Between a Rock and a Hard Place

The pace of tragic events in Kosovo stepped up only a week after the “historic” peace treaty signed by Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic and US envoy Richard Holbrooke. The Yugoslav army and police troops are withdrawing in a hurry, but they have been given back-up and reinforcements at the same time. Diplomatic sources told Reuters and The New York Times that two battalions had been deployed in Kosovo last Monday. The action is believed to be the Serbian government’s response to the death of three police officers a few days earlier, as well as to the increasingly frequent KLA provocations. Fresh clashes hindered the distribution of humanitarian aid to an army of displaced persons. It’s still unclear how the international community will persuade the KLA to stop violating the ceasefire. It’s also unclear how NATO intends to provide security to the OSCE verifying mission or apply the rules of the road for the verifyers on the ground.

As the deadline for Milosevic to comply in full with the UN Resolution 1199 is getting closer, it’s getting ever so obvious that nothing has actually been resolved. However, it’s as clear as daylight that Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians will suffer the most, apart, of course, from the Kosovo Serbs who have been sacrificed on the alter of “lasting peace” long ago. The Bosnian formula didn’t work out here. The major powers pulled their big foot back in the last minute and independent Kosovo vanished in the thin air for the ethnic Albanians. Both their politicians and the population are now confused and frustrated, as only Ibrahim Rugova appears to be slightly composed in his static position. Ethnic Albanians in Pristina believe that he will sign whatever Holbrooke asks him to. This would-be signature is disputed by everyone, in the belief that “the people will not accept it”, but there is still no sign of another ethnic Albanian leader capable of taking their people to some other destination. Although they condemn Rugova unanimously, his many adversaries are all too weak to challenge him and too proud to join forces. The appeals to form a “National unity front” which would take over from Rugova are fruitless because such an institution can’t work effectively without a strong leader.

Rugova, on the other hand, has lost much of his reputation and credibility among the ethnic Albanians. His Democratic League of Kosovo (DSK) is merely a shadow of the party it once was, in terms of structure as well as finance. Some DSK factions “changed sides” to join Hidayet Hisseni and Rexep Qosja, some went to Adem Demaqi while a few ran off straight to the KLA. It’s hard to keep any kind of order, let alone political order, when ten percent of the population is on the run, taking refuge provided by friends or relatives. Hence Rugova’s future signature will be meaningless rather than illegitimate for many ethnic Albanians. The DSK is like a car whose transmission belt has gone to pieces. Rugova can steer and step on the gas pedal all he wants, for the car will move a yard or two only when Richard Holbrooke pushes it. Ethnic Albanian villages are deserted and ravaged after the Serb offensive, the population is always on the run and even the ancient vendetta rules are no longer valid. Local self-declared KLA commanders calling themselves after various predators (Tigers, Lions, Hawks, etc) relish and cherish situations such as the one we now have in Kosovo.

Anyone in command of 20 or so armed men can call himself a commander of a particular area, take tax and direct traffic. The situation in Kosovo bears a clear resemblance to the chaos in northern Albania now that the Serb troops have started withdrawing. That chaos is, in fact, the only effective result of actions that have been taken since March. A Reuters reporter quoted several desperate refugees and desperate self-declared KLA commanders as saying that they will fight to the last man standing. The reporter said that the self-declared commanders kept whispering something into his mobile phone while doing the interview. Our guess is that he was talking about the growing prices of flour and oil rather than “fighting the aggressor”. You don’t need an enemy with commanders like that.

A force with the ability to conquer Kosovo’s hills, disarm the gangs and bring law and order is nowhere in sight. Serbia is not allowed to any more, NATO won’t while the ethnic Albanians can’t do it alone. All this implies that he situation on the ground will keep getting worse in every respect, no matter what Milosevic and Holbrooke sign. The only difference is that the aggravating situation will now be monitored, or “verified” if you like, by NATO’s non-combat aircraft in the air and OSCE observers on the ground. The international community will thus be able to get a better look at what’s going on in Kosovo. No one will benefit from such a course of events, especially not the ordinary folk who can choose brutal Serbian repression or ethnic Albanian terrorism.

Serbia should be the last to take any pleasure from the chaos within enemy ranks. The Serbs who regard Kosovo as their country’s sacred land can’t possibly be overjoyed with the fact that this sacred land is beginnin to look like northern Albania. What is worse, the major powers will be keen to find the guilty party as the situation on the ground gets worse and Serbia is still the more obvious target than the disorganized and disjointed ethnic Albanians. The threat of a military intervention hasn’t been eliminated, it has merely been postponed for a later date. NATO has set foot in the Balkans in a big way and it remains perilously close to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. What ever it does in the future, Belgrade will have to watch its step very carefully from now on.

As long as the Serbs insist on their sovereignty in Kosovo, they must take the lion’s share of the responsibility for the situation in the province now matter how much of a nuisance the ethnic Albanians and the major powers are. The Kosovo conflict will be resolved only when it is taken and dealt with seriously or, in the worst case scenario, if Serbia gives up its sovereignty in the southern province.