of premier, and at present it does not seem that Djukanovic would grant him that.  In that case it could easily happen that the new government could not be formed within the constitutional deadline of 60 days, which is what the Vice-President of the government, Miodrag Vukovic is predicting, and this would mean the dissolution of parliament and new parliamentary elections, with a prolongation of the political crisis in Montenegro.  However in DPS, they are calculating that the government could be constituted with the help of parties of national minorities (Muslims and Albanians) — if they enter parliament.  Still, it seems that all those calculations do not give Slobodan Milosevic enough confidence that he will be able to limit the influence of his biggest adversary at this moment — Milo Djukanovic.  Ever since the presidential elections in Montenegro, the fight against Djukanovic has been the top political priority for Milosevic, and in it he, and especially his wife, Ph.D. Mira Markovic, have not been particular about their weapons.  They used all weapons at their disposal.  Montenegro is economically sabotaged, politically ignored, and demonized in the media.  The ruling tandem has not done all that only to let Djukanovic consolidate his power after the parliamentary elections.  What is the Milosevic-Markovic duo planing next?  Before the inauguration of President Djukanovic on January 15, Milosevic attempted to get the federal government to institute martial law in that Republic.  This failed thanks to the President of the federal government, Radoje Kontic, who is now being replaced for this, and the Head of the Military Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army, General Momcilo Perisic, who now no longer enjoys Milosevic’s confidence.  Judging from all accounts, the President of FRY has not given up at all on a violent alternative for subjugating Montenegro, having had little success with any other option.  First, the Federal Defense Minister, Pavle Bulatovic, active member in Momir Bulatovic’s election campaign (and at the time of this writing, the most serious candidate for the new Kontic), in the past months has replaced all Heads of Territorial Defense in Montenegro.  In every one of the 21 communities of Montenegro he has appointed his own, politically reliable people for Heads of Territorial Departments of the Ministry of Defense.  Bulatovic has in his hands the list of all military personnel who were given weapons before the war in Bosnia, with the quantities of those weapons not being small at all.  It is quite clear how important this is, should Milosevic really decide to use the Army in Montenegro, except that all this is, of course, well known in Podgorica.  As far as the Army Headquarters are concerned, there is a conviction in the top political circles in Montenegro that General Perisic has been, for some time now, the biggest guarantee for stability in Yugoslavia.  However, as we are finding out from reliable sources, Milosevic is not talking at all with Perisic about the eventual use of the Army in this Republic.  He is glossing over him, and communicating directly with the reliable Commander of the Second Army (which covers Montenegro), General Bozidar Babic — the weekly Monitor in Podgorica writes, citing anonymous Army sources, and adding that during the eventful presidential elections in Montenegro, the heads of the Second Army completely aligned with Momir Bulatovic, that is to say Slobodan Milosevic.  It is claimed that the command of the Second Army used every official meeting of officers to issue the instruction “vote for the political option of Momir Bulatovic”, and that “after Bulatovic’s election defeat on January 14, a group of officers, headed by Babic, formed an operational headquarters which was off limits to those who had already expressed a different political opinion, that is to say those whose political loyalty could not be relied upon.”  All in all, this group of officers “did everything to include the Army in the resolution of the political crisis in Montenegro” during the January demonstrations in which around fifty police officers were injured, with only General Perisic to thank for avoiding the Army’s intervention on that occasion.  Thus, in January, it became clear that Milosevic was incapable of destroying Djukanovic without engaging a significant armed force.  If he manages to misuse the Army this time (if he cannot manage with Perisic’s consent, he will replace him easily), people in Podgorica who are in a position to know this best claim that Montenegro will defend itself.  How will it defend itself?  With the police.  Is the police force sufficiently strong?  It is said that its members are young people, many of whom have had experience on the battlefield, and that young people who are not in the police are with Djukanovic and are more than willing to take up arms in order to defend Montenegro from Milosevic.  What can the Army do with tanks in Montenegro, given the rugged terrain?  It can control Podgorica, but those we interviewed claim that not even this could last for long, given the mentioned motivation for taking up arms.  If the Army were to stand up in Milosevic’s name to destroy the legitimate President Djukanovic, they are certain in Podgorica that this would mean the end of the Yugoslav Army and of Yugoslavia itself.  This would probably be the end of Milosevic, but he is certainly fearing that his end is near, regardless of whether or not he prevents Djukanovic’s further strengthening.  Probably no one has forgotten that Milosevic has never held back from shedding blood.  If the ever weakening Milosevic were to decide on this step in Montenegro, here there is mention of rivers of blood, as well as of a vendetta being issued against Milosevic and his family.  What is worst in all this is that no one thinks this to be an incredible scenario, even though fears are sometimes formulated differently.  For instance, there is fear of the year 1918 being repeated, fear of a war between the “Green Heads” (who supported a federation with Serbia) and the “White Heads” (supporters of a unified state), fear of new kinds of guerrillas in the woods, fear of a new Committee Movement, of several thousand savage murders and burnt houses, all of which was Montenegrin reality between the years 1919 and 1926.  However, as far at the Yugoslav Army is concerned, there are several very concrete, worrisome indications.  Last weekend, on the border between Montenegro and Albania, the Army had broadened the border corridor (in which the Army controls all actions, including police ones) from the standard 200 meters, right up to 2.5 kilometers.  Montenegro was not consulted in this, and there are no apparent reasons for such a measure, given that the border is peaceful and the Liberation Army of Kosovo is not penetrating Yugoslavia from there.  Second, the Yugoslav Army has scheduled war games in Montenegro on June 6, several days after the elections.  In Podgorica it is supposed that Montenegro is more fertile ground for a massive armed conflict than Kosovo, where NATO is more resolved to intervene because of a very real possibility of an escalation into the rest of the region.  However, the conflict in Montenegro could easily become a sub-regional conflict, because it is assessed that in such an event, Sandzak could also raise up arms.  The Montenegrin and Serbian parts of Sandzak would fight with the objective of resolving the general status of this region, which could also draw the support of Alija Izetbegovic, who is indebted to the people of Sandzak from the war in Sarajevo, all of which means that Dayton would go to smithereens.  There is justified fear that the answer to the question — “Is it possible that Milosevic is ready to do all that?” — could quite possibly be positive.

Opinion Poll

One relevant research into Montenegrin public opinion, recently published in Podgorica, indicates that for the first time, less than half of the population of Montenegro considers FRY as “the best solution for Montenegro and Serbia.”  Still, there are analysts who think that the “boiling point” of anti-Yugoslav sentiment has not yet been reached, because what is at issue is resistance to Slobodan Milosevic, and not to the state unification between Serbia and Montenegro as such.  However, it is clear that a general anti-Yugoslav sentiment must follow, by definition, the growing resistance against Milosevic, while Milosevic himself is doing everything with his policies to strengthen such sentiments.  As far as politicians outside Montenegro are concerned, around 13 percent of citizens expressed confidence in Slobodan Milosevic, while 30 percent expressed distrust of the President of FRY.  It is indicated that the voter base of Djukanovic’s coalition is comprised mostly of young people between the ages of 18-30, with higher levels of education, of entrepreneurs, of citizens who declare their allegiance for Montenegro, and also of representatives of national minorities.  Older citizens and uneducated people will vote for Bulatovic’s Party, and no minorities.  It is interesting that researchers of public opinion, as well as others, assess that for the first time in Montenegrin history an anti-war generation has come of age.  As Miodrag Vukovic, Vice-President of the Government of Montenegro, put it: “Montenegro has left the time of gun fighting behind it.  Times have passed in which a Montenegrin will sooner go to war than to a wedding, in which a son did not remember his father because the father had died on the battlefield while he was still in his diapers.”  It is considered that this fact is clearly reflected on the Montenegrin political scene.